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Abstract 
This thesis makes four different contributions to the literature on international finance 
and corporate governance. Firstly, it examines the forward exchange rate bias and the 
forward premium puzzle, using weekly and daily data from thirty-one developed and 
emerging economies during 1999-2010. The forward-spot relationship is analysed 
through both a time series and a panel construction. Secondly, it empirically 
investigates the relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure of 
interest rates, as proposed by Lim and Ogaki (e.g. Fama 1984; Lim and Ogaki 2004), 
using data from sixteen emerging economies during 1993-2011. Thirdly, it examines 
the impact of the term structure of the interest rates on security risk in G7 countries 
and it tests the stability of this relation during pre- and post-financial crisis periods. 
Fourthly, this dissertation explores the link between a director’s pay and corporate 
performance using a panel data set of FTSE 350 companies during 2004-2009. 
 
The empirical results demonstrate a robust cointegrating forward-spot relationship 
and support the forward rate unbiasedness with high frequency data; however, the 
forward premium puzzle remains in most sample economies. The term structure of 
interest rates plays an important role in exchange rate determination and the 
cointegrating relationship is stable despite the presence of a number of exchange rate 
regime changes for the emerging economies. In this study the short rate is considered 
as a proxy for economic uncertainty and the yield spread is considered as a proxy for 
business condition. The findings show statistically significant effects of the short rate 
and yield spread on the security risk for G7 economies, implying that interest rate 
policy may be important in reducing market volatility. Lastly, positive and significant 
relationships are identified between corporate performance and a directors’ pay in 
both levels and first difference regression specifications, and through both directions. 
However, this link has broken down since recent financial crisis. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and the Motivations for this Research 
 
Over the past twenty years the question of how to test the predictive power of forward 
exchange rates and the forecast ability of term structure of interest rates on future 
exchange rates in the exchange market has been of considerable interest to many 
people in academia, governments, and the financial industry. The forward rate is 
expected to forecast the future exchange rate in both levels and returns. Previous 
empirical studies have found with regard to the forward-spot relation in levels that 
there is consistent evidence showing that the forward rates are biasd in forecasting the 
corresponding future spot exchange rates. Moreover, for the same relation in returns, 
negative relations are often found in empricial research between the forward premium 
and the depreciation of the exchange rates. 
 
The efficient markets hypothesis plays an important role in understanding the 
forward-spot relation. It states that if the foreign exchange market is competitive and 
frictionless without taxes, transaction costs, or other costs, that the investors are 
rational and risk neutral, and all information is fairly available, then the expected 
returns will be zero, which means that no speculations will have taken place. Thus, 
under this efficient market hypothesis, the forward exchange rate should be an 
unbiased predictor of the corresponding future spot exchange rate because it contains 
all of the information about the expected future exchange rate, as Lin (1999), Lin et al. 
(2002), and others have pointed out. Frenkel (1976) examines this forward-spot 
relation through regression kttkt uFS   lnln   and obtains results with 
close to one. However, Tauchen (2001) demonstrates that this unbiased hypothesis is 
rejected much more emphatically recently than that in earlier works and suggests that 
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this might be because of the limitations in the econometric and statistical 
methodologies that were used in prior studies. It has been proved by previous research 
that the forward rate bias in the foreign exchange markets persists, especially in the 
1980s and the 1990s. Hence, it is interesting in this study to see if it is still present in 
the last two decades while the foreign market has become much more open. It is also 
interesting to analyse whether the improved econometric and statistical procedures 
could help to solve the bias in this forward-spot relation.  
 
The forward premium puzzle, on the other hand, refers to the negative relationship 
between the forward rate and the corresponding future exchange rate in returns. Fama 
(1984) shows that, although the forward rate seems to be a reasonable predictor of 
future spot exchange rate, it somehow fails to forecast the exchange rate returns. 
Engel (1996) supports Fama’s findings and points out that it has been difficult to 
reconcile the forward premium puzzle with economic theory. Numerous economic 
studies have paid attention to this puzzle and they have tried to explain it rationally. 
One of the famous interpretations for this empirical presence of the negative 
coefficient in forward-spot regression in returns is that there is a time-varying risk 
premium. Besides this most natural explanation, there are also some other alternative 
interpretations for this forward premium puzzle that takes into account of peso 
problems, irrational economic agents, segmented markets and trading frictions. 
However, as argued by Hodick (1987) and Engel (1996), none of these interpretations 
have been fully accepted. Therefore, the forward premium anomaly has become one 
of the most considerable unsolved puzzles in economics and it has prompted a 
number of studies, such as those of Macklem (1991), Backus et al. (1996) and Bekaert 
et al. (1997), that have constructed economic models to capture the characteristic of 
this empirically negative relation between forward rate and future exchange rate in 
returns. Some alternative studies view this puzzle mainly as a statistical phenomenon 
and they have also argued that the relative small sample size in the previous studies 
meant that they could not produce convincing conclusions. Hence, it is worthwhile in 
this study to figure out whether the forward rates continues to be a biased forecast of 
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the future spot rates in both levels and returns with a relatively large sample size, as 
well as with improved econometric methods and statistical procedures. 
 
Interest rate parity also introduces a relationship between exchange rate and interest 
rates in the domestic and foreign markets. Dornbusch (1976) suggests that a rise in the 
interest rate leads to domestic currency appreciation by developing a theory of 
exchange rate movements under perfect capital mobility. The relationship between 
exchange rate and interest rates has since been analysed in many studies. For example, 
Isard (1995) and many other studies show that the uncovered interest parity under risk 
neutrality is rejected with short-horizon data. However, Meredith and Chinn (1998) 
find the stylised fact that the forward premium anomaly seems not exist in 
long-horizon data. There are also many other empirical studies which show evidence 
that the uncovered interest parity holds much better in the long-run. For example, 
Edison and Pauls (1993) provide cointegration results suggesting that long-term 
interest rate differentials play a more important role than the short-term interest rate 
differentials in the real exchange rate determination, especially in the long-run. Hence, 
it is natural to analyse the impact of the term structure of interest rates in the exchange 
rate determination. Byeon and Ogaki (1999) use Canonical Cointegrating Regression 
(CCR) to study the relationship between exchange rate and the term structure of 
interest rates for several developed economies. Their study showed statistically 
significant but opposite effects of the short-term interest differential and the long-term 
interest rate differential on the real exchange rate.  
 
Lim and Ogaki (2004) later constructed an economic model that is consistent with the 
short-run and long-run stylised facts, and which helps to explain the forward premium 
anomaly. The idea behind their model is the concept of indirect complementarity due 
to the structure of interest risk under the assumption of risk aversion. Specifically, 
when the domestic short-term interest rate increases, investors with a short-term 
investment horizon holding long-term bonds suffer a capital loss. Meanwhile, 
investors with foreign bonds also face a capital loss as a result of domestic currency 
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appreciation. Hence, as long as the domestic currency appreciation is associated with 
an increase in the domestic short-term interest rate the investors will try to avoid 
holding both domestic long-term and foreign bonds, which makes these two assets 
strong substitutes. In addition, it is well known that domestic short-term and 
long-term bonds are also strong substitutes, and a substitute of a substitute is an 
indirect complement. Thus, the domestic short-term bonds and the foreign bond can 
be considered as indirect complements. In their research, Lim and Ogaki (2004) show 
that when the direct substitutability between the short-term bonds and the foreign 
bonds dominates the indirect complementarity then the relationship between the 
exchange rate and the interest rate differentials is consistent with conventional 
wisdom. However, if the indirect complementarity dominates the direct 
substitutability then this relationship will become at odds. Most emerging economies 
have changed their exchange rate regimes since the 1990s and, consequently, the 
behaviour of the interest rates might not be consistent. Therefore, the term structure of 
interest rates has become another main focus when analysing the determination of the 
exchange rate. Additionally, the empirical evidence is rather limited for emerging 
economies in this area; hence, it is interesting to examine the relationship between 
exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates, especially for emerging market. 
 
The term structure of interest rates is not only important in exchange rate 
determination but also plays a significant role in forecasting stock and bond returns. 
Campbell (1987) states that the term structure of interest rates predicts stock returns 
and shows the importance of the nominal interest rates uncertainty in pricing both 
short-term and long-term assets. Campbell and Shiller (1991a) find evidence to show 
that the long rate tends to fall and the short rate tends to rise when the yield spread 
between the long- and short-term interest rates is relatively high. Cochrane and 
Piazzesi (2005) demonstrates that a return-forecasting factor (i.e. a tent-shaped 
combination of forward rates) is countercyclical and could help to predict stock 
returns.  
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Standard asset pricing models state that the expected excess return on an asset can be 
expressed as the product of the asset’s systematic risk and the price of the risk in 
equilibrium. Fama and French (1989a) produce evidence to show that common 
components exist in the time variation of bond and stock expected returns. Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999) establish consumption based models using external habit 
information and suggest that the time variation in the expected excess returns on bond 
is partially explained by a time-varying aggregate price of risk. More recently, 
Wachter (2006) emphasises that there is a positive forecasting relation between the 
yield spread and future excess returns of bonds which is generated by the external 
habit preferences. Hence, it is natural to ask whether the bond risk is also 
time-varying and if this time variation can be interpreted by the short-term interest 
rates and yield spread. Viceira (2007b) provides a similar analysis on bond risk, but 
only for the US bond market. It is interesting to extend this study by investigating the 
relationship between bond risk and the nominal term structure of interest rates for 
other countries in the G7, as well as under panel construction. 
 
In order to measure the bond and stock risk the realised second moments of bond 
returns are taken into consideration; this measure has been used in various studies, 
such as those by Barsky (1989), Shiller and Beltratti (1992), and Campbell and 
Ammer (1993b). More recently, Anderson et al. (2003) point out that the use of 
realised volatility constructed from high-frequency intraday returns permits the use of 
traditional time series procedures for modelling and forecasting. Barndorff-Nielsen 
and Shephard (2004) theoretically discuss the foundation for the application of the 
realised second moments in modelling these dynamics. They have also empirically 
examined the relationship between the time variation in the second moments of bond 
returns and the time variation in the term structure of interest rates. Boyd et al. (2005) 
study the unconditional co-movement of bond and stock returns by looking at the 
realised covariance of bond returns with stock returns, as well as the realised bond 
CAPM beta, and they provide evidence that a business cycle component exists in the 
variation of the second moments of stock returns. This research project intends to 
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study how the term structure of interest rates forecasts the bond risk, which is 
measured as the realized covariance of bond returns with stock returns, as well as the 
bond CAPM beta, and it extends Viceira’s (2007b) work to G7 economies and 
econometrically improves it by applying panel construction into the analysis.  
 
Lastly, this study also examines the relationship between executive compensation and 
a firm’s performance because this is another hot research topic that currently attracts 
worldwide attention and media interest. For example, in the US a CNN Money report 
with the title “CEO pay: Sky high gets even higher” showed that the average pay ratio 
of CEO-to-worker leaps from year to year. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) point out 
that according to the research of Harvard University on pay of the top five executives 
across a large set of public companies the earnings of those executives amounted to 
approximately 10% of their companies’ earnings during 2001 to 2003, which was 
almost double of what was during the period of 1993 to 1995. In the U.K., the 
generous executive pay package and its increase has led to growing public anger in 
the past two decades. The average pay ratio of CEO-to-employee has increased from 
47-to-1 to 128-to-1 over a decade, whereas management guru Peter Drucker proposed 
that this ratio should be no larger than 20-to-1 in the U.K. However, in comparison to 
the U.S. empirical studies on directors’ remuneration and firm performance were 
rather limited in the U.K. until the 1990s, when several important reports were 
produced (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; and Hampel, 1998). All of these 
reports play an important part in the disclosure of directors’ remuneration, and since 
their publication, research on executive compensation has started to become easier 
and it has attracted considerable attention.  
 
Empirically, Conyon (1997) takes a sample of top director remuneration packages 
within 213 large U.K. companies, recorded from 1988 to 1993, in order to estimate 
the innovations of corporate governance, and finds a positive relationship between 
director remuneration and shareholder return. Conyon and Murphy (2000) investigate 
CEO pay and incentives for both U.S. and U.K. firms. Gregg et al. (2005) find an 
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asymmetric relationship between executive cash compensation and corporate 
performance with relatively high and low corporate returns, and suggest that overall 
there is weak relationship between pay and performance. Additionally, Ozkan (2007) 
uses a hand-collected data set of 390 non-financial companies and identified a 
significantly positive relation between corporate performance and CEO cash 
compensation; however, there was an insignificant relation for CEO total pay. 
Meanwhile, Girma et al. (2007) report that there is weak link between CEO 
compensation and performance for U.K. firms over the period 1981-1996. From these 
previous studies one could observe that the evidence relating directors’ remuneration 
and corporate performance in the U.K. is mixed. This is a motivation in this study to 
reconsider this pay-performance relationship for the large U.K. companies, where the 
focus will not only be on CEO pay but also on the pay of the highest paid director and 
of the total board. Meanwhile, it is also interesting to see if the firm’s performance, on 
the other hand, has a significant effect on determining the directors’ compensation 
packages.  
 
 
1.2. Objectives of this Study 
 
The context of this study is embedded in a large volume of literature analysing the 
exchange rates, term structure of interest rates, as well as security risk and corporate 
finance on executive compensation. This study contributes to the literature by 
conducting four empirical investigations. The more specific objectives of this study 
are as follows: 
i. To test the existence of both forward rate biasedness and forward premium 
puzzle in both developed and emerging markets. They are two of the most 
important anomalies in international finance and the empirical studies in this 
area were far from conclusive. 
ii. To examine the relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure 
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of interest rates for emerging economies. As previous studies focused mainly 
on developed economies, the evidence for emerging economies in this area 
was limited, especially for the last two decades during which many of the 
sample emerging economies had changed their exchange regimes.  
iii. To find out whether the bond and stock risk is time-varying and explained by 
the short-term interest rates and yield spread, which are the variables 
correlated with the time variation in bond and stock excess returns, 
respectively. Once these relationships are identified, it could help the monetary 
authority to control the volatilities of the security market through interest rate 
policies. 
iv. To analyse the effects of corporate performance on determining the directors’ 
remuneration and also to evaluate the impact of the directors’ pay on firm 
performance for large U.K. companies. This pay-performance relationship has 
attract considerable attention, expecially after the recent financial crisis when 
most of these large firms faced sharp decreases in their returns without the 
same significant changes taking place in their executives’ pay packages. Hence, 
it is important and interesting to identify the positive pay-performance 
relationship and to examine the differences in this relationship before and after 
the recent crisis. 
 
 
1.3. Outline and the Contributions of this Study 
 
This study includes four main empirical analyses, which are to be found in Chapters 2 
to 5. The organisation of this study, together with a brief description of the main 
contribution of each chapter, follows: 
 
Chapter 2 studies the relationship between forward rate and the corresponding future 
exchange rate in both levels and returns. The predictive power of forward exchange 
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rate has been one of the most considerable interests in international finance and 
economics. According to the efficient market hypothesis, as the forword rate contains 
relevant information about the expected future spot exchange rate, it should be an 
unbiased predictor of the corresponding future exchange rate. However, consistent 
empirical evidence has shown that not only the forward rate was biased in forecasting 
of the future exchange rate but also the forward premium was negatively correlated 
with the depreciation of the exchange rate. Since most of those empicial literatures 
were based on the information from 1980s and 1990s, it is interesting to see whether 
this is still the case in last decade when the foreign exchange market has become 
much more open and whether the improved econometric methodologies and statistic 
procedures could help to solve these puzzles. Chapter 2 improves the existing 
literature in several ways. Firstly, unlike previous works which test either for forward 
rate unbiasedness or forward premium anomaly, this study examines the forward-spot 
relation with regressions in both levels and returns using information from thirty-one 
economies. Secondly, most of the previous empirical wisdom regarding this relation is 
based on the evidence obtained from individual developed economy or a group of 
developed economies, such as the G7. Compared with developed economies, 
emerging economies have some different characteristics and they have been playing a 
more and more important role in the global currency market. Thus, in Chapter 2 the 
major emerging economies are included, and more individual developed economies 
are taken into account than that in previous studies. The evidence from an additional 
twenty individual emerging economies provides more valuable information in 
understanding the forward-spot relationship. Thirdly, it is usually argued that the 
existence of the forward premium puzzle might happen because of poor econometric 
and statistical techniques. In Chapter 2 a number of improved methodologies are 
applied to test for the forward-spot cointegration and to analyse the forward premium 
regressions. Lastly, the panel constructions are implemented respectively for the 
sample of the developed and emerging economies, which provides a more complete 
picture of forward rate unbiasedness and which gives additional evidence on the 
forward premium puzzle. 
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In Chapter 3, an empirical investigation on the relationship between the exchange rate 
and the term structure of interest rates is pursued for emerging markets. It focuses on 
emerging economies because they have significantly different characteristics 
compated to the developed economies and the empirical literature was rather limited. 
Meanwhile, many emerging coutries moved from their long-standing currency 
crawling pegs towards floating exchange rate regimes in the late 1990s, it is 
interesting to study this relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure 
of interest rates and check its consistency while the policy changes. Lim and Ogaki 
(2004) provide a theoretical model suggesting that the short term interest rate 
differential has an opposite effect from that of conventional wisdom when the indirect 
complementarity dominates the direct substitutability; however, their empirical 
evidence is mainly drawn from analyses of developed economies. Chapter 3 extends 
the previous literature by focusing on the effects of the three-month real interest rate 
differential and the normalised one-period interest rate differential on the real 
exchange rate in emerging economies. Moreover, the previous works have used 
different econometric techniques, mainly for time series analysis. In Chapter 3 a wide 
range of panel data techniques is applied to investigate this relation between the 
exchange rate and term structure of interest rates. Additionally, since most emerging 
economies abandoned their long-standing currency crawling pegs and adopted 
floating exchange rate regime in 1990s (especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
and the Russian financial crisis of 1998), the stability of this relationship is considered 
through a series of tests of structural breaks. 
 
Chapter 4 pays attention to the forecasting power of the term structure of interest rates 
in the bond and stock markets. It is important and interesting to investigate if the bond 
and stock market could be controlled through interest rate policy where the short rate 
proxies for economic uncertainty and the yield spread procies for business conditions. 
Various studies in the previous literature have focused on the relationship between 
bond and stock returns, and the term structure of interest rates. This study extends the 
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research in this area by examining whether the bond risk is also time-varying and 
whether this time variation can be also explained by the short-term interest rate and 
yield spread. Although Viceira (2007) provides a similar analysis on bond risk, it was 
only done for the US bond market. This current research project investigates the 
relationship between bond risk, measured as the realised second moments of bond 
returns, and the nominal term structure of interest rates for the US and other 
developed economies in the G7. Furthermore, it treats the G7 economies as a whole 
with analysis under panel construction. In addition, the effect of the recent financial 
crisis on the relation between time variation in bond risk and time variation in the 
term structure of interest rates is also examined in order to confirm the stability 
throughout the sample period.  
 
Chapter 5 aims to examine the relationship between the directors’ emolument and 
corporate performance for the largest companies in the U.K. The previous literature 
mainly focused on companies in the U.S., this chapter studies U.K. firms with the 
most recent data and most improved economectric approaches. A key contribution of 
his chapter is to evaluate the directors’ compensation for the CEO (both cash and total 
pay), the highest paid director, and the whole board of directors among FTSE 350 
firms for the sample period 2004-2009. Differently from the previous studies in this 
area, this chapter investigates this pay-performance relationship with the most recent 
data set for both CEO and highest paid director because they are not always the same 
person in a company. The second contribution is that the fixed effects method is 
implemented in the panel data estimation with inclusion of both white diagonal and 
cross-section SUR to control for the observation specific heteroskedasticity and 
cross-section correlation. Although the panel estimation with fixed effects has been 
applied in previous studies, few of them have taken into account the techniques to 
deal with heteroskedasticity and cross-section correlation in estimation. Furthermore, 
the bootstrapping methodology is applied in this chapter to check the robustness of 
the findings. In addition, this chapter also takes consideration of the latest financial 
crisis which began in mid-2007, and investigates its impacts on the corporate 
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pay-performance relationship, which is the third contribution of this chapter. 
 
The last chapter is the conclusion. It provides a synopsis as well as a discussion of the 
overall findings and implications of this research.  
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Chapter 2 Forward Exchange Bias and the Forward Premium 
Puzzle 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Of considerable interest in the past twenty years has been the test of the predictive 
power of forward exchange rates, in both levels and returns. For forward-spot relation 
in levels, consistent empirical evidence has shown that the forward rates are not 
unbiased forecasts of the corresponding future spot exchange rates in foreign currency 
markets even with very low trading costs. Meanwhile, for the same relation in returns, 
a negative relation between the forward premium and the depreciation of the 
exchange rates is often found in the empirical literature.  
 
The efficient markets hypothesis has played an important role in our understanding of 
the forward-spot relation. The efficient markets hypothesis states that if the foreign 
exchange market is competitive, frictionless (i.e. no taxes, transaction costs or other 
costs), with all information available and used rationally by the risk-neutral economic 
agents, then there will be no speculations because the expected returns will be zero 
(Hansen and Hodrick 1980). Hence, according to the efficient market hypothesis, the 
forward rate should be an unbiased predictor of the corresponding future spot 
exchange rate because it contains all of the relevant information about the expected 
future exchange rate (e.g. Lin 1999; Lin et al. 2002). In other words, if the two 
assumptions of rational expectation and risk neutrality are satisfied, then the forward 
rate should provide an unbiased forecast of the further spot exchange rate. Frenkel 
(1976) shows evidence that supports this hypothesis through regression 
kttkt uFS   lnln  , where S and F are spot and forward exchange rate, 
respectively, and k  in the subscripts represents the forward contract length. He finds 
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that   is close to one. However, Tauchen (2001) suggests that due to limitations in 
the econometric and statistical methodologies used in prior studies, the unbiasedness 
hypothesis is found to be rejected much more strongly recently than that in earlier 
studies.  
 
The forward premium puzzle refers to the negative relation between the return on 
nominal exchange rate and the forward premium, especially for data up until the early 
1990s (Baillie and Bollerslev 2000). One interpretation of the forward premium 
anomaly is that the forward rate is a biased predictor of the corresponding future spot 
rate. However, Fama (1984) shows that although the forward rate seems to be a 
reasonable predictor of further spot exchange rate, it somehow fails to forecast the 
exchange rate returns. Engel (1996) supports Fama’s findings and points out that it 
has been difficult to reconcile with the economic theory. Furthermore, Barnhart and 
Szakmary (1991), and Hai, Nelson and Wu (1997) point out that the forward rate 
unbiasedness regression has no information at the relation between exchange rate 
depreciation and forward premium, unless the future spot exchange rate and forward 
rate has an exact 1:1 cointegration relation. However, the assumption of exact 1:1 
cointegration relation has been rejected in numerous empirical works (Evans and 
Lewis (e.g. Evans and Lewis 1995; Luintel and Paudyal 1998; Phillips and McFarland 
1997). Maynard (2003) further shows that a very small deviation from 1:1 
cointegration can result in substantial bias.  
 
Another interpretation of the empirical presence of the negative slope coefficient in 
forward-spot regression in returns is that there is a time-varying risk premium. This is 
known as the most natural explanation that risk premium drives a wedge between 
expected changes and actual changes of exchange rates, and it results in a prediction 
with the wrong direction. However, modelling the risk premium is a real challenge. 
Engel (1999) models the risk with the covariance of consumption and exchange rate 
in a model with nominal rigidities. There are also some other alternative explanations 
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for the forward premium puzzle that take peso problems, irrational economic agents, 
segmented markets, and trading frictions into account. However, none of these 
interpretations has been fully accepted (Engel 1996; Hodrick 1987). 
 
Hence, the forward premium puzzle has prompted numerous studies related to the 
international asset pricing models, which take into account the effect of consumption 
risks on the forward prediction bias, to see if they can capture the characteristic of a 
negative relation when regressing the changes in spot rates on the lagged forward 
premium (Backus et al. 1996; Bekaert et al. 1997; Macklem 1991). Some other 
studies view this forward premium puzzle mainly as a statistical phenomenon simply 
due to the autocorrelation in the forward premium that is particularly persistent. A 
further problem is that the relatively small sample size used in the previous empirical 
literature does not in reality tell us that much.  
 
It is argued in previous research that the forward exchange rate bias in the foreign 
exchange markets has been persistent, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. However, 
the currency market has recently become much more open. Consequently, this current 
chapter is motivated to see if this bias is still present in the last decade. Baillie and 
Bollerslev (2000) and many other papers have pointed out that the so-called forward 
premium anomaly could be viewed as a statistical artefact from having small sample 
sizes and a lack of modern econometric methodologies. Consequently, this current 
chapter will aim to establish if the forward rates continue to be a biased forecast of the 
future spot rates, both in levels and in returns, by using samples with a large horizon 
and improved econometric methodologies and statistical procedures.  
 
In this chapter we improve the existing literature in several points. Firstly, unlike the 
prior literature which has tested either for forward rate biasedness or for forward 
premium anomaly, we will examine the forward-spot relation with regressions in both 
levels and returns. Secondly, a number of the previous empirical studies have 
analysed an individual developed economy or a group of developed economies, such 
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as the G7. Compared with the developed economies the emerging economies have 
some significantly different characteristics, such as higher average inflation, inflation 
volatility, and lower per capita income (Bansal and Dahlquist 2000). In addition, the 
emerging economies have been playing a more and more important role in the global 
currency market. In this chapter we will extend the literature by including emerging 
economies as well as the more individual developed economies that were the subject 
of the previous studies. We will report additional evidence obtained from twenty 
individual emerging economies, thereby enriching the analysis of the forward-spot 
relation. Thirdly, it is usually argued that the forward premium puzzle might be 
caused by the poor econometric and statistical methodologies which have been used 
in some of the previous studies. In this chapter, several improved econometric 
methodologies are applied to test for the forward-spot cointegration and to analyse the 
forward premium regression. We will apply both a Fully Modified OLS and a 
Dynamic OLS in a time series cointegration analysis, and we will use ARCH/GARCH 
methodologies to capture the risk premium. In addition, we will also extend the 
previous literature by using panel data for the samples of developed and emerging 
economies, respectively. The rolling coefficients are also documented in order to 
provide a complete picture of the forward-spot relationship.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief review of 
the key works of the previous literature, especially previous empirical studies. Section 
2.3 discusses some of the important econometric methodologies that have been 
applied in testing the forward-spot relationships. The data and the corresponding 
descriptive statistics are described in detail in Section 2.4. Meanwhile, Section 2.5 
presents the models of forward-spot relations, both in levels and returns. Empirical 
evidence is shown in Section 2.6 for both the forward rate bias and the forward 
premium anomaly with respect to individual countries as well as their panel. Finally, 
Section 2.7 concludes this chapter. 
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2.2. Literature Review 
 
The empirical literature regarding forward rate biasedness relates to the hypothesis of 
market efficiency. For example, Geweke and Feige (1979) present a joint test and 
suggest that due to the economic agent’s risk aversion and the existence of transaction 
costs, the foreign exchange markets are not efficient. In the 1980s and 1990s a 
number of studies focused on testing for the market efficiency hypothesis, and most of 
them failed to find supportive evidence. This failure was attributed to several factors, 
such as the existence of risk premium and its negative correlation with expected 
future spot rate, as well as the lack of appropriate econometric and statistical 
methodologies. These studies include, Fama (1984), Boothe and Longworth (1986), 
Hakkio and Rush (1989), Sephton and Larsen (1991), Liu and Maddala (1992).  
 
The forward rate bias puzzle describes a situation where the forward rate does not 
provide an unbiased forecast of the future spot rate. Numerous studies can be found to 
test for forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis; however, empirically the results from 
these studies are inconclusive and conflicting. The earlier studies, such as those of 
Cornell (1977) and Kohlhagen (1979), support the hypothesis of unbiasedness. 
However, most of the more recent studies reject this hypothesis, for example, Gregory 
and McCurdy (1984), Bakshi and Naka (1997), Lin (1999), Lin et al. (2002), 
Chernenko et al. (2004). Meanwhile, a number of others, such as Edwards (1982), 
Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), Lin and Chen (1998), report mixed results. There are 
some limitations in the literature. A number of studies in this area use only one sample 
period or one time horizon (e.g. one month), such as Barnhart and Szakmary (1991), 
Lin (1999). Also, many well-cited unbiasedness tests have misspecification issues (e.g. 
structure homogeneity) and some other arguments arise from the data non-stationarity. 
Soon after Geweke and McCurdy (1984) addressed the specification error, Chiang 
(1988) took a stochastic coefficient approach. Furthermore, Lin et al. (2002) 
introduced a variable mean response model transformed from a logarithmic change 
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specification, which is estimated by a four-step generalised least squares procedure. 
 
Additionally, several recent studies have also examined the presence of common 
stochastic trends between the forward rate and the corresponding future spot rate, but 
the empirical results are of conflicts as well. Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) reported the 
existence of a common trend between the forward and future spot exchange rates for 
seven currencies. However, Diebold et al. (1994) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1994) 
argue that the cointegrating relationships in a system of exchange rates are sensitive to 
a constant term from the cointegration space and when they included a constant term 
in the model they failed to find the unique cointegrating relationship. In brief, it is 
often contended that better econometric methodologies and statistical procedures can 
produce better results in this area. 
 
The forward premium puzzle is closely related to the phenomenon of forward rate 
bias. A great number of studies link this issue to uncovered interest parity in the sense 
that the expected currency depreciation is in terms of the domestic and foreign interest 
rates differential while the covered interest parity holds that capital is perfectly mobile 
in the foreign exchange market. For a given positive interest differential, higher 
negative correlations between exchange rate change and interest rate differential 
imply a higher expected excess return (Bansal and Dahlquist 2000). Froot and Frankel 
(1989) demonstrate that the variation of the forward premium depends on the 
expected exchange rate depreciation and, therefore, considerably different results 
would be obtained with survey-based measures of currency depreciation. Although 
Chinn and Frankel (2002) find some evidence of the presence of risk premium 
through examining seventeen different currencies, with a relative broader set of 
currencies it is difficult to reject the uncovered interest parity hypothesis.  
 
It is accepted that the most natural explanation for the existence of forward premium 
anomaly is that a risk premium drives a wedge between the expected and actual 
changes of the exchange rates. The empirical presence of the risk premium and how to 
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model it (both theoretically and empirically) has been widely discussed in recent 
literature in this area. For example, Hansen and Hodrick (1983) use a latent factor 
model of asset pricing under frictionless exchange market to rationalise the risk 
premium from investing in foreign currency deposits. Fama (1984) shows a negative 
relation between expected currency depreciation and interest rate differential, and 
suggests that it might be caused by the risk premium, which is more volatile than the 
expected currency depreciation.  Jagannathan and Wang (1996) apply a 
cross-sectional method and analyse it to see if the systematic risk can account for the 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the risk premia. Furthermore, Bansal and Dahlquist 
(2000) take into account some country specific attributes (such as per capital GNP, 
sovereign rating, inflation, and inflation volatility) and provide evidence that these 
attributes seem to be more important in explaining the cross-section of risk premia 
than the systematic risk. There are some other risk-based explanations relying on the 
presence of sticky prices in the general equilibrium models. For example, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Backus et al. (1996) illustrate that general 
equilibrium models with nominal price rigidities and corporation of participation 
constrains can explain why the forward premium points in the wrong direction for the 
ex post change of the exchange rate. Another example is Engel (1999), who suggests 
that the risk exists because of the covariation of consumption and exchange rates in 
the general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. Other rigidities have also been 
used to induce the risk premia in such models. For example, Alvarez et al. (2002) 
incorporate the “limited participation” of the agents who only enter into arbitrage 
when the benefits sufficiently exceed costs. More recently, Verdelhan (2006) and 
Moore and Roche (2006) apply external habit preferences with a combination of 
multiple costs and/or rigidities, and have provided a more fruitful model to explain the 
forward premium puzzle. 
 
In most previous studies it has been consistently argued that more improved 
econometric methodologies and better statistical procedures can play a considerably 
important role in solving the forward rate bias and forward premium anomaly. Chinn 
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and Meredith (2004) treat interest rates as endogenous variables in an economic sense 
to account for the divergence in the results reported by McCallum (1994) through 
both short and long-horizons. Villanueva (2005) illustrates this argument within an 
improved econometric framework but without clearly demonstrating if these 
approaches could interpret the presence of a negative relation between forward and 
corresponding future spot exchange rates. A number of other econometric issues have 
also been discussed in the literature. Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) provide evidence to 
show a nonlinear relationship between the change of spot rate and forward discount, 
and they argue that the forward discount is likely to point in the right direction of the 
change in spot exchange rate when it is relatively large in absolute value whereas the 
forward discount would point in the wrong direction when it is relatively small. 
Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) also suggest that the reason why the nonlinearity exists 
is because the transaction costs are smaller (or larger) compared to the potential gains. 
Meanwhile, Bansal and Dahoquist (2000) use a cubic drift to further examine the 
nonlinearity and state-dependence in the forward premium puzzle. In addition, 
Maynard (2003) implies that the negative relation between forward and corresponding 
future spot exchange rates cannot be entirely interpreted through time series analysis. 
 
According to the above discussions of the key literature in this area, the forward-spot 
relationships in both levels and returns are seen to be far from conclusive. Most of the 
previous studies have focused on the U.S. dollar against other currencies. In this 
chapter we will treat the U.K. as the demestic country instead in order to enrich the 
existing literature. Moreover, previous literature provided evidence on this 
relationship between the forward and future spot exchange rates mainly for developed 
economies and especially for 1980s and 1990s. However, the emerging economies 
have been grown very fast in last decade and the exchange market has become more 
open to those economies. This chapter uses more recent data to analyse if these 
puzzles are still present, for both developed and emerging economies for the last ten 
years. In addition, limitations in econometrics were found in previous research and it 
has been argued that the lack of the modern econometric techniques might be the 
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reason why these puzzles exist; hence this chapter also extends the existing literature 
with improved economic methodologies and statistical procedures. 
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2.3. Methodology 
 
It has been argued that improved econometric methodologies and statistical 
procedures could help to solve, or at least better explain the empirical puzzles in the 
forward-spot relationships. In this chapter we will analyse the forward rate 
unbiasedness and the forward premium anomaly with respect to both time series of 
individual countries and their panel. 
 
 
2.3.1. Time-Series Analysis 
2.3.1.1 Fully Modified OLS cointegration 
It is well known that lots of economic time series are different stationary, and a 
regression involving the levels of these I(1) series produces misleading results. 
Phillips (1986) argues that the Wald tests for coefficient significance spuriously show 
a significant relationship between unrelated series. There are a number of methods in 
the literature to address cointegration relationships. One of them is Engle and 
Granger’s (1987) two-step test, which is a single equation approach cointegration test 
that has been widely implemented to investigate, in particular, the bi-variate 
cointegration relationship. However, Hamilton (1994) shows that the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) based estimation of the cointegrating vector converges at a faster rate 
than is standard. Hamilton (1994) also shows that the OLS estimates have an 
asymptotic distribution that is generally non-Gaussian, exhibit asymptotic bias, and 
are a function of non-scalar nuisance parameters. Thus, a static OLS is not 
recommended because the conventional testing procedures are not valid unless it is 
substantially modified.  
 
Phillips and Hansen (1990) propose an estimator which employs a semi-parametric 
correction to eliminate the problems caused by the long run correlation between the 
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cointegrating equation and stochastic regressors innovations. To examine the 
cointegration relationship between  1~ IYt  and  1~ IX t , one could specify the 
following regression: 
(2.3.1)        ttt XY                               
The resulting Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator employs preliminary estimates 
of the symmetric and one-side long-run covariance matrices of the residuals. It is 
asymptotically unbiased and has fully efficient mixture normal asymptotics, allowing 
for standard Wald tests using asymptotic 
2 statistical inference. 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Dynamic OLS/GLS Cointegration 
In order to see how sensitive the results with different econometric methodologies are 
it is intended that the dynamic OLS/GLS (DOLS/DGLS) (Saikkonen 1991; Stock and 
Watson 1993) will also be applied as an alternative method of cointegration test. The 
dynamic OLS/GLS (DOLS/DGLS) is also a single equation estimator of cointegration 
relationship. Hence, similar to the Engle-Granger approach, this approach does not 
address the problem of multi-cointegration but it is improved in the sense that it can 
handle unbalanced regression when variables are of different orders of integration. 
Furthermore, the obtained standard errors from the cointegrating regression are valid 
for hypothesis testing through Wald statistics. Moreover, the DOLS/DGLS estimator 
of the cointegrating vector is found to be preferable to a range of other asymptotic 
estimator when the sample size is relatively shorter (Stock and Watson 1993). It is 
asymptotically equivalent to Johansen (1988) estimator of cointegration when 
variables in the system are I(1) and there is a single cointegrating vector (Arghyrou 
and Luintel 2007). The DOLS regression associated with tY and tX is given by: 
(2.3.2)        

 
k
kkt
tktktt uXXY
0,
 ,           
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Where tY and tX denote the corresponding variables respectively as specified under 
FMOLS framework and tu is a random error term. DGLS is required in order to 
control for residual autocorrelation. One can define the order of difference for the lead 
and lag terms based on the order of integration of the corresponding regressor (Stock 
and Watson 1993). For instance, if a regressor is I(2) then the lead and lag terms must 
be differenced twice (i.e.,  tx ). The lead and lag differences of the regressors in 
the DOLS estimator are used to control for any endogenous feedback and the 
nuisance parameters. There is no unique method to determine the order of lead and lag. 
Normally, the order of lead and lag is set according to the data frequency, thus, in this 
chapter we set a fourth order lead and lag for the weekly data set and a fifth order lead 
and lag for the daily data. 
 
A more general covariance estimator, which is proposed by Newey and West (1987), 
can be applied to control the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
of unknown form. The HAC coefficient covariance estimator can be written as: 
(2.3.3)            11 ˆˆ   XXTXXNW  
Where ˆ is any of the long-run covariance matrix (LRCOV). It can be used to 
calculate the HAC robust standard errors (Newey and West 1987), employed in unit 
root (Phillips and Perron 1988) and cointegration analysis (Phillips and Hansen 
1990b). Newey and West (1987) suggest a nonparametric kernel method to calculate 
systematic LRCOV with an automatic bandwidth selection methods for kernel 
estimators (Andrews 1991; Newey and West 1994).
1
 
 
 
                                                        
1
 Further details are provided in Appendix I at the end of this chapter. 
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2.3.1.3 ARCH/GARCH/TGARCH 
In econometrics, especially financial econometrics, AutoRegressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models (Engle 1982) are commonly applied to analyse 
observed financial time series because they are able to capture the stylised features of 
real world volatility. One major contribution of the ARCH approach is that it captures 
the time-varying volatility clustering (i.e. large changes are followed by future large 
changes and periods of small changes are followed by future small changes). If an 
AutoRegressive Moving Average Model (ARMA model) is assumed for the error 
variance, the model is a Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model (Bollerslev 1986). 
 
To model a time series with an ARCH process, one could define the error terms t in 
terms of a stochastic piece tz and a time-dependent standard deviation  such that: 
(2.3.4)        ttt z   
Where  1,0...~ Ndiizt . Thus, the series 
2
t in ARCH(q) model is: 
(2.3.5)        

 
q
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And the specification of GARCH(p, q) model is given by: 
(2.3.6) 
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Where p is the order of the GARCH terms 
2 and q refers as the order of the ARCH 
terms 
2 . 
 
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test can be used to test for ARCH effects, the test 
statistic is:  
(2.3.7)           qRqTLM 21
2 ~    
In order to detect the ARCH effects, models will be estimated in terms of mean and 
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variance simultaneously by the maximum likelihood estimator. 
 
The Threshold ARCH/GARCH (TARCH/TGARCH) model which was introduced by 
Zakoian (1994) is similar to GJR ARCH/GARCH (Glosten et al. 1993b) and it is used 
to model asymmetry in the ARCH process. In contrast to the standard ARCH and 
GARCH models which treat good news  01 t and bad news  01 t  
symmetrically, the specification of TGARCH model is given by: 
(2.3.8)        ttttt ed  
2
112
2
11             A R C HT       
(2.3.9)        tttttt ed   1
2
112
2
11        G A R C HT       
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Hence, the 2 is known as the symmetry as leverage terms. If 2 is positive and 
significant then that implies that ‘bad news’ increases the conditional variance 
(volatility). 
 
 
2.3.2. Panel Data Analysis 
2.3.2.1 Panel Unit Root Test 
In getting the full picture of the forward-spot cointegration relationship panel analysis 
is also provided, starting with the unit root tests. There are numerous convenient 
methods to test unit root under a panel framework, such as: the Fisher-type ADF tests 
(Breitung 2000; Im et al. 2003; Levin et al. 2002), the Fisher-PP tests (Choi 2001; 
Maddala and Wu 1999), and the LM tests (Hadri 2000). The panel unit root tests are 
simply multiple-series unit root tests that have been applied to panel data structures, 
but these tests are known to have higher power than the unit root tests based on 
individual time series and they have become more popular in recent literature.  
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The unit root test is made on the basis of whether or not there are restrictions on the 
autoregressive process across cross-sections or series. Consider the following AR(1) 
process for panel data: 
(2.3.10)        itiititiit Xyy   1  
Where itX represent the exogenous variables, including any fixed effects or 
individual trends; Ni ,...,2,1 describes cross-section units or series, and Tt ,...,2,1  
denotes the time periods; and it are those errors that are assumed to be mutually 
independent idiosyncratic disturbances. Hence, if 1i , then ity is said to be 
weakly (trend-) stationary. On the other hand, if 1i then ity contains a unit root. 
Some unit root tests assume that the coefficient i is constant across cross-sections 
(such as the Levin, Lin Chu (LLC), Breitung, and Hadri tests) while others allow i  
to vary freely for different i  (such as the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS), Fisher-ADF 
and Fisher-PP tests). The details of these tests are provided in Appendix III at the end 
of this chapter.  
 
The Table 2-1 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter summarises the basic 
characteristics of the panel unit root tests that are used in this chapter. 
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2.3.2.2 Panel Estimation with Fixed Effects 
Panel data sets combine time series and cross sections, and are commonly used in 
economics because they capture variations in the data and provide more powerful 
tests. The panel model with period and cross-section specific effects can be specified 
as: 
(2.3.11)        itittiit Xy    
Where 
i captures the specific effects that are variant across different cross-sections 
but constant across time, and 
t refers to time effects which are invariant across 
different sections. The fixed effects structure with cross-section SUR allows for the 
exploitation of the contemporaneous residuals across cross-sections which makes the 
estimates more efficient. More specifically, it can be shown as: 
(2.3.12)          ijtjtit XE  *  
(2.3.13)          0* tjtis XE   
For all i, j,s and t with ts  . The contemporaneous covariances do not vary over t.  
 
Using the period specific residual vectors, we may rewrite this assumption as: 
(2.3.14)          Mttt XE  *  
For all t, where, 
(2.3.15)        
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Therefore, the cross-section SUR which is weighted least squares on this specification 
(sometimes referred to as the Parks estimator) is simply the feasible GLS estimator 
for systems where the residuals are both cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and 
contemporaneously correlated. The residuals are employed from first stage estimates 
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to form an estimate of M , and then in the second stage a feasible GLS is performed. 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Panel Cointegration 
In recent literature, one of the extensive interests of panel data focuses on the 
cointegration tests. Similar to time series cointegration analysis, the most commonly 
used panel cointegration methods include the Engle-Granger (1987) based two-step 
tests (such as the Pedroni (1999), Pedroni (2004) and Kao (1999) tests) and the 
Fisher-type test using Johansen methodology (such as Maddala and Wu (1999)). The 
Engle-Granger (1987) two-steps cointegration test is based on an examination of the 
residuals of a spurious regression. Under the Engle-Granger framework it is assumed 
that the variables in the regression are all I(1), then if the residuals are I(0) the 
variables are cointegrated. Pedroni (1999), Pedroni (2004) and Kao (1999) extended 
the Engle-Granger construction to test for cointegrations involving panel data. 
Maddala and Wu (1999) use Fisher’s combined results from individual independent 
tests to propose an alternative approach to test for cointegration in the panel data. The 
panel cointegration details are provided in Appendix IV at the end of this chapter for 
Pedroni, Kao and Maddala and Wu, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, the dynamic OLS/GLS can also be applied to panel data constructions. 
Consider the following panel setting with fixed effects: 
(2.3.16)        

 
k
kkt
itkitikittiit uXXY
0,
     
In this case, similarly to the time series DOLS/DGLS, the order of difference for the 
lead and lag terms are specified according to the order of integration of itX , which is 
used to control for any endogenous feedback and the nuisance parameters. To be 
consistent with the corresponding time series cointegration analysis, in this chapter we 
will set the fourth and fifth order lead and lag for these weekly and daily panel data, 
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respectively. Newey and West’s (1987) HAC is also used to control the presence of 
both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form under the panel 
framework. 
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2.4. Data and Sample Countries 
 
Firstly, in this chapter we re-examines the relationship between ltF , and ltS   of 
Sterling in comparison with the currencies of most of the major developed economies 
as well as several emerging economies. The existing literature has mainly studied the 
U.S. dollar in comparison with other currencies. To extend this understanding, we 
focus on the pound Sterling instead of the U.S. Dollar. To be consistent with the 
previous analysis, the exchange rate is denoted as tS  at time t in this chapter, which is 
equal to the domestic currency, British pound, per unit of certain foreign currency.  
The FTSE group assigns the market status of countries as Developed, Advanced 
Emerging, and Secondary Emerging based on their economic size, wealth, and the 
quality, depth, and breadth of their markets. In this chapter the sample of developed 
economies comprises FTSE standard developed countries. For the sake of simplicity 
the countries of the European Union will be considered to be one economy. Therefore, 
this analysis consists of eleven economies, which are: Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, 
Switzerland and the United States. South Korea is excluded because of a data 
limitation. Meanwhile, the sample of emerging economies contains twenty countries 
from both FTSE Advanced and Secondary markets, which are: Brazil, Hungary, 
Mexico, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The most recent weekly and daily data are 
obtained from Datastream and the sample consists of observations from January 1
st
, 
1999 (when the European euro started to circulate) to November 3
rd
, 2010. The 
forward rates are one month forward rates directly obtained from Datastream, which 
are matched with corresponding future spot rates. For instance, the current forward 
rate is supposed to forecast the spot exchange rate four weeks ahead for weekly data. 
Bank holidays are excluded. The descriptive statistics and some univariate properties 
of weekly and daily data are documented in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3 in Appendix I at 
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the end of this chapter. 
 
The mean and standard deviations of the changes of spot and forward exchange rates 
are reported, respectively, for weekly as well as daily data sets. The standard 
deviations are relatively large even with daily frequency, indicating that the exchange 
markets are volatile across time. The results of the logarithms of both weekly and 
daily exchange rates which are based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are 
also reported in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3, respectively. This shows that all of the spot 
exchange rates are first difference stationary, or I(1). The corresponding weekly and 
daily forward rates also have qualitatively similar results of I(1). Thus, the logarithmic 
growth rates of the spot and forward rates are stationary, which is consistent with the 
results in the previous literature.  
 
The results of panel unit root tests are shown below in Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 in 
Appendix I at the end of this chapter for weekly and daily data, respectively. The 
results of the logarithms of panel weekly and daily spot and forward exchange rates 
which are based on different test methods show that all of the spot exchange rates are 
first difference stationary, or I(1). The corresponding forward rates also have 
qualitatively similar results of I(1). Note that the Hadri test has the null of stationarity, 
while others all have the null hypothesis of unit root. Consistent with the time series 
test results, the logarithmic growth rates of the spot and forward rates are stationary 
for both samples of developed economies and emerging economies. These panel unit 
root tests results of both weekly and daily exchange rates demonstrate the robustness 
of the corresponding results for time series analysis, which is also consistent with 
evidence shown in the previous studies.  
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2.5. Modelling Framework 
2.5.1. Forward Rate Unbiasedness 
 
Generally, the hypothesis of the unbiased forward rate is examined through estimation 
of the following equation: 
(2.5.1)        ltltlt FS    ,lnln   
Where ‘ln’ represents the natural logarithm. Under rational expectations, the 
unbiasedness of the forward rate for the future spot rate needs the intercept coefficient 
0  and the slope coefficient 1 , and at the meantime, lt to be a white-noise. 
 
The traditional OLS based estimates are not reliable unless the statistic regression 
forms a valid Engle-Grange cointegrating vector (Engle and Granger 1987). This 
happens because both the spot and the forward nominal exchange rates are first order 
integrated so that the regressions suffer from a non-standard distribution due to the 
non-stationary data. However, the Engle-Granger cointegrating vector is not reliable 
for traditional Wald type coefficient tests. Thus, to investigate the cointegration as 
well as the unbiasedness relationship between ltS  and ltF , , Equation (2.5.1) is 
estimated as an FMOLS cointegrating regression and the stationarity of cointegrating 
vector is tested for each single developed or emerging economy. Moreover, to find out 
whether ltF , is an unbiased predictor of ltS  , the restrictions of a zero intercept 
coefficient and a slope coefficient of unity are jointly tested with FMOLS 
cointegrating vector. The Dickey and Fuller (1979) critical values of unit root tests are 
suitable for testing the stationarity of FMOLS cointegrating vector and the Wald 
statistics is adopted to evaluate coefficient restrictions of unbiasedness.  
 
The DOLS is adopted as an alternative estimator of a cointegration relationship in 
order to address the sensitivity of the cointegrating relationship among econometric 
methodologies. Both Saikkonen (1992), and Stock and Watson (1993) have advocated 
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the DOLS approach to constructing an asymptotically efficient estimator which 
eliminates the feedback in the cointegrating system. This method involves 
augmenting the cointegrating regression with leads and lags of differenced regressor 
so that the resulting cointegrating equation error term is orthogonal to the entire 
history of the stochastic regressor innovations. Moreover, by applying DOLS with 
HAC (Newey-West) the corresponding standard errors are reliable to test the null 
hypotheses of unbiasedness through Wald statistics, which is 
2 distributed. In 
addition, the results from DOLS with HAC (Newey-West) proves the robustness of 
the cointegrating relationship between ltS  and ltF , . 
 
The DOLS model for testing the cointegration relationship between ltS  and ltF ,  is 
given by: 
(2.5.2)        

 
k
kkt
ltkltkltlt uFFS
0,
,, lnlnln        
In view of the data frequencies, in this chapter we will set fourth and fifth orders leads 
and lags for weekly and daily data, respectively. Moreover, to get robust cointegration 
estimation results a HAC (Newey-West) approach is applied to control for both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Under a panel estimation framework, the 
model can be specified as follows in order to control for the fix effects across time 
and sections: 
(2.5.3)        

 
k
kkt
ltikltikiltitilti uFFS
0,
,,,,,,, lnlnln      
 
 
2.5.2. The Forward Premium Puzzle 
 
The forward premium puzzle, which is closely related to the phenomenon of the 
forward rate biasness, suggests that the forward premium usually points in the wrong 
direction for the ex post movement in the spot exchange rate. In this section some new 
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evidence associated with this puzzle will be documented with the most recent data set. 
Firstly, the forward premium puzzle is analysed through various time-series 
regressions and the results are interpreted separately. Then, a panel data analysis is 
applied thereby providing a full picture of the forward-spot relationship in returns. 
Our results are not subject to small sample bias. 
 
The percentage change in the spot exchange rate is defined as  tlt SS lnln   and the 
corresponding forward premium is written as  tlt SF lnln ,   where ltF , is defined as 
the forward exchange rate. By adding and subtracting tlt SS lnln  from the forward 
premium and taking conditional expectations, one can easily observe that the forward 
premium can be simply expressed in terms of the expected depreciation in the 
exchange rate and the risk premium on the forward contract, which is: 
(2.5.4)        
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Where t  is defined as the information available at time t. Since the forward 
premium, the expected depreciation of the currency, and the forward risk premium are 
highly related one could easily restrict one of them given sufficient information of the 
other two counterparts. Thus, the expected currency depreciation is usually measured 
by regressing the change in spot exchange rate on the forward premium as follows: 
(2.5.5)          llttltlltlt SFSS ,, lnlnlnln     
Where llt , is an error term. l is the sampling frequency associated with the maturity 
time of the forward contract. For instance, for weekly data on one-month forward 
contract, then 4l . According to the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP), 0l
and 1l . Hence, this widely used regression is well-known in examining the 
forward premium puzzle and violations of UIP. The empirical regularity related to the 
forward premium anomaly is a concern because of the fact that l is invariably found 
not only to be significantly less than one but it is also often found to be negative, 
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especially for the 1980s (see, for example, Fama (1984), Hodrick and Srivastawa 
(1986), Baillie (1989), Engel (1996)). 
 
In order to further characterise the persistence of the forward premium puzzle, a 
state-dependent linear projection specified as below is taken into consideration in this 
chapter. This projection is firstly used in Bansal (1997) and then applied in Baillie and 
Bollerslev (2000). 
(2.5.6)            llttltltltlltlt SFSFSS ,,, lnlnlnlnlnln 

    
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The forward premium is split into two states, positive and negative,   tlt SF lnln ,
and   tlt SF lnln , , with an arbitrary zero forward premium. Furthermore, following 
Baillie and Bollerslev (2000), a cubic regression is also estimated in order to check 
for robustness by eliciting any state-dependence in this forward premium puzzle. The 
equation is specified as: 
(2.5.9)
      llttltltltltltlltlt SFSFSFSS ,
3
,
2
,, lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln     
There are several reasons for the presence of the forward premium puzzle, the most 
widely accepted explanation is that a time-varying risk premium exists which drives a 
wedge between the expected and actual exchange rates changes. There are different 
surveys provided in the literature to model the time-varying risk premium. Using the 
consumption based risk premium approach, Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) provide a 
model with the existence of a significant time-dependent risk premium (see Appendix 
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V for further detail): 
(2.5.10)            lttlttltt SFSSE ,, lnlnlnln      
 
As pointed out by Fama (1984), a negative slope coefficient in the forward premium 
regression indicates a negative sample covariance between expected currency 
appreciation and risk premium,    0lnln ,  lttltt SSECov  , as well as a high 
variability of the risk premium,     tlttlt SSEVarVar lnln,   . Hence, a reasonable 
explanation for an extraordinary forward premium anomaly is that either the size 
and/or volatility of the empirical risk premium are surprisingly large, or some 
fundamental deficiencies exist in the econometric analysis. In order to capture the 
effects of a time-dependent risk premium on the relation between currency 
depreciation and forward premium, a    qpGARCHqARCH ,/  model is specified in 
the following form: 
(2.5.11)          ttltltlltlt ehSFSS   lnlnlnln ,      
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It is well known that the exchange markets become more volatile when the news is 
bad than when the news is good. In contrast to the standard ARCH/GARCH models 
that treat good news  01 te  and bad news  01 te symmetrically, the 
TARCH/TGARCH models allow for the potential different effects of good and bad 
news (shocks) on conditional variance. 
(2.5.14)         
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Where,  
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If i is positive and significant then this implies that ‘bad news’ increases the 
conditional variance (volatility). 
 
In order to control for the bias arising from sampling with short horizon, the panel 
data series for the different categories (i.e. all, developed, emerging economies, 
respectively) are analysed. The panel model of Equation (2.5.5) with period and 
cross-sectional fixed effects is specified below: 
(2.5.16)          lltitiltitititilti SFSS ,,,,,,,, lnlnlnln      
Where i and t capture the fixed effects for cross-section and period, respectively. 
Cross-section SUR is used to control for possible heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the variance-covariance matrix to report robust coefficient estimates and 
standard errors. Similarly, Equations (2.5.6) and (2.5.9) are also estimated under panel 
framework. 
 
Additionally, the rolling regressions method is applied here to check for changes in 
the regression coefficients over time in order to assess the model’s stability. Many 
research projects have used this econometric procedure to estimate the same equation 
multiple times with either a growing sample or a partially overlapping sample. In this 
chapter, in order to assess the stability of the slope coefficient, we estimate the 
forward premium regression with a certain number of observations taken from the 
whole sample and keep reestimating the same regression using the same amount of 
obervations but with dropping the first observation and adding another following 
observation to the previous subsample until the last observation is included. More 
specifically, the two-year rolling regressions are estimated for the weekly data under 
panel framework. The first estimate is obtained using 104  11 obervations for 
developed economies, 10420 observations for emerging economies and 10431 
observations for the whole sample, respectively, beginning at the first week of January 
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1999 and running through to the last week in December 2000. Then, the next 
estimation uses data from the second week of January 1999 to the first week in 
January 2001. This proceeds until the final estimate is obtained by using data from the 
first week of November 2008 to the last week of October 2010. In addition, the rolling 
regression method is applied with the panel model of forward premium anomaly for 
daily data. Similarly, two-year rolling regressions are implemented for the daily data 
set with the first slope coefficient estimate obtained using 52111 obervations for 
developed economies, 52120 observations for emerging economies and 52131 
observations for the whole sample, respectively, beginning on the first working day in 
1999 to the last working day in 2001, then the second slope coefficient estimate is 
yield using observations from the second working day in 1999 to the first working day 
in 2002, which also includes 52111 obervations for developed economies, 52120 
observations for emerging economies and 52131 observations for the whole sample, 
respectively. It keeps rolling until the last estimate is obtained using the first working 
day in November 2008 to the last working day in October 2010. Thus the same 
amoumt of observations are included in every single regression estimation and a 
series of slope coefficient estimates (with two-year sample) are obtained for weekly 
and daily data, respectively.  
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2.6. Empirical Results 
2.6.1. Forward Rate Unbiasedness  
 
Equation (2.5.1) is estimated to analyse the cointegration relationship between ltS   
and ltF , through a FMOLS cointegrating regression. The unbiasedness hypothesis of 
zero intercept and slope coefficient of unity is also tested with a FMOLS 
cointegrating vector. The results obtained from analyses with weekly and daily data 
respectively are provided in Table 2-6 and Table 2-7 in Appendix I at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected in all cases according to the ADF 
tests on the FMOLS cointegrating residuals. This indicates that ltS  and ltF , are 
cointegrated. It can also be seen that the overwhelming majority of the estimated 
intercept and slope coefficients are very close to zero and unity, respectively. The 
results of the Wald coefficient restrictions tests are reported in the last columns in 
Table 2-6 and Table 2-7 for both weekly and daily data. At weekly frequency, the 
unbiasedness of joint zero intercept and slope of unity within the forward-spot relation 
is rejected for most economies, except for: Israel and Norway in the developed 
markets; and, Chile, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey in the emerging 
markets. Although the joint coefficient restrictions are rejected in most cases, sixteen 
out of thirty-one countries accept zero intercept as well as slope of unity under single 
coefficient restriction tests. In the analysis of the daily data, the results show that there 
is not enough evidence to comfortably reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness. The 
only exception here is Mexico, however, the joint hypothesis of zero intercept and 
slope of unity is only statistically rejected at the 10% level. Quite a few empirical 
works with results rejecting the unbiasedness can be found in previous literature as 
discussed earlier; however, very few of them have checked their results using daily 
frequency data. The capital mobility is low with daily frequency data and the results 
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in our study provide new evidence on the relationship between ltS   
and ltF , , 
indicating that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange 
rate in high frequency.  
 
In order to check the robustness of the findings to test methods, this cointegrating 
relationship between ltS  and ltF , is also analysed using DOLS. The DOLS estimator 
is asymptotically equivalent to Johansen’s (1988) ‘maximum-likelihood’ based 
estimator of cointegrating vectors when variables in the system are I(1) and there is a 
single cointegrating vector. HAC (Newey-West) is applied to control for both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the cointegration tests. The results are 
presented in Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter. 
 
The choice of a DOLS estimator associates with the first order integration and 
univariate properties of the data. The results of the ADF tests on the error correction 
terms indicate that the null hypothesis of non-cointegration between ltS  and tF  
is 
rejected at the 5% significance level across all pairs, which gives the same conclusion 
of cointegration as those suggested by the FMOLS cointegration test. The conclusion 
could be made that there is a significant and robust long-run relationship between the 
forward and future spot exchange rates. Most of the intercept coefficients are not 
statistically different from zero and all of the slope coefficients are positively signed 
as expected, they are statistically highly significant and close to unity. The fourth 
columns of Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 contain the Wald test statistics under the null 
hypothesis of a zero intercept. The null is statistically rejected for nineteen out of 
thirty-one economies at 5% level with weekly data, while it is only rejected for three 
countries at 5% level and four other countries at 10% level with daily data. The results 
of single restriction of slope of unity show similar patterns. The results of the more 
important test from the point of view of the unbiasedness hypothesis of both zero 
intercept and slope of unity are reported in the final columns of Table 2-8 and Table 
2-9 for weekly and daily data analysis, respectively. The joint hypothesis of 
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unbiasedness is rejected for most economies with weekly data (except for Norway, 
Chile, and Indonesia) at the 5% significance level. However, the rejection of the 
unbiasedness hypothesis can be found in only six economies at the 5% level and 
another three economies at the 10% level, with daily data frequency. Thus, we 
conclude that a robust cointegrating relation exists between ltS   
and tF , and, 
moreover, the biasedness of the forward rate might not be as bad as reported in the 
empirical literature with high frequency data where the null hypothesis of 
unbiasedness is hard to reject for most of these sample economies. The results imply 
that the forecasting ability of the forward exchange rate on the future spot exchange 
rate is stronger than we thought before with daily frequency data. 
 
Furthermore, the cointegration relation between spot and forward exchange rates is 
estimated under panel construction. The results of Pedroni and Kao cointegration tests 
are reported in Table 2-10 and Table 2-11 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter. In 
both tables the results reject the null of non-cointegrated panels, with weekly and 
daily samples, respectively. The results are similar for all sample economies, 
developed economies and emerging economies. This implies that the spot and forward 
exchange rates are cointegrated under panel construction and the robust long-run 
relationships between the forward and future spot exchange rates are present for both 
developed and emerging economies in last decade. In order to check the robustness of 
this panel cointegration relation and test for the unbiasedness hypothesis, the 
DOLS/DGLS panel cointegration test is also applied. The results obtained from 
DOLS/DGLS panel cointegration tests are reported in Table 2-12 and Table 2-13 in 
Appendix I at the end of this chapter. The findings of cointegration are found to be 
robust to test methods. 
 
The Levin, Lin and Chu panel unit root test on the panel cointegrating residuals 
rejects the null of the unit root in favor of stationarity. This implies that the spot and 
forward exchange rates are cointegrated in panel framework for the sample of all 
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economies, developed economies, and emerging economies and this long-run 
relationship is not sensitive among econometric approaches. These results are 
consistent with those from the Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration tests which were 
reported earlier. Thus, for both time series and panel data analyses, there is evidence 
of the existence of a cointegration relation between spot and forward exchange rates. 
The Wald test statistics and p-values are reported for each coefficient restrictions. The 
unbiasedness hypothesis is strongly rejected for all three subsamples, although the 
face values of the corresponding coefficients seem as such. Therefore, with the 
evidence obtained from both time series and panel data analyses, one can make a 
robust conclusion that there is a robust long-run relationship between the spot and 
forward exchange rates. Furthermore, the forward rate unbiasedness appears for quite 
a few currencies, especially with high frequency data, although it is rejected under 
panel data analysis.  
 
 
2.6.2. The Forward Premium Puzzle 
 
A negative slope coefficient is often found in the forward premium regression (2.5.5) 
and it is widely known as the forward premium anomaly, which indicates the presence 
of a large time-variation in the risk premium. If we define the expected depreciation 
of the domestic currency as td  and the forward risk premium as tp , then the 
forward premium is equal to tt pd  . Thus, the slope coefficient of regressing td  on 
 tt pd   is equal to    ttttt pdVarpddCov , . We take a part of the table from 
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) as Table 2-14 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter, 
which gives the implication for the slope coefficient in the forward premium 
regression. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the slope coefficient should be equal to unity 
when the uncovered interest rate parity holds. However, the unit slope coefficient is 
44 
 
rarely found in the empirical analysis. If the variance of the forward risk premium is 
greater than the variance of the currency depreciation, then a negative slope 
coefficient will be found in the forward premium regression, which is known as the 
forward premium puzzle and will be empirically examined in this study.  
 
Table 2-15 and Table 2-16 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter report the results of 
regressions specified in Equations (2.5.7), (2.5.8) and (2.5.11) and corresponding 
Wald test statistics of Equations (2.5.8) and (2.5.11), respectively, for every single 
currency in the sample. The HAC (Newey-West) covariance matrix is used in all 
regressions to control for any possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The 
evidence shows that the slope coefficient is much more likely to be negative for 
developed economies than emerging economies, which indicates that the forward 
premium puzzle is more often found in the developed coutries. More specifically, the 
analysis using weekly data shows that the forward premium puzzle is present in seven 
out of eleven developed countries, while it exists in half of the emerging economies in 
the sample. The results from the analysis using highly frequent daily data seem to be 
improved, in which case the slope coefficients for Hong Kong, Japan, United States, 
Brazil, Colombia, and United Arab Emirates become positive in regressions. 
Nevertheless, the time-series regression results suggest that the slope coefficient 
estimates are not significant for most cases because of the relatively large standard 
errors, and few of the coefficients are close to one taken at face value. Furthermore, 
taken into account of the discrete-state dummy, quite a few countries have their slope 
coefficients across the two states opposite in sign but two-thirds are insignificantly 
different from each other. These results are slightly different from the evidence 
provided by Bansal (1997), and Bansal and Dahlquist (2000). Moreover, the results 
from the cubic equation specification Equation (2.5.11) are reported in the last 
columns for time-series analysis with weekly and daily data, respectively. The 
non-linear terms are statistically significantly different from zero simultaneously for 
more than half of these economies. This implies that there are non-linear relations 
between the exchange rate changes and the forward premium in a few developed and 
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emerging markets. Since the standard time-series regression analysis cannot address 
the risk terms in understanding the phenomenon of the forward premium puzzle, we 
turn to implement the analysis using ARCH/GARCH/TGARCH models to capture the 
volatility clustering in the exchange markets.   
 
It is well known that the time series of financial variables often show volatility 
clustering. ARCH/GARCH models are useful in modelling changes in volatility over 
time. Taking the U.S. and India as representative developed and emerging economies, 
respectively, the plots of weekly exchange rate changes appear to be very volatile. It 
can be observed that large changes are followed by future large changes and periods 
of small changes are followed by future small changes (i.e. there is evidence of 
time-varying volatility as well as volatility clustering). 
 
Figure 2-1: Exchange rate changes and forward premium in the U.S. 
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Figure 2-2: Exchange rate changes and forward premium in India 
 
 
To identify the existence of ARCH effects, the Lagrange Multiplier test, which was 
proposed by Engle (1982), is used here and the results are reported in the second 
column in Table 2-17 and Table 2-18 for both weekly and daily data, respectively. 
Once the ARCH effects are identified, we will apply ARCH/GARCH/TGARCH 
models as specified in the previous section in order to re-estimate the relation between 
currency depreciation and the forward premium. The corresponding results are 
reported in Table 2-17 and Table 2-18 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter. 
 
The ARCH-LM test results show that the ARCH effects exist in standard relation 
between exchange rate changes and forward premium for all of the sample economies, 
either with weekly data or daily observations. Based on these test results, 
ARCH/GARCH models are applied further to re-examine this forward premium 
puzzle for every individual currency, respectively. The p-value of the Wald coefficient 
tests are reported in Table 2-17 and Table 2-18, following the slope coefficient 
estimates and corresponding standard deviations. The results show that the 
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which implies that the risk factor plays an important role in forecasting the future spot 
rate in the foreign market. Although the empirical forward premium puzzle cannot be 
solved by taking into account the risk factors, most of the slope coefficients are 
statistically significant in regressions controlling the time-varying risk premium. 
Thses results indicate that the risk premium should be taken into consideration when 
forcasting the future exchange rate using the forward exchange rate. However, the risk 
premium might not take the whole responsibility for the presence of the forward 
premium puzzle. Moreover, the TGARCH methodology is used to detect the 
difference in this relation in response to good and bad news. It turns out that quite a 
few economies (with p-value in the last columns less than 5%) perform significantly 
differently to bad news than to good news. However, the results from the regressions 
with weekly and daily data frequencies are not quite consistent with each other, more 
significant difference of the effect from good news and bad news appears with higher 
data frequency. Hence, we will next turn to run the standard forward premium 
regression under a panel framework, the results are shown in Table 2-19 and Table 
2-20 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter for weekly and daily data, respectively. 
 
In order to show a complete picture of the relationship between currency depreciation 
and forward premium an alternative focus should be given to the evidence obtained 
from using panel data series, which are reported in Table 2-19 and Table 2-20. The 
sample is split into two subsamples: one for the developed economies, and the other 
for the emerging economies. All of the developed economies have complete data from 
January 1999 to December 2010; except for Israel, which has data from March 2004 
to December 2010. However, for the emerging economies the data are not quite 
balanced. Twelve out twenty economies have complete data while among the 
remaining eight economies the shortest sample period is from March 2004 to 
December 2010.  
 
In the panel data analysis, the fixed effects (for both periods and cross-sections) are 
taken into account in the regression estimation. It can be seen that the slope 
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coefficient estimate is negative for each subsample with weekly data, but positive for 
all economies and emerging subsample with daily data. Moreover, Table 2-19 and 
Table 2-20 also present the panel estimation results from the discrete-state dummy 
regression. The slopes across the two regimes are opposite in sign in all cases with 
both weekly and daily data, and most of them are statistically significant. The Wald 
statistics for the equality of the slopes across two states is sharply rejected, except for 
the developed economies with weekly data. This is consistent with our time series 
analysis and the empirical results which are provided by Bansal (1997) and Bansal 
and Dahlquist (2000) that shows that the forward premium puzzle occurs when
  0lnln  exft . The last column documents the results from cubic regression 
specification. The evidence here shows non-lineararity in the relation between 
changes in forward and future spot exchange rates with both data frequencies.  
 
Additionally, a rolling regressions analysis is applied to check the stability of the 
slope coefficient estimate. The slope coefficient estimates from rolling regressions are 
coefficients obtained with shorter time spans iterated multiple times. Figure 2.3 
depicts the estimates of β from 514 2-year rolling panel regression of forward 
premium using weekly and daily data, respectively. The panel rolling regressions are 
estimated for the developed economies, the emerging economies, and the whole 
sample. Within each subsample, the first estimate is obtained using 104  11 
obervations for developed economies, 10420 observations for emerging economies 
and 10431 observations for the whole sample, respectively; beginning at the first 
week of January 1999 and running through to the last week in December 2000. Then 
the next estimation uses data from the second week of January 1999 and runs to the 
first week of January 2001. The final estimate is obtained by using data from the first 
week of November 2008 and which runs to the last week of October 2010. In addition, 
the rolling procedure is implemented with daily data, but with each single slope 
coefficient estimate obtained using 52111 obervations for developed economies, 
52120 observations for emerging economies and 52131 observations for the 
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whole sample, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 2-3: Slope coefficients from rolling regressions 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Slope coefficients from rolling regressions 
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obtained with shorter time span and more recent observations. The forward premium 
puzzle with a negative slope coefficient occurs only in the middle of the first decade 
of the twenty-first century for the emerging economies, while the sequence of 
estimated   for the developed economies varies considerably over the sample 
period. Compared with the emerging economies, the slope coefficient from the 
forward premium regression for the developed economies exhibits more substantial 
variation. However, it is worth noticing that many of the more recent slopes are 
actually positive for both developed and emerging economies, implying that the 
forward premium has played a better role in forecasting the future currency 
depreciation in emerging economies compared with their counterparts and this 
forecasting ability improved in recent years. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have reconsidered two important anomalies in international finance 
and economics, which are the forward rate biasedness and forward premium puzzle. 
The forward rate biasedness is the rejection of the joint hypothesis of zero intercept 
and slope of unity in regressions of logarithm of spot exchange rate of forward 
exchange rate. The forward premium puzzle describes the negative slope coefficients 
which have invariably been reported in the regressions of the changes in the logarithm 
of the spot rate on the forward premium throughout the literature. However, it has 
been suggested that both the forward rate biasedness and the forward premium puzzle 
could be resolved by using better econometric methods and statistical procedures. In 
this chapter we have adopted FMOLS and DOLS methodologies to analyse time 
series cointegrating forward-spot relation and GARCH group methods to examine the 
forward-spot relation in returns. Furthermore, because Maynard (2003) pointed out 
that the negative coefficient in forward premium regression cannot be fully explained 
using time series characteristics of the variables we have incorporated panel data 
constructions in our empirical study.  
 
Unlike the prior literature which has tested either for forward rate unbiasedness or 
forward premium puzzle, in this chapter we examine this forward-spot relation with 
regressions in both levels and returns using information from thirty-one developed 
and emerging economies. The empirical results from the regressions in levels 
demonstrate a robust long-run relationship between the forward and corresponding 
future spot exchange rates, which is consistent with previous literature. This chapter 
extends those literatures by confirming the robustness of this forward-spot 
cointegration relationship through different cointegration tests, and by using data in 
both weekly and daily frequencies. The forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis is also 
examined for individual economies with time series, as well as their panels. The joint 
hypothesis of zero intercept and slope of unity is not rejected in time series analysis 
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for most economies with daily frquecy data. This result indicates that the forward rate 
has been an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate in most developed and 
emerging economies over last decade and it is not sensitive to econometric 
approaches. This is one of the main interesting findings and contributions in this 
chapter. However, this unbiasedness forward-spot relation could not be identified with 
panel data of the developed and emerging groups.  
 
Much of the previous empirical wisdom regarding the forward-spot relationship is 
based on evidence obtained from an individual developed economy or a group of 
developed economies, such as the G7. Compared with developed economies, 
emerging economies have a number of different characteristics and they play a much 
more important role in the exchange market. Hence, in this chapter we have extended 
the previous literature by paying more attention to the emerging economies and found 
that the forward premium anomaly is not a pervasive phenomenon: it seems to occur 
more often in developed economies. We have also adopted GARCH type models to 
capture the volatility clustering in the exchange rate, which might help to address the 
risk premium in the forward-spot relationship in returns. The results show the 
presence of significant ARCH/GARTH effects while regressing the currency 
depreciation on the corresponding forward premium. Although this does not solve the 
forward premium anomaly, the slope coefficients estimated in regressions of the 
changes in the logarithm of the spot rate on the forward premium become more 
statistically significant controls for the risk factors. It suggests that the risk factor 
should be taken into consideration when forecasting the future spot exchange rate 
with the corresponding forward exchange rate. The standard forward premium 
regressions are estimated for each individual economy with both time series and their 
panels to achieve a complete picture and fully understand this forward-spot 
relationship which has rarely found in previous studies. The rolling slope coefficients 
within panel framework are also provided for developed and emerging economies. 
The results show that with shorter samples the standard forward premium regression 
specifications generate slope coefficient estimates that are widely dispersed, 
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especially for the developed economies, and many of the slopes estimated using more 
recent data are actually positive, with some of them significantly greater than one for 
both developed and emerging economies.  
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Appendix I 
 
Table 2-1: Summary of panel unit root (UR) tests 
Test Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative Hypothesis Possible 
Deterministic 
Component 
Autocorrelation 
Correction Method 
Levin, Lin and 
Chu 
Unit Root No Unit Root None, F, T Lags 
Breitung Unit Root No Unit Root None, F, T Lags 
IPS Unit Root Some cross-sections 
without UR 
F, T Lags 
Fisher-ADF Unit Root Some cross-sections 
without UR 
None, F, T Lags 
Fisher-PP Unit Root Some cross-sections 
without UR 
None, F, T Kernel 
Hadri No Unit 
Root 
Unit Root F, T Kernel 
None – no exogenous variables; F – fixed effect; T – individual effect and individual trend. 
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Table 2-2: Descriptive statistics and the stationarity of weekly exchange rates 
Currency Spot rates   Forward rates   
 Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF 
level 
Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF 
level 
AUD 0.00082 0.01558 -25.8460*** -0.05039 0.00081 0.01556 -25.9083*** -0.06223 
CAD 0.00072 0.01411 -24.3704*** -0.87331 0.00071 0.01409 -24.4069*** -0.88009 
EUR 0.00033 0.1056 -22.5145*** -0.31087 0.00033 0.01056 -22.5229*** -0.32151 
HKD 0.00007 0.01330 -25.1049*** -1.43697 0.00007 0.01327 -25.0601*** -1.44094 
ILS 0.00105 0.01512 -20.0549*** -0.51479 0.00105 0.01509 -20.0309*** -0.51786 
JPY 0.00058 0.01805 -25.8857*** -0.54247 0.00058 0.01804 -25.9081*** -0.56059 
NZD 0.00061 0.01648 -25.6585*** -0.86495 0.00060 0.01647 -25.6822*** -0.86633 
NOK 0.00454 0.01262 -24.3774*** -0.80176 0.00045 0.01262 -24.4474*** -0.81291 
SGD 0.00048 0.01155 -25.2520*** -0.12929 0.00047 0.01152 -25.2071*** -0.13918 
CHF 0.00060 0.01268 -24.3015*** 0.20033 0.00060 0.01267 -24.2811*** 0.18747 
USD 0.00007 0.01343 -25.0722*** -1.4572 0.00007 0.01341 -25.0127*** -1.45863 
BRL 0.00197 0.02099 -17.4941*** -1.0706 0.00195 0.02096 -17.3849*** -1.01157 
HUF 0.00018 0.01598 -25.0040*** -1.67731 0.00019 0.01599 -25.0167*** -1.66703 
MXP -0.00031 0.01678 -25.1972*** -1.20697 -0.00028 0.01693 -25.0485*** -1.21691 
PLZ 0.00062 0.01651 -22.0279*** -0.85593 0.00063 0.01655 -22.1216*** -0.86910 
ZAR -0.00023 0.02209 -25.3813*** -2.21464 -0.00022 0.02214 -25.4437*** 2.19779 
TWD 0.00015 0.01238 -25.0622*** -1.23696 0.00014 0.01244 -24.7943*** -1.26754 
CLP 0.00112 0.01796 -17.1867*** -1.26949 0.00111 0.01799 -17.1542*** -1.27672 
CNY 0.00025 0.014154 -21.2238*** -0.59377 0.00025 0.01396 -21.1483*** -0.58753 
COP 0.00151 0.02184 -18.3817*** -1.10935 0.001513 0.021954 -18.3721*** -1.10933 
CZK 0.00090 0.01340 -22.8396*** 0.33722 0.000901 0.013402 -22.9051*** 0.32448 
INR -0.000002 0.01264 -23.8382*** -1.90434 -0.000008 0.012652 -23.8278*** -1.94129 
IDR -0.00013 0.02153 -12.2713*** -2.09485 -0.00010 0.01868 -22.9245*** -1.83829 
MYR 0.00098 0.01516 -24.9005*** -2.48227 0.00978 0.01513 -24.9051*** -2.51392 
MAD 0.00072 0.01047 -17.2163*** -0.61756 0.00071 0.01042 -17.2439*** -0.62326 
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Currency Spot rates   Forward rates   
 Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF 
level 
Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF 
level 
PKR -0.00076 0.01656 -19.9044*** -1.62318 -0.00079 0.01655 -19.8670*** -1.59147 
PHP -0.00014 0.01490 -25.2712*** -1.45671 -0.00013 0.01503 -25.3331*** -1.44971 
RUR 0.00022 0.01326 -17.3499*** -2.24166 0.00021 0.01298 -18.2286*** -2.34073 
THB 0.00038 0.01416 -26.6564*** -0.48110 0.00037 0.01418 -26.5248*** -0.49112 
TRL -0.00237 0.02577 -23.7101*** -3.86667 -0.00228 0.03716 -24.2710*** -2.75705 
AED 0.00007 0.01342 -25.0725*** -1.45702 0.000068 0.01335 -24.9764*** -1.45694 
Variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Changes refer to the first difference of natural logarithms of 
exchange rates. * indicates significance at 10% (or better), ** represents significance at 5% (or better), and *** 
denotes significance at 1% level (or better). Currencies included in the sample are Australian Dollar (AUD), 
Canadian Dollar (CAD), Euro (EUR), Hong Kong Dollar (HKD), Israeli New Shekel (ILS), Japanese Yen (JPY), 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD), Norwegian Krone (NOK), Singapore Dollar (SGD), Swiss Franc (CHF), US Dollar 
(USD), Brazil Real (BRL), Hungarian Forint (HUF), Mexico Peso (MXP), Polish Zloty (PLZ), South African 
Rand (ZAR), New Taiwan Dollar (TWD), Chile Peso (CLP), Chinese Yuan (CNY), Colombia Peso (COP), Czech 
Koruna (CZK), Indian Rupee (INR), Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), Morocco Dirham 
(MAD), Pakistan Rupee (PKR), Philippine Peso (PHP), Russian Ruble (RUR), Thailand Baht (THB), Turkish 
Lira (TRL) and United Arab Emirates Dirham (AED). 
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Table 2-3: Descriptive statistics and the stationarity of daily exchange rates 
 Spot rates   Forward rates   
 Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF level Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF level 
AUD 0.00017 0.00745 -55.9191*** -0.30985 0.00017 0.00745 -55.9240*** -0.30985 
CAD 0.00015 0.00641 -54.7534*** -0.97512 0.00015 0.00641 -54.7961*** -0.97512 
EUR 6.8E-05 0.00502 -53.1951*** -0.44617 6.8E-05 0.00502 -53.1753*** -0.44617 
HKD 1.1E-05 0.00597 -52.6777*** -1.54708 1.1E-05 0.00596 -52.7351*** -1.54708 
ILS 0.00020 0.00716 -39.3541*** -0.62408 0.00020 0.00715 -39.3524*** -0.62408 
JPY 0.00012 0.00840 -53.1168*** -0.71854 0.00012 0.00841 -53.1134*** -0.71854 
NZD 0.00014 0.00759 -53.4700*** -0.86691 0.00014 0.00759 -53.4649*** -0.86691 
NOK 9.7E-05 0.00607 -53.0143*** -1.08497 9.7E-05 0.00607 -53.0203*** -1.08497 
SGD 9.1E-05 0.00540 -54.0446*** -0.29103 9.0E-05 0.00540 -34.5186*** -0.29103 
CHF 0.00012 0.00589 -54.6265*** 0.02682 0.00012 0.00589 -54.5737*** 0.02682 
USD 1.1E-05 0.00599 -52.5913*** -1.56205 1.1E-05 0.00598 -52.6107*** -1.56205 
BRL 0.00039 0.01006 -43.0894*** -1.17459 0.00038 0.01006 -42.9265*** -1.17459 
HUF 4.4E-05 0.00714 -51.8415*** -1.81169 4.6E-05 0.00714 -51.8257*** -1.81169 
MXP -6.0E-05 0.00779 -54.0660*** -1.23447 -5.2E-05 0.00785 -53.9596*** -1.23447 
PLZ 0.00012 0.00729 -53.4748*** -0.95252 0.00012 0.00729 -46.0025*** -0.95252 
ZAR -4.1E-05 0.01004 -53.6975*** -2.17774 -3.9E-05 0.01005 -53.6420*** -2.17774 
TWD 3.0E-05 0.00596 -57.4342*** -1.38211 3.0E-05 0.00602 -58.0283*** -1.38211 
CLP 0.00021 0.00809 -37.8426*** -1.50010 0.00021 0.00808 -37.6548*** -1.50010 
CNY 4.0E-05 0.00635 -45.568*** -0.69831 4.1E-05 0.00629 -46.1343*** -0.69831 
COP 0.00029 0.0090 -38.5080*** -1.17184 0.00029 0.00902 -38.6256* -1.17184 
CZK 0.00019 0.00624 -54.1364*** 0.24611 0.00019 0.00624 -54.1370*** 0.24611 
INR -2.8E-06 0.00596 -55.3459*** -2.03471 -3.4E-06 0.00597 -55.2728*** -2.03471 
IDR -2.6E-05 0.01007 -34.4493*** -2.11635 -1.9E-05 0.00906 -34.2120*** -2.11635 
MYR 0.00019 0.00690 -54.8547*** -2.57394 0.00019 0.00690 -54.8625*** -2.57394 
MAD 0.00014 0.00498 -39.3416*** -0.72034 0.00014 0.00497 -39.3816*** -0.72034 
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 Spot rates   Forward rates   
 Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF level Mean S.D. 
ADF 1st 
diff. 
ADF level 
PKR -0.00016 0.00732 -39.7945*** -1.57379 -0.00017 0.00731 -39.7961*** -1.57379 
PHP -1.8E-05 0.00692 -55.5282*** -1.37439 -1.5E-05 0.00698 -55.3366*** -1.37439 
RUR 2.6E-05 0.00644 -38.1174*** -2.659568 2.3E-05 0.00662 -38.3726*** -2.65957 
THB 7.6E-05 0.00669 -54.5157*** -0.66226 7.6E-05 0.00672 -54.7686*** -0.66226 
TRL -0.00047 0.01304 -43.3847*** -3.7122*** -0.00045 0.01688 -56.0684*** -3.7122*** 
AED 1.1E-05 0.00599 -52.6157*** -1.56200 1.1E-05 0.00598 -52.631*** -1.56200 
Variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Changes refer to the first difference of natural logarithms of 
exchange rates. * indicates significant at 10% (or better), ** represents significance at 5% (or better), and *** 
denotes significance at 1% level (or better). 
  
59 
 
Table 2-4: Panel Unit Root Tests for the stationarity of weekly exchange rates 
Economy Exchange rate Levin, 
Lin, Chu 
Breitung Im, 
Pesaran, 
Shin 
Fisher- 
ADF 
Fisher- 
PP 
Hadri 
All 
Economies 
exln  level 1.0662 
[0.8568] 
1.1189 
[0.8684] 
2.4275 
[0.9924] 
2.4848 
[0.9935] 
2.6757 
[0.9963] 
57.916** 
[0.0000] 
 exln  1st diff. -169.31** 
[0.0000] 
-85.617** 
[0.0000] 
-137.52** 
[0.0000] 
-69.619** 
[0.0000] 
-70.103** 
[0.0000] 
1.4244* 
[0.0772] 
 frln  level 1.9334 
[0.9734] 
0.5581 
[0.7116] 
2.6682 
[0.9962] 
2.7334 
[0.9969] 
2.9051 
[0.9982] 
58.253** 
[0.0000] 
 frln  1st diff. -171.24** 
[0.0000] 
-88.002** 
[0.0000] 
-140.04** 
[0.0000] 
-70.176** 
[0.0000] 
-70.127** 
[0.0000] 
1.0367 
[0.1499] 
Developed 
Economies 
exln  level 3.1854 
[0.9993] 
0.6339 
[0.7369] 
3.5416 
[0.9998] 
3.5697 
[0.9998] 
3.9492 
[1.0000] 
36.562** 
[0.0000] 
 exln  1st diff. -107.5*** 
[0.0000] 
-49.10*** 
[0.0000] 
-88.48*** 
[0.0000] 
-42.37*** 
[0.0000] 
-42.29*** 
[0.0000] 
0.958 
[0.1689] 
 frln  level 3.158 
[0.9992] 
0.614 
[0.7302] 
3.510 
[0.9998] 
3.541 
[0.9998] 
3.922 
[1.0000] 
36.60*** 
[0.0000] 
 frln  1st diff. -106.7*** 
[0.0000] 
-49.22*** 
[0.0000] 
-88.49*** 
[0.0000] 
-42.37*** 
[0.0000] 
-42.29*** 
[0.0000] 
0.947 
[0.1718] 
Emerging 
Economies 
exln  level -1.059 
[0.1449] 
0.922 
[0.8218] 
0.396 
[0.6538] 
0.446 
[0.6723] 
0.402 
[0.6563] 
44.99*** 
[0.0000] 
 exln  1st diff. -130.8*** 
[0.0000] 
-71.42*** 
[0.0000] 
-105.6*** 
[0.0000] 
-55.25*** 
[0.0000] 
-55.91*** 
[0.0000] 
1.063* 
[0.1440] 
 frln  level -0.019 
[0.4923] 
0.227 
[0.5897] 
0.719 
[0.7640] 
0.777 
[0.7813] 
0.708 
[0.7606] 
45.38*** 
[0.0000] 
 frln  1st diff. -133.8*** 
[0.0000] 
-74.63*** 
[0.0000] 
-108.7*** 
[0.0000] 
-55.95*** 
[0.0000] 
-55.95*** 
[0.0000] 
0.588 
[0.2782] 
The results report both test statistics and p-value (within brackets) for each unit root test. Breitung test 
includes both individual and trend effects while the rest include constant only but the results are robust when 
including constant and trend and/or none. Lag length selection based on Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) 
of maximum lags. Newey-west bandwidth selection and Parzen kernel applied in the cases that spectral 
estimation required. * represents significance at 10% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level and *** 
indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 2-5: Panel Unit Root Tests for the stationarity of daily exchange rates 
Economy Exchange rate 
Levin, 
Lin, Chu 
Breitung 
Im, 
Pesaran, 
Shin 
Fisher- 
ADF 
Fisher- 
PP 
Hadri 
All 
Economies 
exln  level 0.865 
[0.8064] 
0.219 
[0.5866] 
1.731 
[0.9583] 
1.830 
[0.9664] 
2.288 
[0.9889] 
184.6*** 
[0.0000] 
 exln  1st diff. -380.5*** 
[0.0000] 
-187.3*** 
[0.0000] 
-311.3*** 
[0.0000] 
-27.18*** 
[0.0000] 
-25.438** 
[0.0000] 
1.346* 
[0.0892] 
 frln  level 1.510 
[0.9344] 
-0.288 
[0.3867] 
1.922 
[0.9727] 
2.033 
[0.9785] 
2.557 
[0.9947] 
185.3*** 
[0.0000] 
 frln  1st diff. -378.5*** 
[0.0000] 
-190.4*** 
[0.0000] 
-308.47** 
[0.0000] 
-28.47*** 
[0.0000] 
-25.39*** 
[0.0000] 
0.526 
[0.2996] 
Developed 
Economies 
exln  level 2.815 
[0.9976] 
0.038 
[0.5151] 
3.011 
[0.9987] 
3.097 
[0.9990] 
3.447 
[0.9997] 
119.0*** 
[0.0000] 
 exln  1st diff. -238.8*** 
[0.0000] 
-118.1*** 
[0.0000] 
-196.9*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.52*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.42*** 
[0.0000] 
0.377 
[0.3529] 
 frln  level 2.783 
[0.9973] 
0.014 
[0.5054] 
2.977 
[0.9985] 
3.066 
[0.9989] 
3.434 
[0.9997] 
119.2*** 
[0.0000] 
 frln  1st diff. -232.1*** 
[0.0000] 
-118.3*** 
[0.0000] 
-189.8*** 
[0.0000] 
-16.01*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.42*** 
[0.0000] 
0.365 
[0.3574] 
Emerging 
Economies 
exln  level -1.041 
[0.1490] 
0.242 
[0.5958] 
-0.074 
[0.4704] 
41.24 
[0.4163] 
39.33 
[0.5001] 
141.6*** 
[0.0000] 
 exln  1st diff. -296.3*** 
[0.0000] 
-145.5*** 
[0.0000] 
-241.6*** 
[0.0000] 
788.9*** 
[0.0000] 
648.1*** 
[0.0000] 
1.395* 
[0.0814] 
 frln  level -0.258 
[0.3981] 
-0.375 
[0.3538] 
0.187 
[0.5741] 
36.22 
[0.6411] 
32.75 
[0.7852] 
142.4*** 
[0.0000] 
 frln  1st diff. -299.0*** 
[0.0000] 
-149.1*** 
[0.0000] 
-243.2*** 
[0.0000] 
779.7*** 
[0.0000] 
643.1*** 
[0.0000] 
0.383 
[0.3508] 
The results report both test statistics and p-value (within brackets) for each unit root test. The Breitung test 
includes both individual and trend effects while the rest include constant only; however, the results are robust 
when including constant and trend and/or none. The lag length selection is based on the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC) of maximum lags. Newey-west bandwidth selection and Parzen kernel applied in the cases that 
spectral estimation required. * represents significance at 10% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level and 
*** indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 2-6: FMOLS Cointegration tests between ltS   and ltF ,   with weekly data 
Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0  1  10    
AUD 
   002339.0002065.0
009115.1008887.04 tt AUFAUS   -7.1957*** 18.519*** 15.190*** 24.393*** 
CAD 
   002791.0002143.0
003945.1002266.04 tt CAFCAS   -6.5851*** 1.1177 1.9983 6.7300** 
EUR 
   001404.0000528.0
005276.1000964.04 tt EUFEUS   -6.6937** 3.3282* 14.119*** 44.920*** 
HKD 
   002946.0007563.0
003840.1008564.04 tt HKFHKS   -5.4552*** 1.2824 1.6995 17.003*** 
ILS 
   003908.0007777.0
004668.1009228.04 tt ILFILS   -4.8403*** 1.4077 1.4267 1.4308 
JPY 
   001983.0010340.0
008150.1039219.04 tt JPFJPS   -4.9607*** 14.386*** 16.893*** 135.44*** 
NZD 
   002459.0002577.0
005900.1007722.04 tt NZFNZS   -6.2965*** 8.9759*** 5.7549*** 31.019*** 
NOK 
   002694.0006612.0
001987.1005076.04 tt NOFNOS   -7.0970*** 0.5892 0.5441 1.0543 
SGD 
   001865.0001866.0
008115.1006102.04 tt SGFSGS   -6.1037*** 10.691*** 18.926*** 110.55*** 
CHF 
   002004.0001601.0
006832.1003066.04 tt CHFCHS   -6.1688*** 3.6673* 11.622*** 85.817*** 
USD 
   002969.0001560.0
000979.1000418.04 tt USFUSS   -5.53833*** 0.07168 0.10872 7.81941** 
BRL 
   005530.0007433.0
992340.0001606.04 tt BRFBRS   -5.74777*** 0.04671 1.91888 57.4223*** 
HUF 
   004399.0026003.0
000514.1007584.04 tt HUFHUS   -7.8665*** 0.0851 0.0137 103.42*** 
MXP 
   002641.0007652.0
012840.1042333.04 tt MXFMXS   -6.9049*** 30.603*** 23.644*** 152.69*** 
PLZ 
   003129.0005383.0
002293.1005338.04 tt PLFPLS   -5.8639*** 0.9835 0.5369 10.471*** 
ZAR 
   005087.0012870.0
997656.0000718.04 tt ZAFZAS   -6.5395*** 0.0031 0.2122 48.733*** 
TWD 
   003080.0012331.0
014670.1056768.04 tt TWFTWS   -6.0400*** 21.193*** 22.693*** 59.205*** 
CLP 
   007029.0048312.0
005978.1040462.04 tt CLFCLS   -5.17010** 0.70142 0.72326 1.37247 
CNY 
   002449.0006341.0
015864.1037948.04 tt CNFCNS   -4.5403*** 35.817*** 41.956*** 119.52*** 
COP 
   006535.0054011.0
004045.1035541.04 tt COFCOS   -5.9718*** 0.4330 0.3831 4.7431* 
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Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0  1  10    
CZK 
   001700.0006413.0
999974.0000203.04 tt CZFCZS   -7.5877*** 0.0010 0.0002 0.0726 
INR 
   005610.0024289.0
012438.1055806.04 tt INFINS   -6.8530*** 5.2788** 4.9166** 23.240*** 
IDR 
   019502.0187969.0
006057.1059036.04 tt IDFIDS   -7.0698*** 0.0986 0.0965 0.1603 
MYR 
   005615.0010250.0
003601.1006344.04 tt MYFMYS   -5.6813*** 0.3831 0.4114 0.5122 
MAD 
   004469.0012096.0
021128.1058952.04 tt MAFMAS   -4.5247*** 23.754*** 22.353*** 36.794** 
PKR 
   008797.0042095.0
0968503.0147470.04 tt PKFPKS   -4.0230*** 12.273*** 12.818*** 27.589*** 
PHP 
   002459.0010833.0
006296.1030530.04 tt PHFPHS   -5.8843*** 7.9421*** 6.5535** 57.771*** 
RUR 
   022925.0089545.0
059825.1236899.04 tt RUFRUS   -6.6093*** 6.0001*** 6.8098*** 13.971*** 
THB 
   002230.0009276.0
008880.1037058.04 tt THFTHS   -6.0646*** 15.960*** 15.856*** 16.133*** 
TRL 
   092144.0074001.0
023362.1022886.04 tt TRFTRS   -2.9168** 0.0957 0.0643 0.0957 
AED 
   003968.0005577.0
004603.1006383.04 tt AEFAES   -5.5127*** 1.3100 1.7541 10.152*** 
ADF critical value at the 5% significance level is -3.34. Since the ADF t-ratios are highly robust to higher order 
augmentation (1-25) only the results based on a uniform augmentation (i.e. 10) reported here. The hypotheses
0 , 1 and 10   are tested and the results are reported, respectively. * denotes significance 
at 10% (or better), ** indicates significance at 5% (or better) and *** stands for significance at 1% level (or 
better). All Wald test statistics are 2 distributed. 
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Table 2-7: FMOLS Cointegration tests between ltS   and ltF ,  with daily data 
Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0   1
 10    
AUD 
   015830.0013978.0
007744.1007447.021 tt AUFAUS   -10.583*** 0.2839 0.2393 0.3483 
CAD 
   016567.0012723.0
002523.1000961.021 tt CAFCAS   -11.841*** 0.0057 0.0232 0.2537 
EUR 
   012506.0004703.0
003476.1000201.021 tt EUFEUS   -10.258*** 0.0018 0.0772 0.5711 
HKD 
   014361.0036871.0
002814.1005928.021 tt HKFHKS   -9.0773*** 0.0259 0.0384 0.6912 
ILS 
   016507.0032851.0
002687.1005716.021 tt ILFILS   -7.7524*** 0.0303 0.0265 0.0513 
JPY 
   014148.0073778.0
006112.1028499.021 tt JPFJPS   -9.2024*** 0.1492 0.1866 2.6597 
NZD 
   016567.0017345.0
002251.1002642.021 tt NZFNZS   -11.148*** 0.0232 0.0186 0.0386 
NOK 
   015949.0039139.0
001772.1004346.021 tt NOFNOS   -10.317*** 0.0123 0.0123 0.0123 
SGD 
   013042.0013044.0
006273.1004265.021 tt SGFSGS   -10.305*** 0.1069 0.2314 2.1117 
CHF 
   012203.0009770.0
001522.1000798.021 tt CHFCHS   -10.761*** 0.0067 0.0156 0.0755 
USD 
   014528.0007634.0
999950.0000957.021 tt USFUSS   
-9.2192*** 0.0157 0.00001 0.3320 
BRL 
   017725.0023827.0
992661.0003393.021 tt BRFBRS   -9.4332*** 0.0203 0.1714 3.1386 
HUF 
   019873.0117465.0
994476.0028505.021 tt HUFHUS   -9.9027*** 0.0589 0.0773 4.2763 
MXP 
   013431.0038926.0
011581.1038700.021 tt MXFMXS   -10.899*** 0.9884 0.7435 5.7788* 
PLZ 
   016096.0027689.0
998662.0001233.021 tt PLFPLS   -8.1139*** 0.0020 0.0069 0.2193 
ZAR 
   019600.0049573.0
991647.0016148.021 tt ZAFZAS   -10.321*** 0.1061 0.1816 3.1258 
TWD 
   014639.0058636.0
002775.1010656.021 tt TWFTWS   -9.9585*** 0.0330 0.0359 0.1227 
CLP 
   029707.0204182.0
003667.1025438.021 tt CLFCLS   -7.8665*** 0.0155 0.0152 0.0205 
CNY 
   013794.0035708.0
014664.1034891.021 tt CNFCNS   -7.4557*** 0.9548 1.1300 3.4974 
COP 
   023726.0196082.0
003593.1032049.021 tt COFCOS   -7.4694*** 0.0267 0.0229 0.4313 
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Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0   1
 10    
CZK 
   007468.0028162.0
998679.0005766.021 tt CZFCZS   -10.542*** 0.0419 0.0313 0.2477 
INR 
   020672.0089502.0
010825.1048786.021 tt INFINS   -10.069*** 0.2971 0.2742 1.5888 
IDR 
   028571.0275389.0
011538.1111698.021 tt IDFIDS   -8.5017*** 0.1645 0.1631 0.1800 
MYR 
   016064.0029331.0
004366.1007557.021 tt MYFMYS   -9.7814*** 0.0664 0.0739 0.1152 
MAD 
   018538.0050171.0
019324.1053924.021 tt MAFMAS   -7.8377*** 1.1552 1.0866 1.7972 
PKR 
   026700.0127754.0
965970.0159290.021 tt PKFPKS   -7.2035*** 1.5546 1.6245 3.5406 
PHP 
   011165.0049177.0
003977.1020172.021 tt PHFPHS   -9.1865*** 0.1683 0.1269 2.3584 
RUR 
   042139.0164592.0
064922.1256623.021 tt RUFRUS   -6.6201*** 2.4310 2.3737 4.2771 
THB 
   014817.0061634.0
004828.1020048.021 tt THFTHS   -9.1885*** 0.1058 0.1062 0.1064 
TRL 
   103423.0083018.0
043113.1037663.021 tt TRFTRS   -3.1037*** 0.2058 0.1738 0.2125 
AED 
   014620.0026577.0
002919.1004304.021 tt AEFAES   -9.1962*** 0.0262 0.0399 0.4152 
ADF critical value at the 5% significance level is -3.34. Since the ADF t-ratios are highly robust to higher 
order augmentation (1-25) only the results based on a uniform augmentation (i.e. 10) reported here. The 
hypotheses 0 , 1 and 10   are tested and the results are reported, respectively. * 
indicates significance at 10% (or better) and ** indicates significance at 5% (or better), *** represents 
significance at 1% (or better), respectively. All Wald test statistics are 2 distributed with degree of 
freedom one and two, respectively. 
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Table 2-8: DOLS Cointegration tests between ltS   and ltF ,  with weekly data 
Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0  1  10    
AUD 
   000503.0000410.0
006736.1006862.04 tt AUFAUS   -7.15449*** 280.152*** 179.249*** 592.276*** 
CAD 
   000664.0000477.0
002598.1001123.04 tt CAFCAS   -6.57388*** 5.54222** 15.3345*** 75.7388*** 
EUR 
   000864.0000272.0
003169.1000046.04 tt EUFEUS   -6.67739*** 0.02830 13.4533*** 102.824*** 
HKD 
   001519.0003852.0
004282.1009711.04 tt HKFHKS   -5.45526*** 6.35498** 7.94302*** 44.4291*** 
ILS 
   000759.0001417.0
001910.1003401.04 tt ILFILS   -4.82748*** 5.75862** 6.33629** 8.79669** 
JPY 
   001367.0007267.0
006451.1030147.04 tt JPFJPS   -4.95235*** 17.2094*** 22.2607*** 1085.24*** 
NZD 
   000822.0000853.0
004698.1006435.04 tt NZFNZS   -6.28702*** 56.8923** 32.6970*** 182.781*** 
NOK 
   001824.0004337.0
002113.1005346.04 tt NOFNOS   -7.09787*** 1.51927 1.34208 3.20335 
SGD 
   001172.0001176.0
006659.1004544.04 tt SGFSGS   -6.08798*** 14.9312*** 32.2562*** 229.923*** 
CHF 
   000797.0000603.0
005526.1001855.04 tt CHFCHS   -6.15028*** 9.46765*** 48.0396*** 434.404*** 
USD 
   001523.0000779.0
001499.1000127.04 tt USFUSS   -5.53845*** 0.02652 0.96771 23.8690*** 
BRL 
   001429.0001896.0
992702.0002356.04 tt BRFBRS   -5.74474*** 1.54416 26.0958*** 231.072*** 
HUF 
   002233.0013201.0
997903.0008183.04 tt HUFHUS   -7.86182*** 0.38419 0.88137 151.088*** 
MXP 
   003243.0009738.0
011789.1038918.04 tt MXFMXS   -6.90584*** 15.9734*** 13.2132*** 104.402*** 
PLZ 
   001207.0001992.0
000324.1001704.04 tt PLFPLS   -5.85861*** 0.73183 0.07182 20.9806*** 
ZAR 
   002148.0005480.0
994994.0007760.04 tt ZAFZAS   -6.54464*** 2.00557 5.43363** 292.352*** 
TWD 
   003028.0012171.0
013885.1053472.04 tt TWFTWS   -6.03877*** 19.3027*** 21.0234*** 93.6623*** 
CLP 
   002310.0015383.0
002453.1016605.04 tt CLFCLS   -5.16836*** 1.09918 1.12832 1.73952 
CNY 
   001823.0004592.0
015184.1036221.04 tt CNFCNS   -4.53798*** 62.2085*** 69.3902*** 106.313*** 
COP 
   002758.0022986.0
002442.1022326.04 tt COFCOS   
-5.96787*** 0.94335 0.78390 32.6043*** 
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Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0  1  10    
CZK 
   000910.0003437.0
000208.1000059.04 tt CZFCZS   -7.59130*** 0.00029 0.05234 15.2104*** 
INR 
   003796.0016267.0
012890.1057708.04 tt INFINS   -6.85296*** 12.5847*** 11.5339*** 128.109*** 
IDR 
   015459.0151926.0
996425.0034570.04 tt IDFIDS   -7.06900*** 0.05178 0.05349 0.32158 
MYR 
   001364.0002440.0
007746.1013557.04 tt MYFMYS   -5.69681*** 30.8721*** 32.2437*** 37.8756*** 
MAD 
   003162.0008663.0
019683.1054698.04 tt MAFMAS   -4.52201*** 39.8671*** 38.7564*** 46.3365** 
PKR 
   005171.0024671.0
974746.0117141.04 tt PKFPKS   -4.02691*** 22.5442*** 23.8491*** 62.9481*** 
PHP 
   001315.0005872.0
006024.1029216.04 tt PHFPHS   -5.88511*** 24.7536*** 20.9754*** 115.897*** 
RUR 
   046759.0183785.0
084423.1332771.04 tt RUFRUS   -6.58874*** 3.27844* 3.25970* 4.85640* 
THB 
   002171.0008897.0
004961.1020542.04 tt THFTHS   -6.03185*** 5.33059*** 5.22288** 6.08316** 
TRL 
   097132.0092230.0
854266.0126609.04 tt TRFTRS   -3.15312** 1.88445 2.25112 6.10722** 
AED 
   002331.0004140.0
004435.1007082.04 tt AEFAES   -5.51275*** 2.92581* 3.61935* 18.8326*** 
ADF critical value at the 5% significance level is -3.34. Since the ADF t-ratios are highly robust to higher order 
augmentation (1-25) only the results based on a uniform augmentation (i.e. 10) reported here. The hypotheses
0 , 1 and 10   are tested and the results are reported, respectively. * indicates significance at 
10% (or better), ** indicates significance at 5% (or better) and *** indicates significance at 1% (or better), 
respectively. All Wald test statistics are 2 distributed with degree of freedom one and two, respectively.  
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Table 2-9: DOLS Cointegration tests between ltS   and ltF ,  with daily data 
Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0  1  10    
AUD 
   014643.0013282.0
008785.1011201.021 tt AUFAUS   -10.591*** 0.7111 0.3599 3.8130 
CAD 
   014091.0011021.0
993586.0003196.021 tt CAFCAS   -11.789*** 0.0841 0.2072 1.4690 
EUR 
   013976.0005614.0
999308.0000158.021 tt EUFEUS   -10.236*** 0.0008 0.0025 0.0112 
HKD 
   012381.0031711.0
981508.0048497.021 tt HKFHKS   -9.0241*** 2.3388 2.2308 2.7772 
ILS 
   015574.0031671.0
997619.0001611.021 tt ILFILS   -7.7335*** 0.0026 0.0234 2.3150 
JPY 
   014089.0073965.0
997938.0012242.021 tt JPFJPS   -9.1632*** 0.0274 0.0214 0.4857 
NZD 
   013345.0013927.0
991643.0006263.021 tt NZFNZS   -11.089*** 0.2022 0.3922 2.0725 
NOK 
   015094.0037586.0
990897.0020534.021 tt NOFNOS   -10.270*** 0.2985 0.3637 2.5717 
SGD 
   012854.0013253.0
005725.1005208.021 tt SGFSGS   -10.302*** 0.1544 0.1984 0.4826 
CHF 
   012327.0010324.0
007966.1007960.021 tt CHFCHS   -10.813*** 0.5945 0.4177 1.4432 
USD 
   012430.0006526.0
978404.0011788.021 tt USFUSS   -9.1644*** 3.2632* 3.0186* 3.2658 
BRL 
   015401.0020759.0
976105.0017924.021 tt BRFBRS   -9.4133*** 0.7456 2.4074 19.512*** 
HUF 
   024721.0147082.0
965225.0200582.021 tt HUFHUS   -9.8053*** 1.8598 1.9788 18.003*** 
MXP 
   011231.0033036.0
997156.0004161.021 tt MXFMXS   -10.857*** 0.0159 0.0641 4.3660 
PLZ 
   018773.0033349.0
983923.0024551.021 tt PLFPLS   -8.0655*** 0.5420 0.7335 4.5649 
ZAR 
   016673.0041178.0
952576.0115442.021 tt ZAFZAS   -10.234*** 7.8595*** 8.0908*** 8.4471** 
TWD 
   0011735.0047143.0
984776.0060988.021 tt TWFTWS   -9.9007*** 1.6736 1.6831 1.6925 
CLP 
   021304.0146590.0
974948.0168936.021 tt CLFCLS   -7.7968*** 1.3281 1.3829 2.7506 
CNY 
   039422.0009132.0
004419.1009132.021 tt CNFCNS   
-7.4239*** 0.0537 0.0880 2.0494 
COP 
   018166.0150674.0
982387.0138661.021 tt COFCOS   -7.4175*** 0.8469 0.9401 5.7937** 
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Currency Cointegrating Vector ADF(10) 0  1  10    
CZK 
   008369.0032071.0
001488.1008108.021 tt CZFCZS   -10.563*** 0.0639 0.0316 2.7048 
INR 
   016518.0071103.0
969980.0128089.021 tt INFINS   -9.9655*** 3.2453* 3.3028* 3.8132 
IDR 
   023467.0228505.0
960299.0382518.021 tt IDFIDS   -8.4156*** 2.8023* 2.8621* 4.9316* 
MYR 
   019704.0035414.0
965921.0059390.021 tt MYFMYS   -9.7741*** 2.8125* 2.9913* 4.0135 
MAD 
   017794.0049177.0
008388.1026435.021 tt MAFMAS   -7.8033*** 0.2890 0.2222 6.4878** 
PKR 
   026413.0125347.0
929752.0335147.021 tt PKFPKS   -7.1499*** 7.1490** 7.0733*** 7.7945** 
PHP 
   009862.0043609.0
988094.0050088.021 tt PHFPHS   -9.1604*** 1.3193 1.4573 3.4052 
RUR 
   054838.0215019.0
973929.0098227.021 tt RUFRUS   -6.4603*** 0.2087 0.2260 4.6792* 
THB 
   014088.0059058.0
000298.1002468.021 tt THFTHS   -9.1644*** 0.0018 0.0005 0.5981 
TRL 
   065656.0062303.0
845379.0137266.021 tt TRFTRS   -3.2857** 4.8540** 5.5461** 8.5744** 
AED 
   012447.0022594.0
981201.0034869.021 tt AEFAES   -9.1412*** 2.3818 2.2811 2.5437 
ADF critical value at the 5% significance level is -3.34. Since the ADF t-ratios are highly robust to higher order 
augmentation (1-25) only the results based on a uniform augmentation (i.e. 10) reported here. The hypotheses
0 , 1 and 10   are tested and the results are reported, respectively. * indicates significance at 
10% (or better), ** indicates significance at 5% (or better) and *** indicates significance at 1% (or better), 
respectively. All Wald test statistics are 2 distributed with degree of freedom one and two, respectively. 
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Table 2-10: Panel cointegration for weekly data 
Economy Test 
No Intercept or 
Trend 
Individual 
Intercept 
Individual Intercept 
and Individual Trend 
All Economies Pedroni  -88.63113*** 
[0.0000] 
-67.90634*** 
[0.0000] 
-88.63113*** 
[0.0000] 
 Kao  
 
-10.35146*** 
[0.0000] 
 
Developed 
Economies 
Pedroni  -65.60129*** 
[0.0000] 
-57.94933*** 
[0.0000] 
-51.40137*** 
[0.0000] 
 Kao  
 
-7.687700*** 
[0.0000] 
 
Emerging 
Economies 
Pedroni -62.77741*** 
[0.0000] 
-54.59534*** 
[0.0000] 
-47.06893*** 
[0.0000] 
 Kao 
 
-6.081128*** 
[0.0000] 
 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration tested using both Pedroni and Kao tests. Panel 
rho-statistics and p-values (within brackets) reported for Pedroni tests, while panel ADF test 
statistics and p-value (within brackets) reported for Kao tests. d.f. corrected Dickey-Fuller 
residual variances used. Lag length selection based on Schwarz information criterion (SIC) with 
a max lag of 16. Newey-West bandwidth selection and Parzen kernel applied. * represents 
significance at 10% level (or better)，** denotes significance at 5% level (or better) and *** 
stands for significance at 1% level (or better). 
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Table 2-11: Panel cointegration for daily data 
Economy Test 
No Intercept or 
Trend 
Individual 
Intercept  
Individual Intercept 
and Individual Trend  
All Economies Pedroni  -137.9735*** 
[0.0000] 
-125.1185*** 
[0.0000] 
-105.1600*** 
[0.0000] 
 Kao  
 
-17.94994*** 
[0.0000] 
 
Developed 
Economies 
Pedroni  -126.9814*** 
[0.0000] 
-111.0822*** 
[0.0000] 
-95.12833*** 
[0.0000] 
 Kao  
 
-18.27960*** 
[0.0000] 
 
Emerging 
Economies 
Pedroni -88.27325*** 
[0.0000] 
-80.47931*** 
[0.0000] 
-66.86064*** 
[0.0000] 
 Kao 
 
-10.95509*** 
[0.0000] 
 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration tested using both Pedroni and Kao tests. Panel 
rho-statistics and p-values (within brackets) reported for Pedroni tests, while panel ADF test 
statistics and p-value (within brackets) reported for Kao tests. d.f. corrected Dickey-Fuller 
residual variances used. Lag length selection based on Schwarz information criterion (SIC) with 
a max lag of 16. Newey-West bandwidth selection and Parzen kernel applied. * represents 
significance at 10% level (or better), ** denotes significance at 5% (or better) and *** stands for 
significance at 1% level (or better).  
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Table 2-12: DOLS/DGLS panel cointegration for weekly data 
Economy Cointegrating vector 
Liven, Lin 
and Chu 
0  1  10    
All 
Economies 
   006179.0018336.0
ln945132.0163092.0ln ,4. titi FREX   
-15.485*** 
[0.0000] 
79.1147*** 
[0.0000] 
78.8433*** 
[0.0000] 
116.509*** 
[0.0000] 
Developed 
Economies 
   003020.0004743.0
ln991465.0012558.0ln ,4. titi FREX   
-11.233*** 
[0.0000] 
7.01175*** 
[0.0081] 
7.98829*** 
[0.0047] 
26.1676*** 
[0.0000] 
Emerging 
Economies 
   007543.0028973.0
ln9316071.0262710.0ln ,4. titi FREX   
-11.467*** 
[0.0000] 
82.2161*** 
[0.0000] 
82.2080*** 
[0.0000] 
82.2994*** 
[0.0000] 
DOLS/DGLS based panel cointegrating vector reported. The corresponding standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis beneath the coefficient estimates. The Liven, Lin and Chu unit root test applied to the residuals 
and t-statistic and p-value (within brackets) reported. Wald test statistics are 2 distributed with coefficient 
restrictions. The hypotheses 0 , 1 and 10   are tested and the results are reported, 
respectively. * represents significance at 10% level (or better), ** denotes significance at 5% level (or better) 
and *** stands for significance at 1% level (or better).  
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Table 2-13: DOLS/DGLS panel cointegration for daily data 
Economy Cointegrating vector 
Liven, Lin 
and Chu 
0  1  10    
All 
Economies 
   002945.0008741.0
ln926017.0218970ln ,21. titi FREX   
-8.5872*** 
[0.0000] 
627.592*** 
[0.0000] 
630.987*** 
[0.0000] 
1180.33*** 
[0.0000] 
Developed 
Economies 
   002344.0003697.0
ln979703.0031217.0ln ,4. titi FREX   
-22.344*** 
[0.0000] 
71.2843*** 
[0.0000] 
74.9631*** 
[0.0000] 
1185.03*** 
[0.0000] 
Emerging 
Economies 
   003524.0013537.0
ln912569.0335391.0ln ,4. titi FREX   
-6.5586*** 
[0.0000] 
613.840*** 
[0.0000] 
615.512*** 
[0.0000] 
781.804*** 
[0.0000] 
DOLS/DGLS based panel cointegrating vector reported. The corresponding standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis beneath the coefficient estimates. The Liven, Lin and Chu unit root test applied to the residuals 
and t-statistic and p-value (within brackets) reported. Wald test statistics are 2 distributed with coefficient 
restrictions. The hypotheses 0 , 1 and 10   are tested and the results are reported, 
respectively. * represents significance at 10% level (or better), ** denotes significance at 5% level (or better) 
and *** indicates significance at 1% level (or better). 
 
 
 
Table 2-14: Implications of the forward premium regression 
Case 
 
 
 
 pdVar
pddCov
l



,
   pVar  and  dVar   pdCov ,  
I UIP holds = 1     0 pVardVar    0, pdCov  
II Forward premium puzzle < 0      dVarpdCovpVar  ,    0, pdCov  
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Table 2-15: Forward premium regressions for weekly individual currencies 
 Standard Regression State-dependent Regressions 
 l   lSE   

l   lSE   l   lSE   Walda Waldb 
AUD -1.668293 (2.197720) 10.53580 (9.795939) -2.675148 (2.614909) [0.2381] [0.2187] 
CAD 3.764998 (2.765245) 2.697637 (2.871547) 40.73557 (22.66754) [0.1039] [0.0082] 
EUR -2.949988 (2.481661) -0.970986 (2.001127) -66.84694 (55.57890) [0.2395] [0.2220] 
HKD -0.274635 (1.533656) 0.133526 (1.710382) -6.020495 (14.19427) [0.6792] [0.5987] 
ILS 2.430125 (4.056591) 13.20642 (5.641080) -21.05569 (6.591431) [0.0008] [0.0132] 
JPY -0.078261 (1.916444) - - - - - [0.2153] 
NZD 0.074285 (2.006352) -3.133600 (7.594002) 0.612921 (2.872583) [0.6960] [0.0176] 
NOK -0.287618 (0.897005) 1.064355 (2.287079) -1.654934 (2.197319) [0.5089] [0.6242] 
SGD 0.027291 (1.578744) 0.496944 (1.621413) -12.76872 (23.51594) [0.5798] [0.0286] 
CHF -2.622531 (1.674875) - - - - - [0.1718] 
USD -0.391068 (1.824968) 0.224563 (2.293350) -5.460071 (14.84268) [0.7252] [0.0987] 
BRL -0.552721 (1.109150) 3.956976 (5.534260) -0.644125 (1.184492) [0.4636] [0.0029] 
HUF 0.294609 (0.866611) - - - - - [0.0290] 
MXP -1.402588 (0.466335) - - - - - [0.3007] 
PLZ 3.076579 (1.616203) 0.897825 (6.316552) 3.500722 (2.202913) [0.7333] [0.9292] 
ZAR -3.734457 (1.554624) - - - - - [0.1952] 
TWD 0.621394 (0.546443) 0.679708 (0.692541) 0.501006 (1.293478) [0.9118] [0.5342] 
CLP -1.644884 (2.546650) 4.170893 (3.251435) -6.490521 (2.962303) [0.0323] [0.0007] 
CNY -0.359722 (1.027857) 1.421321 (0.643555) -6.817858 (2.287280) [0.0005] [0.0047] 
COP -2.083723 (1.823453) 12.12868 (9.319366) -3.268063 (2.073537) [0.1321] [0.1833] 
CZK 2.239894 (1.748067) -0.735609 (2.318866) 9.775305 (6.845558) [0.2125] [0.0444] 
INR -1.366524 (0.800403) -3.572993 (1.935446) -0.612907 (1.034958) [0.2283] [0.1259] 
IDR 0.359994 (0.173375) 0.331155 (0.241341) 0.414590 (0.221153) [0.8055] [0.0338] 
MYR 0.467092 (1.624414) 0.287051 (2.225378) 0.954811 (4.441067) [0.9060] [0.7030] 
MAD 0.531290 (0.821504) -1.056964 (3.515045) 0.758907 (1.065344) [0.6597] [0.7982] 
PKR 0.229783 (0.796921) -1.971142 (2.127700) 0.577421 (1.000908) [0.3464] [0.3932] 
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 Standard Regression State-dependent Regressions 
 l   lSE   

l   lSE   l   lSE   Walda Waldb 
PHP 0.851056 (0.950242) 15.66456 (10.29166) 0.517517 (1.004603) [0.1559] [0.0772] 
RUR 1.236777 (0.682613) -2.112768 (2.034568) 1.349197 (0.715695) [0.1528] [0.0007] 
THB -0.342735 (1.077043) -1.723450 (1.878651) 0.159650 (1.600021) [0.5194] [0.0139] 
TRL -0.014004 (0.033643) -0.035650 (0.036149) 0.482529 (0.172702) [0.0041] [0.0107] 
AED -0.164253 (1.332711) 1.062560 (1.361062) -9.663346 (6.457274) [0.1247] [0.0205] 
This table reports results from estimation of regressions (2.5.5)   llttltlltlt SFSS ,, lnlnlnln    , (2.5.6) 
    llttlttltltlt SFSFSS ll ,,, lnlnlnlnlnln 

  
 and (2.5.9)       llttltltltltltlltlt SFSFSFSS ,
3
,
2
,, lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln   
. 
The standard regression is the regression of percentage change in the exchange rate on the associated 
forward premium. The plus-minus regression refers to a case when observations of the forward premia are 
categorized into negative and positive observations. The corresponding standard error is given within 
parenthesis. The Walda statistic refers to the test of the hypothesis that   ll  . The Wald
b statistic refers 
to the test of the hypothesis that the added terms are zero. P-values from Wald tests are reported within 
brackets. HAC (Newey-West) covariance matrices are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
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Table 2-16: Forward premium regressions for daily individual currencies 
 Standard Regression State-dependent Regressions 
 l   lSE   

l   lSE   l   lSE   Walda Waldb 
AUD -2.026882 (1.567068) 8.494450 (6.826307) -3.008529 (1.838198) [0.1349] [0.6709] 
CAD 2.929582 (1.913539) 2.563572 (1.989776) 18.34294 (18.45382) [0.4050] [0.0420] 
EUR -3.028630 (1.849059) -1.531778 (1.514393) -53.92475 (52.22452) [0.3200] [0.9145] 
HKD 0.177604 (1.069942) -0.200299 (1.205276) 5.701214 (6.050991) [0.3678] [0.5550] 
ILS 4.051134 (2.875034) 12.68456 (3.961078) -17.88011 (6.831541) [0.0010] [0.1396] 
JPY 0.434898 (1.475289) - - - - - [0.0771] 
NZD -1.749471 (5.929299) -3.364944 (6.929290) -1.189737 (8.627303) [0.8674] [0.1904] 
NOK -0.403826 (0.717016) 0.786063 (1.757603) -1.643190 (1.725765) [0.4443] [0.0001] 
SGD 0.616040 (1.128182) 0.644291 (1.198541) -0.453171 (14.38138) [0.9407] [0.0448] 
CHF -6.922925 (3.586132) -7.049443 (3.613501) 29.16910 (3.726661) [0.0000] [0.0702] 
USD 0.228114 (1.284825) -0.704727 (1.546841) 8.747067 (7.750362) [0.2665] [0.1302] 
BRL -0.542814 (0.840737) 5.137957 (4.083717) -0.618085 (0.878736) [0.2133] [0.0001] 
HUF 0.339862 (0.638317) - - - - - [0.2784] 
MXP -1.483341 (0.354394) - - - - - [0.1031] 
PLZ 3.155290 (1.092927) -0.772769 (4.335230) 3.942777 (1.567836) [0.3779] [0.2469] 
ZAR -3.986464 (1.115118) -5.550962 (1.715975) -3.983209 (1.120782) [0.5724] [0.2600] 
TWD 1.486975 (1.267544) 0.822560 (1.574125) 2.595360 (2.600260) [0.5864] [0.8502] 
CLP -1.930320 (1.631843) 4.617137 (2.340675) -7.453288 (1.951404) [0.0005] [0.0000] 
CNY -0.226157 (0.662156) 1.611798 (0.464477) -7.273854 (1.761677) [0.0000] [0.0001] 
COP 2.092099 (1.352700) 7.545510 (4.781440) -2.948001 (1.554940) [0.0575] [0.3010] 
CZK 2.363472 (1.203210) -0.881022 (1.586791) 9.976375 (3.992676) [0.0296] [0.1332] 
INR -1.451861 (0.589355) -4.341840 (1.47378) -0.509177 (0.777628) [0.0419] [0.0206] 
IDR 0.351412 (0.124395) 0.334295 (0.168957) 0.387419 (0.166812) [0.8275] [0.0840] 
MYR 0.911563 (1.265265) 0.987964 (1.808032) 0.706242 (3.176597) [0.9468] [0.0878] 
MAD 0.680199 (0.606124) -1.762270 (2.473660) 1.029353 (0.776165) [0.3368] [0.5494] 
PKR 0.304150 (0.530124) -2.520046 (1.677044) 0.740346 (0.659960) [0.1087] [0.0416] 
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 Standard Regression State-dependent Regressions 
 l   lSE   

l   lSE   l   lSE   Walda Waldb 
PHP 0.842425 (0.806721) 20.30653 (9.527355) 0.366683 (0.846778) [0.0423] [0.0008] 
RUR 1.258867 (0.401713) -2.130128 (1.320447) 1.369911 (0.418592) [0.0217] [0.0029] 
THB -0.407807 (0.717661) -1.983211 (1.407897) 0.196742 (1.082990) [0.2982] [0.7020] 
TRL -0.012299 (0.023435) -0.033912 (0.024725) 0.565389 (0.129088) [0.0000] [0.0001] 
AED 0.105048 (0.908628) 0.626183 (1.019930) -4.208953 (4.589028) [0.3344] [0.0187] 
This table reports results from estimation of regressions (2.5.5)   llttltlltlt SFSS ,, lnlnlnln    , (2.5.6) 
    llttlttltltlt SFSFSS ll ,,, lnlnlnlnlnln 

  
 and (2.5.9)       llttltltltltltlltlt SFSFSFSS ,
3
,
2
,, lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln   
.The 
standard regression is the regression of percentage change in the exchange rate on the associated forward 
premium. The plus-minus regression refers to a case when observations of the forward premia are 
categorised into negative and positive observations. The corresponding standard error is given within 
parenthesis. The Walda statistic refers to the test of the hypothesis that   ll  . The Wald
b statistic refers 
to the test of the hypothesis that the added terms are zero. P-values from Wald tests are reported within 
brackets. HAC (Newey-West) covariance matrices are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
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Table 2-17: Forward premium regressions for weekly individual currencies 
 
ARCH-LM 
Test 
GARCH  TGARCH 
 ARCH(8) l   lSE   Walda l   lSE   Waldb 
AUD [0.0000] 1.376425 (0.558408) [0.0000] 0.511269 (0.454054) [0.0269] 
CAD [0.0000] 3.905756 (0.927522) [0.6959] 4.733805 (1.000680) [0.9581] 
EUR [0.0000] -1.473396 (0.549750) [0.5458] -2.943949 (0.621232) [0.4319] 
HKD [0.0000] 0.445257 (0.416783) [0.0000] 0.254440 (0.427364) [0.5560] 
ILS [0.0000] 3.803390 (1.186661) [0.0000] 3.539969 (1.209662) [0.2565] 
JPY [0.0000] -1.333633 (0.634489) [0.0000] -0.413990 (0.404129) [0.0361] 
NZD [0.0000] -0.033422 (0.403733) [0.0000] -0.451954 (0.804945) [0.5925] 
NOK [0.0000] -0.313961 (0.304724) [0.0000] -0.143700 (0.288062) [0.8033] 
SGD [0.0000] 1.053112 (0.403519) [0.4163] 0.728130 (0.488256) [0.8434] 
CHF [0.0000] -0.500211 (0.505704) [0.0000] -2.977091 (0.445207) [0.4352] 
USD [0.0000] -0.047398 (0.511393) [0.0001] -0.220502 (0.501427) [0.7883] 
BRL [0.0000] -1.065901 (0.354802) [0.0000] -0.867972 (0.393264) [0.3687] 
HUF [0.0000] 0.443774 (0.201706) [0.3044] 0.363502 (0.287976) [0.9996] 
MXP [0.0000] -1.994491 (0.152612) [0.9408] -1.946578 (0.158990) [0.5471] 
PLZ [0.0000] 1.843276 (0.388035) [0.1843] 1.776139 (0.396477) [0.8226] 
ZAR [0.0000] -1.685568 (0.425032) [0.0000] -1.427135 (0.441086) [0.4406] 
TWD [0.0000] 0.704664 (0.202952) [0.0000] 0.627941 (0.277112) [0.9760] 
CLP [0.0000] -1.092467 (0.358006) [0.5786] -1.729286 (0.527719) [0.9975] 
CNY [0.0000] 1.590525 (0.337127) [0.0984] 1.664971 (0.204601) [0.0033] 
COP [0.0000] -3.670529 (0.392249) [0.6056] -4.480197 (0.431756) [0.9676] 
CZK [0.0000] 1.662768 (0.162023) [0.0000] 2.110504 (0.588627) [0.5060] 
INR [0.0000] -2.203514 (0.255821) [0.0636] -1.938253 (0.248975) [0.5793] 
IDR [0.0000] 0.431685 (0.035221) [0.0000] 0.355634 (0.039084) [0.4272] 
MYR [0.0000] 1.965392 (0.585107) [0.0064] 0.751672 (0.433370) [0.4262] 
MAD [0.0000] 0.525199 (0.251234) [0.0013] 0.529968 (0.131133) [0.9233] 
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ARCH-LM 
Test 
GARCH  TGARCH 
 ARCH(8) l   lSE   Walda l   lSE   Waldb 
PKR [0.0000] 0.744422 (0.187054) [0.8950] 0.765128 (0.198100) [0.0001] 
PHP [0.0000] -0.744378 (0.149431) [0.0000] -0.390677 (0.332516) [0.8448] 
RUR [0.0000] 1.190274 (0.163699) [1.0000] 1.108316 (0.144521) [0.9586] 
THB [0.0000] -0.715972 (0.306116) [0.0595] -0.347496 (0.502499) [0.9989] 
TRL [0.0000] -0.011829 (0.004789) [0.9975] 0.007416 (0.007900) [0.9303] 
AED [0.0000] 0.862217 (0.360894) [0.0000] 0.920023 (0.338685) [0.3429] 
This table report results from regressions (2.5.11)   ttltltlltlt ehSFSS   lnlnlnln , , (2.5.12) 
t
q
i
ititt eh   


1
2 , (2.5.13) 
t
p
i
iti
q
i
ititt heh   




11
2  and (2.5.14) 
t
q
i
ititi
q
i
ititt edeh   




1
2
1
2 . The p-value 
of ARCH –LM tests with lag length = 8 are reported within brackets. The corresponding standard errors 
from GARCH (8, 8) and TGARCH (8, 8, 8) are reported in parenthesis. The Walda statistic refers to the test 
of the hypothesis that the coefficients of GARCH terms are equal to zero simultaneously. The Waldb statistic 
refers to the test of the hypothesis that the coefficients for good news and bad news are equal in TGARCH 
model. P-values from Wald tests are reported within brackets. All estimations are reported with 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 2-18: Forward premium regressions for daily individual currencies 
 
ARCH-LM 
Test 
GARCH  TGARCH 
 ARCH(5) l   lSE   Walda l   lSE   Waldb 
AUD [0.0000] 1.683220 (0.198962) [0.0000] 1.465331 (0.187510) [0.3869] 
CAD [0.0000] 5.092563 (0.259279) [0.0000] 3.019965 (0.270160) [0.0000] 
EUR [0.0000] -2.986889 (0.438839) [0.0845] -0.843731 (0.158116) [0.1963] 
HKD [0.0000] -0.605690 (0.099180) [0.0000] -0.482024 (0.104763) [0.3647] 
ILS [0.0000] 6.401000 (0.300180) [0.0000] 6.754148 (0.272660) [0.0001] 
JPY [0.0000] -1.796942 (0.158426) [0.0000] -0.225394 (0.177031) [0.0250] 
NZD [0.0000] -1.754533 (0.973312) [0.0000] -1.783311 (1.112564) [0.0195] 
NOK [0.0000] -1.068064 (0.073305) [0.0000] -1.074433 (0.078244) [0.7817] 
SGD [0.0000] -1.486775 (0.099477) [0.0000] -1.559325 (0.102152) [0.2558] 
CHF [0.0000] -2.553494 (0.676744) [0.0000] -7.037566 (1.071042) [0.0016] 
USD [0.0000] -0.823642 (0.121799) [0.0000] -0.950937 (0.121610) [0.2518] 
BRL [0.0000] -0.511535 (0.116630) [0.0016] -0.522390 (0.117331) [0.3364] 
HUF [0.0000] 0.476272 (0.054904) [0.0000] 0.861936 (0.065159) [0.5181] 
MXP [0.0000] -2.054075 (0.031133) [0.0000] -1.845056 (0.064239) [0.0000] 
PLZ [0.0000] 1.839385 (0.289031) [0.0000] 2.105150 (0.089376) [0.7034] 
ZAR [0.0000] 0.179406 (0.113285) [0.0000] 0.224365 (0.120147) [0.6140] 
TWD [0.0000] -0.136644 (0.175473) [0.0000] -0.164027 (0.166401) [0.1270] 
CLP [0.0000] 0.518524 (0.171105) [0.0000] 0.816171 (0.182359) [0.0164] 
CNY [0.0000] 1.856012 (0.048337) [0.0000] 1.616915 (0.046423) [0.2625] 
COP [0.0000] -2.491654 (0.127449) [0.0000] -2.775851 (0.133213) [0.5350] 
CZK [0.0000] 1.740064 (0.094259) [0.0000] 1.974348 (0.104094) [0.0043] 
INR [0.0000] -2.535088 (0.066388) [0.0000] -2.659891 (0.067748) [0.0619] 
IDR [0.0000] 0.320252 (0.015926) [0.0000] 0.306931 (0.014724) [0.3579] 
MYR [0.0000] 0.614006 (0.136811) [0.0000] 0.098945 (0.168050) [0.2516] 
MAD [0.0000] 0.365968 (0.046445) [0.0000] 0.421426 (0.044471) [0.4471] 
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ARCH-LM 
Test 
GARCH  TGARCH 
 ARCH(5) l   lSE   Walda l   lSE   Waldb 
PKR [0.0000] 0.678582 (0.051003) [0.0000] 0.672997 (0.051026) [0.1444] 
PHP [0.0000] -0.831138 (0.077754) [0.0000] -0.838590 (0.076481) [0.7157] 
RUR [0.0000] 0.865588 (0.044522) [0.0000] 0.986612 (0.043828) [0.1111] 
THB [0.0000] -1.181646 (0.083368) [0.0000] -1.168975 (0.079899) [0.3585] 
TRL [0.0000] 0.007075 (0.001619) [0.0000] 0.006386 (0.002982) [0.0155] 
AED [0.0000] 0.355676 (0.085727) [0.0000] 0.643103 (0.091989) [0.4304] 
This table report results from regressions (2.5.11)   ttltltlltlt ehSFSS   lnlnlnln , , (2.5.12) 
t
q
i
ititt eh   


1
2 , (2.5.13) 
t
p
i
iti
q
i
ititt heh   




11
2  and (2.5.14) 
t
q
i
ititi
q
i
ititt edeh   




1
2
1
2 .The p-value of 
ARCH –LM tests with lag length = 5 are reported within brackets. The corresponding standard errors from 
GARCH (5, 5) and TGARCH (5, 5, 5) are reported in parenthesis. The Walda statistic refers to the test of 
the hypothesis that the coefficients of GARCH terms are equal to zero simultaneously. The Waldb statistic 
refers to the test of the hypothesis that the coefficients for good news and bad news are equal in TGARCH 
model. P-values from Wald tests are reported within brackets. All estimations are reported with 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 2-19: Panel analysis of forward premium regressions (weekly data) 
 Standard regression State-dependent regressions 
 l   lSE   

l   lSE   l   lSE   Walda Waldb 
All -0.001414 (0.011793) -0.017962 (0.012580) 0.295268 (0.074685) [0.0001] [0.0000] 
Developed -0.105865 (0.401700) -0.155069 (0.540733) 0.000056 (0.823622) [0.8860] [0.0092] 
Emerging -0.000924 (0.011887) -0.016607 (0.012733) 0.276601 (0.076911) [0.0003] [0.0000] 
This table reports results from panel estimation of regressions (2.5.5)   llttltlltlt SFSS ,, lnlnlnln    , (2.5.6) 
    llttlttltltlt SFSFSS ll ,,, lnlnlnlnlnln 

  
 and (2.5.9)       llttltltltltltlltlt SFSFSFSS ,
3
,
2
,, lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln   
.The 
standard regression is the regression of percentage change in the exchange rate on the associated forward 
premium. The plus-minus regression refers to the case when observations of the forward premia are 
categorized into negative and positive observations. The corresponding standard error is given within 
parenthesis. The Walda statistic refers to the test of the hypothesis that   ll  . The Wald
b statistic refers 
to the test of the hypothesis that the added terms are zero. P-values from Wald tests are reported within 
brackets. HAC (Newey-West) covariance matrices are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
 
 
Table 2-20: Panel analysis of forward premium regressions (daily data) 
 Standard regression State-dependent regressions 
 l   lSE   

l   lSE   l   lSE   Walda Waldb 
All 0.000324 (0.005427) -0.014987 (0.005729) 0.313889 (0.036072) [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Developed -0.040316 (0.185938) 0.401096 (0.255720) -1.252199 (0.406503) [0.0023] [0.0007] 
Emerging 0.000868 (0.005464) -0.013949 (0.005786) 0.300336 (0.037028) [0.0000] [0.0000] 
This table reports results from panel estimation of regressions (2.5.5)   llttltlltlt SFSS ,, lnlnlnln    , (2.5.6) 
    llttlttltltlt SFSFSS ll ,,, lnlnlnlnlnln 

  
 and (2.5.9)       llttltltltltltlltlt SFSFSFSS ,
3
,
2
,, lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln   
.The 
standard regression is the regression of percentage change in the exchange rate on the associated forward 
premium. The plus-minus regression refers to a case when observations of the forward premia are 
categorised into negative and positive observations. The corresponding standard error is given in parenthesis. 
The Walda statistic refers to the test of the hypothesis that   ll  . The Wald
b statistic refers to the test of 
the hypothesis that the added terms are zero. P-values from Wald tests are reported within brackets. HAC 
(Newey-West) covariance matrices are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
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Appendix II: HAC (Newey-West) 
 
Following Andrews (1991) and Hansen’s (1992) framework, a sequence of mean-zero 
random P -vectors   tV  may depend on a K -vector of parameters θ, and let 
 0tt VV   where 0  is the true value of θ. Hence, the LRCOV matrix  to be 
estimated is: 
(A.1)         



j
j          
Where,  
(A.2)        
 
    0
0







  
jjj
jVVEj jtt
 
is the antocovariance matrix of tV at lag j . When tV is second-order stationary, 
equals 2 times the spectral density matrix of tV evaluated at frequency zero 
(Hansen (1982), Andrews (1991)).  
 
The class of kernel HAC covariance matrix estimators in Andrews (1991) can be 
written as: 
(A.3)           





j
T jbjk
KT
T ˆˆ  
Where the sample autocovariances  jˆ are given by 
(A.4)         
 
    0ˆˆ
0ˆˆ
1ˆ
1





 


jjj
jVV
T
j
T
jt
jtt
 
k is a symmetric kernel (or lag window) function that, among other conditions, is 
continuous at the origin and satisfies   1xk for all x with   10 k , and 0Tb is a 
bandwidth parameter. The leading  KTT  term is an optimal correction for 
degrees-of-freedom associated with the estimation of the K parameters in . There 
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are a large number of kernel functions that satisfy the required conditions. The 
bandwidth Tb operates in concert with the kernel function to determine the weights 
for the various sample autocovariances.  
 
To construct an operational nonparametric kernel estimator, a value for the bandwidth
Tb  must be chosen. Under general conditions (Andrews 1991) the consistency of the 
kernel estimator requires that Tb is chosen so that Tb and 0TbT as T . 
Alternately, Kiefer and Vogelsang (2002) propose setting TbT  in a testing context. 
 
For the great majority of supported kernels   0Tbjk  for Tbj  so that the 
bandwidth acts indirectly as a lag truncation parameter. However, relating Tb to the 
corresponding integer lag number of included lag m requires an examination of the 
properties of the kernel at the endpoints  1Tbj . The varying relationship between 
the bandwidth and the lag-truncation parameter implies that one should examine the 
kernel function when choosing bandwidth values to match computations that are 
quoted in lag truncation form. For example, matching the Newey-West’s (1987) 
Bartlett kernel estimator which uses m weighted autocovariance lags requires setting
1 mbT .  
 
The theoretical results of the relationship between bandwidths and the asymptotic 
truncated MSE of the kernel estimator provide finer discrimination in the rates at 
which bandwidths should increase. The optimal bandwidths may be written in the 
form: 
(A.5)        
 121  qT Tb   
Where   is a constant, and q  is a parameter that depends on the kernel function 
that you select (Andrews 1991). For the Bartlett kernel  bq 1  should grow (at 
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most) at the rate
31T . The truncated kernel does not have an optimal rate, but Andrews 
(1991) reports Monte Carlo simulations which suggest that 
51T works well. 
Meanwhile, the theoretically useful knowledge of the rate at which bandwidths should 
increase at T  does not tell us the optimal bandwidth for a given sample size 
since the constant   remains unspecified. 
 
Andrews (1991) and Newey and West (1994) offers two approaches to estimating  . 
These techniques can be termed as automatic bandwidth selection methods since they 
involve estimating the optima bandwidth from the data rather than specifying a value 
a priori. Both the Andrews and Newey-West estimators for   may be written as: 
(A.6)             121ˆˆ  qk qcq   
Where q  and the constant kc  
depend on properties of the selected kernel and  qˆ
is an estimator of  q , which is a measure of the smoothness of the spectral density 
at frequency zero that depends on the autocovariances  j . Thus: 
(A.7)            121* ˆˆ  qkT Tqcb   
The q  that one uses depends on properties of the selected kernel function.  
 
Newey-West (1994) employ a nonparametric approach to estimating  q . In 
contrast to Andrews who computes parametric estimates of the individual 
 q
sfˆ , 
Newey-West uses a truncated kernel estimator to estimate the 
 qf corresponding to 
aggregate data: 
(A.8)         

 

T
jt
jttj wjwwVVw
T 1
ˆˆˆ1ˆ  
The jˆ  
may be viewed either as the sample autocovariance of a weighted linear 
combination of the data using weights w , or as a weighted combination of the 
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sample autocovariances. Next, Newey and West use the jˆ  
to compute 
nonparametric truncated kernel estimators of the Parzen measures of smoothness: 
(A.9)          


n
nj
j
qq jf 

ˆ
2
1ˆ  
for 2,1q . This expression may be used to obtain the expression for the plug-in 
optimal bandwidth estimator. 
 
To implement the Newey-West optimal bandwidth selection method we require a 
value for n , the lag-selection parameter, which governs how many autocovariances 
to use in forming the nonparametric estimates of  qf . Newey and West show that n  
should increase at (less than) a rate that depends on the properties of the kernel. For 
the Bartlett kernel, the rate is 
92T . In addition, one must choose a weighted vector 
w . Although Newey-West (1987) leaves the choice of w open, they follow Andrew’s 
(1991) suggestion of 1sw  
for all but the intercept in their Monte Carlo simulations. 
Here, the choice is slightly different by setting 1sw for al s . 
 
86 
 
Appendix III: Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Panel unit root tests are technically similar to unit root tests carried out on single 
series, but are applied to panel data structure. Several tests (such as Levin, Lin and 
Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), Fisher-type ADF tests, Im, Pesaran and Shin(2003), and 
Fisher-PP (Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)) tests, and Hadri (2000) LM tests) 
are used here to test the unit roots and the details of these tests are briefly described 
below. 
 
Consider the following AR(1) process for panel data: 
(A.10)        itiititiit Xyy   1  
Where itX  
represent the exogenous variables, including any fixed effects or 
individual trends; Ni ,...,2,1  describes cross-section units or series and 
Tt ,...,2,1  denotes the time periods; and, it  are errors that assumed to be mutually 
independent idiosyncratic disturbance. Hence, if 1i  then ity  is said to be 
weakly (trend-) stationary. On the other hand, if 1i  
then ity  
contains a unit root. 
Some unit root tests assume that the coefficient i  
is constant across cross-sections 
(such as the Levin, Lin Chu (LLC), Breitung, and Hadri tests) while others allow i
to vary freely for different i  (such as the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS), Fisher-ADF 
and Fisher-PP tests). 
 
The Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC), Breitung, and Hadri tests all assume that there is a 
common unit root process so that  i . The first two tests both employ the 
following basic ADF specification: 
(A.11)        itit
p
j
jitijitit Xyyy
i
  


1
1  
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Where the coefficient 1  , and ip  is the lag order for different terms which 
varies across cross-sections. The null and alternative hypotheses for the tests are 
specified as: 
    0:0 H     Unit root 
    0:1 H     Stationary 
Given the lag orders, Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) derives estimates of   from proxies 
for ity  
and ity  through estimation of both ity , 1ity  
on the lag terms jity  (for 
ipj ,...,1 ) and the exogenous variables itX . By denoting the two sets of estimated 
coefficients from these two regressions by   ˆ,ˆ  and   , , respectively, ity can 
be yielded by using the first set of auxiliary estimates, removing the autocorrelations 
and deterministic components from ity : 
(A.12)         ˆˆ
1
1 it
p
j
jitijitit Xyyy
i
 

  
Likewise, 1ity can be written as: 
(A.13)          it
p
j
jitijitit Xyyy
i
 


1
11  
These proxies are then standardised by dividing the corresponding estimated standard 
errors, is : 
(A.14)         iitit syy   
(A.15)         iitit syy 11    
The estimate of the coefficient   is obtained by estimating the pooled proxy 
equation: 
(A.16)        ititit yy   1  
The LLC test statistic for the resulting ˆ  follows an asymptotic normally 
distribution: 
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(A.17)        
   
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
  
Where t  
is the standard t-statistic for 0ˆ  ; 2ˆ  is the estimated variance of the 
error term  ;  ˆse is the standard error of ˆ ; and, 1





  NpTT
i
i . NS  
is 
the average standard deviation ratio, which is defined as the mean of the ratios of the 
long-run standard deviation to the innovations standard deviation for each individual. 
*Tm
 and 
*Tm

 
are the adjusted mean and standard deviations, respectively.  
 
The Breitung methodology is different from LLC in two distinct aspects. Firstly, in 
order to construct the standardized proxies only the autoregressive term is removed, 
which yields: 
(A.18)        
i
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(A.19)        
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Where  ,ˆ , and is  are with same definitions as for LLC. Secondly, the proxies are 
transformed and detrended through the following equations: 
(A.20)        
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(A.21)         11
1
1
* iiTiitit yy
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yyy 
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
  
And the persistence parameter  is estimated from the pooled proxy equation: 
(A.22)        ititit vyy   ** 1  
Under the null hypothesis of unit root, the resulting estimator *  is asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal suggested by Breitung. Furthermore, no kernel 
computations are needed for Breitung, which is in contrast to the LLC which requires 
kernel techniques to estimate NS . 
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The Hadri panel unit root test has a null hypothesis of no unit root in any of the series 
in the panel, and it is based on the residuals from the individual OLS regressions of 
ity , for example on a constant or on a constant, and the trend is as follows: 
(A.23)        itiiit ty    
Under homoscedasticity assumption, the LM statistic based on the residual estimates 
ˆ  taken from the individual regressions is: 
(A.24)          
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Where  tSi are the cumulative sums of the residuals,   


t
s
isi tS
1
ˆ  and 0f
 is the 
average of the individual estimators of the residual spectrum at frequency zero, 
Nff
N
i
i


1
00
 . Furthermore, with heteroskedasticity across i : 
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Hadri suggests that under mild assumptions: 
(A.26)        
   1,0NLMNZ 


 
With 61 and 451  when the model only includes constants ( 0i for all i ), 
and 151 and 630011  otherwise. However, Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) 
show that the Hadri test appears to over-reject the null of stationarity and, therefore, 
may yield results that directly contradict those which are obtained using alternative 
test statistics. 
 
There are also some tests with individual unit root process (such as the Im, Pesaran 
and Shin, the Fisher-ADF, and Fisher-PP tests) where ip  
may vary across 
cross-sections. These tests combine individual unit root tests to yield a panel-specific 
result. 
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Im, Pesaran and Shin consider a separate ADF regression for different cross-sections: 
(A.27)        itit
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The null and alternative hypotheses are specified as: 
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The average of the t-statistics from individual ADF regressions estimation for i , 
which is defined as  iiT pt i  and which is written as: 
(A.28)          Nptt
N
i
iiTNT i






 
1
 
In general, IPS shows that a properly standardised NTt  
has an asymptotic standard 
normal distribution: 
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In addition, there is an alternative approach which was proposed by Maddala and Wu 
(1999), as well as Choi that uses Fisher’s (1932) results to derive tests that combine 
the p-values from individual unit root tests. If i  
is defined as the p-value from any 
individual unit root test from cross-section i  then the asymptotic result under the 
null of unit root for all N cross-sections is: 
(A.30)          22
1
log2 N
N
i
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Choi demonstrates that: 
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Where 
1  is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
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Appendix IV: Panel Cointegration Methodology 
 
Similar to the time series cointegration analysis, the most commonly used panel 
cointegration methods are split into Engle-Granger (1987) based two-step tests (such 
as Pedroni (1999), Pedroni (2004) and Kao (1999) tests) as well as the Fisher-type test 
using Johansen methodology (such as Maddala and Wu (1999)).  
 
The Engle-Granger (1987) two-step cointegration test is based on an examination of 
the residuals of a spurious regression. Under the Engle-Granger framework, assuming 
that the variables in the regression are all I(1), then if the residuals are I(0) the 
variables are cointegrated. Pedroni and Kao extend the Engle-Granger construction to 
tests involving panel data. Pedroni allows for heterogeneous individual and trend 
effects across cross-sections in his panel cointegration tests: 
(A.32)        titMiMitiitiiiiit exxxty ,,,22,11 ...    
For Tt ,...,1 ; Ni ,...,1 ; Mm ,...,1 ; where y and x are assumed to be 
integrated of order one (e.g. I(1)). The parameters i  
and i  are individual and 
trend effects which may be set to zero if desired. The residual tie ,  
should be I(0) if 
y  and x  are cointegrated. Thus, in order to test whether  0~, Ie ti  we will run the 
following auxiliary regression: 
(A.33)        ititiit uee  1  
Or,  
(A.34)        it
p
j
jitijitiit veee
i
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1
1   
for each cross-section. Pedroni provides various methods of constructing statistics for 
testing for null hypothesis of no cointegration ( 1i ). There are two alternative 
hypotheses: firstly, the homogenous alternative,   1 i for all i (which Pedroni 
terms the within-dimension test or panel statistics test); and secondly, the 
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heterogeneous alternative, 1i  for all i  (which is also referred to as the 
between-dimension or group statistics test). 
 
The Pedroni panel cointegration statistic TN , , and he shows that the standardised 
statistic is asymptotically normally distributed: 
(A.35)         1,0, N
v
NTN 
 
 
Where   and v  are Monte Carlo generated adjustment terms. 
 
The Kao test is also an Engle-Granger based cointegration test which follows the 
same basic approach as the Pedroni tests. It differs by specifying cross-section 
specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients on the first-stage regressors. For 
example, consider a bivariate case, which is described in Kao (1999): 
(A.36)        ititiit exy    
For:  
(A.37)        ititit uyy  1  
(A.38)        ititit xx  1  
Where Tt ,...,1 ; Ni ,...,1 . Similarly to Pedroni, Kao obtains the residuals and 
runs the pooled auxiliary regression: 
(A.39)        ititit vee  1  
Or: 
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Under the null of no cointegration, Kao shows that following the statistics: 
(A.41)        
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(A.42)        NtDFt 875.125.1    
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And for the augmented pooled auxiliary regression, where 0p : 
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Converge to  1,0N  asymptotically, where the estimated variance is 
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And the long run covariance is estimated using the usual kernel estimator: 
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Where  is one of the supported kernel functions and b is the bandwidth. 
 
Fisher (1932) derives a combined test that uses the results of the individual 
independent tests. Maddala and Wu (1999) use Fisher’s results to propose an 
alternative approach to testing for cointegration in panel data by combining the tests 
from individual cross-sections to obtain at test statistic for the null panel. If i  
is the 
p-value from an individual cointegration test for cross-section i , then under the null 
hypothesis for the panel: 
(A.48)          22
1
log2 N
N
i
i   

 
Where the 
2  value is based on MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) p-values for 
Johansen’s cointegration trace test and maximum eigenvalue test. 
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Appendix V: Economic foundations of forward risk premium 
 
Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) denote the logarithms of the spot and forward exchange 
rates by the corresponding lower case variables, ts and ltf , , respectively, where the 
forward contract is signed at time t and matured at time t+l. The covered interest rate 
parity (CIP) can be expressed as    *,,1, ltlttlt iisf   , with lti , being the pound 
return on an l-period risk free pound denominated bond and 
*
,lti denoting the foreign 
currency return on a risk free bond denominated in terms of the foreign currency. 
Associating it with uncovered interest parity (UIP) it yields: 
(A.49)             *,,1, ltlttltltt iisfsE                   
Where  tE  denotes the mathematical expectation conditioned on the set of all 
relevant information at time t. Hence the expected rate of appreciation (depreciation) 
should be equal to the current forward premium,  1,  tlt sf . 
 
It is well known that the UIP holds under some joint assumptions, which are: rational 
expectations, risk neutrality, free capital mobility and the absence of taxes on capital 
transfers (Baillie and Bollerslev 2000). According to these assumptions, the expected 
real returns in the forward market is: 
(A.50)           0/,   ltltltt PSFE          
Where tP  denotes the domestic price level, measured by the British pound. A Taylor 
series expansion of Equation (A.50) to second order terms gives: 
(A.51)             ltlttttltltt psCovsVarfsE   1,
2
1
   
Where tp  
is defined as the logarithm of domestic price level. The expression on the 
right hand side of Equation (A.51) contains two terms of second moment, conditional 
on the assumptions of rational expectations and risk neutrality. In the previous 
literature these terms are often referred to as the Jensen inequality term. 
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Under the consumption-based asset pricing model, the representative investor’s real 
returns can be specified as follows, associated with the current and future 
consumption streams: 
(A.52)                0//,   tltltltltt CUCUPSFE    
Where    tlt CUCU   / is the marginal rate of substitution. Thus: 
(A.53)               ltlttltlttttltltt qsCovpsCovsVarfsE   1,
2
1
  
Where ltq  denotes the logarithmic intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. 
Therefore, compared to Eq. (A.51), the last term is specified as a time-dependent risk 
premium, which can be used to explain the empirical deviations from UIP. 
(A.54)         ltlttlt qsCov ,               
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Chapter 3  Exchange Rate and Term Structure of Interest Rates 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
In the late 1990s, quite a few emerging countries abandoned their long-standing 
currency crawling pegs and moved towards floating exchange rate regime, especially 
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1998 Russian financial crisis. For instance, 
Brazil set its currency into an independently floating regime following its own 
currency crisis in 1999, while Chile (whose exchange rate had been classified as 
managed floating since 1997) also finally allowed its currency to float in 1999. 
 
There is a widespread consensus that the relationship between the exchange rate and 
interest rates plays a very important role in policy-making. Dornbusch (1976) 
developed a theory of exchange rate movements under perfect capital mobility, 
following which it has been a conventional wisdom that a rising interest rate is 
associated with the appreciation of domestic currency. This point has been proved in 
more recent papers which have used a risk neutral investor (e.g. Alexius 1999). Thus, 
it is natural to make a corollary that the term structure of interest rates might be 
irrelevant for determining the exchange rate. However, Ogaki and Santaella (1999) 
and Lim and Ogaki (2004) argue that this conventional wisdom may not be that 
reliable and they show evidence that the term structure of interest rates plays an 
important part in the exchange rate determination. In this chapter, we will reconsider 
Lim and Ogaki’s (2004) theory and will empirically extend it by examining the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates for 
emerging economies. 
 
Isard (1995) and many other recent papers show that the uncovered interest parity 
under risk neutrality is rejected with short-horizon data. Engel (1996) points out the 
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presence of forward premium anomaly, which is the finding of a negative slope 
coefficient when one regresses the future exchange rate depreciation on the current 
forward premium. However, it is difficult to interpret this anomaly from an economic 
point of view. Mark and Wu (1998) emphasise that it is hard to explain this anomaly 
with standard consumption-based capital asset pricing model. Another stylised fact 
has recently found that this forward premium anomaly seems not to exist in 
long-horizon data (Meredith and Chinn 1998). At the same time, many empirical 
studies show evidence that the uncovered interest parity holds better in the long-run. 
Edison and Pauls (1993) provide cointegration results which suggest that the 
long-term interest rate differentials play a more important role than the short-term 
interest rate differentials in the real exchange rate determination, especially in the 
long-run. Baxter (1994) argues that the reason why the prior studies could not find a 
statistical link between real exchange rates and real interest differentials is because 
they have focused on high-frequency data. He also shows that there is a positive 
correlation between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials, and this 
relationship is strong at trend and business-cycle frequencies. Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1997) show that some implications of uncovered interest parity hold in the long-run, 
although they are not consistent with the stylised facts in the short-run. More recently, 
Byeon and Ogaki (1999) have used Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) 
techniques and illustrate statistically significant but opposite effects of the short-term 
interest rate differential and the long-term interest rate differential on the real 
exchange rate for several developed countries. However, the evidence for emerging 
economies is rather limited in the literature.  
 
Lim and Ogaki (2004) provide an economic model that is consistent with these 
short-run and long-run stylised facts and which is useful to explain the forward 
premium anomaly. In their model they assume that investors are risk averse with short 
investment horizons, and a complicated effect of the term structure of interest rates on 
the exchange rate is derived. The idea behind their model is the concept of indirect 
complementarity due to the structure of interest risk under the assumption of risk 
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aversion. Specifically, the domestic long-term bonds and the foreign bonds are strong 
substitutes if domestic currency appreciates with the rise in the domestic short-term 
interest rate. When the domestic short-term interest rate increases, investors with a 
short-term investment horizon holding long-term bonds suffer a capital loss. At the 
same time, investors with foreign bonds also face a capital loss as a result of domestic 
currency appreciation. In other words, as long as the domestic currency appreciation 
is associated with an increase in the domestic short-term interest rate then investors 
will try to avoid holding both the domestic long-term and the foreign bonds, which 
makes these two assets strong substitutes. Meanwhile, it is well known that domestic 
short-term and long-term bonds are also strong substitutes, and a substitute of a 
substitute is an indirect complement and, therefore, the domestic short-term bonds and 
the foreign bonds can be also considered as strong indirect complements. As a result, 
only when the direct substitutability between the short-term bonds and the foreign 
bonds dominate the indirect complementarity is the relationship between the exchange 
rate and the interest rate differentials consistent with conventional wisdom. If the 
indirect complementarity dominates the direct substitutability then this relationship 
will become at odds.  
 
It is well known that the monetary authorities try to manage liquidity through interest 
rates, as well as achieving their foreign exchange market objectives. Hence, it is 
interesting to ask if the short-term interest rate has an intuitive effect on the exchange 
rate. According to the theoretical model of Lim and Ogaki (2004), the one-month 
interest rate differential has the opposite effect from conventional wisdom by 
controlling for the effect of the three-month interest rate differential when the indirect 
complementarity dominates the direct substitutability, and vice versa. 
 
Because the term structure of interest rates describes the different yields to maturity, 
which is often considered as an important factor in formulating monetary policy, it has 
motivated a number of theoretical and empirical studies in recent years. In this chapter, 
an empirical investigation on the relationship between the exchange rate and the term 
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structure of interest rates is pursued for emerging markets. The evidence for emerging 
economies is found to be rare in the previous literature; consequently, one of the main 
contributions of this chapter will be to address this gap in our understanding of this 
problem. In addition, the consistency of the term structure of money markets 
(one-month and three-month interest rates) on exchange rate determination has 
recently become another main focus of research and it is taken into account in this 
investigation. The consistency issue which is related to this relationship between the 
exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates for emerging economies arises 
because most of these countries changed their exchange rate regimes during their 
sample periods. Therefore, the behaviour of these interest rates might not be 
consistent while, in the meantime, the markets of long-term bonds for some of these 
emerging economies is not well developed, hence shifts in the yield curves have to be 
taken into consideration. Another contribution of this chapter is the application of a 
panel cointegration approach controlling for fixed effects for each individual country 
and across time. The data and information are found to be relatively limited for 
individual emerging economy and some countries have short sample periods available; 
nonetheless, a whole picture of this cointegration relationship between the exchange 
rate and the term structure of interest rates for emerging market as well as more 
powerful results can be provided through panel construction of the data  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the economic 
model in detail and provides some recent literature that will inform this issue. Section 
3.3 interprets the econometric methodologies that are used to investigate the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates. Data 
and basic statistics are described in Section 3.4, where VAR is applied to approximate 
rational expectations. Section 3.5 discusses the empirical model specifications. The 
results are reported in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 will conclude this chapter. 
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3.2.  Literature Review 
 
Dornbusch (1976) develops a theory of exchange rate movements under perfect 
capital mobility, which has been followed by quite a large literature showing that with 
risk neutral investors an increase in the interest rate would associate with domestic 
currency appreciation. Driskill and McCafferty (1980) adopt rational expectations 
under floating exchange rates to analyse exchange speculation in the foreign market. 
Fukao and Okubo (1984) develop a theoretical model of exchange rate determination 
and interest rate structure in explaining Japanese secondary bond market yields. Both 
of these studies constructed and used two-asset models. Byeon and Ogaki (1999) and 
Lim and Ogaki (2004) extend these two-asset models and construct instead a 
three-asset model to predict the relationship between the exchange rate and the term 
structure of interest rates. Their partial equilibrium model is shown to be consistent 
with the stylised facts for both the short-term and long-term interest rates to determine 
the exchange rate. It is essential to motivate the empirical investigations to investigate 
this further. 
 
The forward premium anomaly is a well-known puzzle in the study of economics. 
Mark and Wu (1998) and Wu (2004) emphasise that it is impossible to explain this 
anomaly with either a standard consumption-based capital asset pricing model or a 
dynamic term structure model. However, another stylised fact has recently found that 
this forward premium anomaly seems not to exist. Mark (1995) finds some 
implications to show that the uncovered interest parity holds in the long-run. Meredith 
and Chinn (1998) give similar results with long-horizon data for G-7 countries. 
Alexius (2001) shows direct evidence that regressions with long-horizon of future 
currency depreciation on the current interest rate differential yield positive slope 
coefficient estimates. There is also other indirect evidence to show that the uncovered 
interest parity holds better in the long-run under the long-run purchasing power parity 
assumptions. For example, Boughton (1988) elucidates that including the term 
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structure of interest rate differentials could help to improve the performance of 
asset-market models of exchange rates empirically for developed economies like the 
U.S., Germany, and Japan. Meanwhile, Edison and Pauls (1993) provide cointegration 
results suggesting that long-term interest rate differentials play a more important role 
than the short-term interest rate differentials in the real exchange rate determination, 
especially in the long run. Baxter (1994) argues that the reason why the prior studies 
could not find a statistical link between real exchange rates and real interest 
differentials is because they focus on high-frequency data. He also shows that there is 
a positive correlation between real exchange rates and real interest differentials, and 
that this relationship is strongest at trend and business-cycle frequencies. More 
recently, Byeon and Ogaki (1999) have used Canonical Cointegrating Regression 
(CCR) techniques and illustrate statistically significant but opposite effects of 
short-term interest rate differential and long-term interest rate differential on the real 
exchange rate for several developed countries.  
 
Theoretically, Lim and Ogaki (2004) have constructed an economic model to explain 
the relationship between exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates which is 
consistent with the stylized facts for both short-term and long-term interest rates. 
Their economic model is built on conditional expectations and variances of risky 
assets. They decompose the effect of domestic short-term interest rate change into the 
direct risk premium effect (i.e. the effect of change in the risk premium for foreign 
bonds when the risk premium for domestic long-term bonds is unchanged) and 
indirect risk premium effect (i.e. effect of change in the risk premium for domestic 
long-term bonds while the risk premium for foreign bonds is kept constant), 
respectively, on demand for foreign bonds. They assume that the investors, who are 
risk averse, have short investment horizons with both domestic and foreign bonds 
while for investors who are risk neutral there is no indirect risk premium effect. Lim 
and Ogaki (2004) find a complicated relationship between the exchange rate and the 
term structure of interest rates. If the indirect complementarity dominates the direct 
substitutability between domestic one-period bonds and foreign bonds, then the 
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relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure of interest rate 
differentials will be counterintuitive and at odds with conventional wisdom (Ogaki 
and Santaella 1999).  
 
More specifically, Lim and Ogaki (2004) assume that the domestic investors are risk 
averse and invest in short horizon with a Constant Absolute Risk Averse (CARA) 
utility function, investors are identical and live only for two periods, and there is equal 
number of investors born in each period. There are three assets in the model: the 
domestic short-term bonds  tSB , , which are risk free; the domestic long-term 
bonds  tLB , ; and the foreign bonds  tFB , , which are considered as the other two 
risky assets, respectively. The returns of these assets follow normal distributions and, 
for the sake of simplicity, the overall price level is assumed to be constant so that the 
variables can be considered in real terms. The domestic short-term and long-term 
discount bonds pay one unit of domestic currency in one and two periods, respectively. 
The foreign short-term and long-term bonds are perfect substitutes, assuming a 
constant foreign interest rate. Thus, a representative investor with initial wealth 
 tW  will invest and hold a portfolio of these three assets to get maximal expected 
utility at the beginning of time t+1 in terms of wealth that defined as 1tW , subject to 
certain budget constraint. Thus, under rational expectation equilibrium with certain 
coefficients combinations, Lim and Ogaki (2004) have achieved a unique saddle point 
solution
2
 for the exchange rate which can be expressed as: 
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Where s  is long-run equilibrium exchange rate.
  
 
Equation (3.2.1), which is the basis of the following empirical study, implies that 
there are four factors that drive the exchange rate away from its long-run equilibrium. 
                                                        
2
 For model and derivation details, please refer to Lim and Ogaki (2004). 
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The first one is the trade shock (the second term on the right hand side of Equation 
(3.2.1)), which increases the current account surplus and appreciates the domestic 
currency. The second is the cumulative current account balance (the third term on the 
right hand side of Equation (3.2.1)), which also tends to appreciate the domestic 
currency. The last two factors are the persistent and temporary shocks in the 
short-term interest rate, respectively. Persistent rises in the short-term interest rate 
appreciates the domestic currency, while the temporary interest rate shock t  makes 
the domestic currency depreciate if the indirect complementarity of short-term and 
foreign bonds exceeds the direct substitutability (the relative magnitude of the indirect 
risk premium effect, 1 ). Whether long-term bonds and foreign bonds are 
substitutes or complements is determined by the sign of  . A positive  indicates 
positive indirect risk premium effect of the short-term interest rate rise on the demand 
of the foreign bonds. An intuitive interpretation of this is that as the short-term 
interest rate increases the investors holding long-term bonds suffer a capital loss 
because the price of the long-term bonds falls. Since a rise in short-term interest rate 
decreases the risk premium for holding long-term bonds, the risk averse investors 
would choose to hold more foreign bonds rather than domestic long-term bonds. 
Therefore, the rise in the short-term interest rate increases the demand for foreign 
bonds through the indirect risk premium effect. As argued by Ogaki and Santaella 
(1999) and Lim and Ogaki (2004) that the term structure of interest rates plays an 
important part in the exchange rate determination, in this chapter we will reconsider 
Lim and Ogaki’s (2004) theory and we will empirically examine the relationship 
between the exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates for emerging 
economies. 
 
In this chapter the empirical models are mainly based on Byeon and Ogaki’s (1999) 
empirical work on the relationship between exchange rate and the term structure of 
interest rates for several developed economies and on Ogaki and Santaella’s (1999) 
investigation of the same relation for Mexico. For developed economies (such as UK, 
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Germany, Japan, Canada, France, Italy, and Switzerland) similar effects of the term 
structure of interest rates are obtained on the exchange rate (Byeon and Ogaki, 1999). 
A risk in the short-term interest rate causes an appreciation in the domestic currency if 
the long-term interest rate rises in response to the rise in the short-term interest rate; 
while it leads to domestic currency depreciation if the long-term interest rate does not 
rise. Mexico is one of the developing countries which adopted a floating exchange 
rate regime due to the impacts of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998. Ogaki and Santaella (1999) use a CCR technique to examine 
how one-month and three-month Cetes interest rates influence the real exchange rate 
in Mexico for the periods before and after 1998. They find that the behaviour of the 
term structure of interest rates does not follow the conventional wisdom, especially 
during these two crises episodes. They suggest that their results for Mexico might be 
useful to understand the operation of floating exchange rate regime, however, they 
have not extended their work to any other developing economy.  
 
It can be seen from the previous literature that the empirical work is mainly focused 
on the developed economies. Evidence and information from emerging economies 
still continues to be rather limited in this area. Meanwhile, most of these empirical 
studies use time series analysis for each individual developed country. The powerful 
panel cointegrating approach is not widely applied to empirically study Lim and 
Ogaki’s (2004) model. The currencies in most emerging economies were not freely 
convertible until the late 1990s and the consistency of the relationship between their 
exchange rates and the term structure of interest rates is rarely found in the previous 
empirical studies.  
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3.3.  Methodology 
3.3.1. Cointegrating Regression 
 
Various economic time series are known as difference stationary. Phillips and Durlauf  
(1986) show evidence that if the series are I(1) in a regression then the conventional 
Wald coefficient tests will yield misleading results; for instance, spuriously showing a 
significant relationship between unrelated series. Engle and Granger (1987) illustrate 
that two or more I(1) series are cointegrated if the linear combination of those 
variables are stationary, or I(0), and such cointegrating vectors characterise the 
long-run relationship between these variables. 
 
Following Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Hansen (1992b), a standard triangular 
representation of a regression with a single cointegrating vector in terms of n+1 
dimensional series vector process  tt Xy ,  can be specified as: 
(3.3.1)        111 uDXy ttt    
With the deterministic trend regressors,
 
  ttt DDD 21 , , and the n stochastic 
regressors tX  
that are governed by the following system of equations: 
(3.3.2)        
tt
tttt
u
DDX
22
2222121




 
Both the cointegrating and regressors equations include the 1p -vector of tD1
regressors, while the deterministic trend regressors (i.e. the 2p -vector of tD2 ) only 
enter into the regressors equations. The constant term, if present, is assumed to be 
included in tD1 . The innovations,  
 ttt uuu 21 , , are assumed to be strictly stationary 
with: zero mean, contemporaneous covariance  , one-sided long-run covariance  , 
and non-singular long-run covariance  . Which is expressed as follows: 
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Thus, ty  
and tX  
are I(1) and cointegrated but exclude both cointegration amongst 
elements of tX  
and multicointegration (details are provided by Phillips and Hansen 
(1990a), Hansen (1992b) and Park (1992) with additional alternative specifications). 
 
Hamilton (1994) suggests that the ordinary least squares (static OLS) estimation of 
the cointegrating vector   is consistent if the series are cointegrated. However, the 
asymptotic distribution of static OLS estimates is generally non-Gaussian due to the 
presence of long-run correlation between the cointegrating equation errors and 
regressor innovations and  12 , and cross-correlation between the cointegrating 
equation errors and the regressors  12 . Thus, the conventional testing procedures 
are not reliable to conduct inference on the cointegrating vector. Nevertheless, if the 
number of stochastic regressors n  is less than the number of deterministic trends 
excluded from the cointegrating equation 2p  then static OLS exhibits an asymptotic 
Gaussian mixture distribution. By defining  0,max 22 pnm  , then if 02 m  the 
deterministic trends in the regressors asymptotically dominate the stochastic trend 
components in the cointegrating equation. 
 
However, apart from these exceptional cases, it is important to construct generally 
asymptotically efficient estimators which involve data transformation or cointegrating 
equation specification modifications to mimic the strictly exogenous tX  
case. 
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3.3.2. Canonical Cointegration Regression (CCR) 
 
The long-run relationship involving cointegrated variables have attracted considerable 
attention recently. Many works have focused on alternative cointegrating estimators 
and their asymptotic properties that are not affected by endogeneity and serial 
correlation under certain circumstances. One of these is the so called Canonical 
Cointegrating Regression (CCR) that was developed by Park (1992). The CCR can be 
applied to a wide class of cointegrating models. It is constructed so that the least 
square procedure yields asymptotically efficient estimators as well as Chi-square tests. 
Several previous studies, such as Phillips and Durlauf (1986), elucidate that the 
classical least squares estimators are nonstandard and biased for cointegrating 
regressions. Johansen (1988) uses a system estimation of error correction models to 
attack the problem of inference in cointegrated models. Park’s (1992) single equation 
CCR procedure yields the same asymptotically efficient estimators and Chi-square 
tests as Johansen’s (1988) system maximum likelihood method. 
 
Park’s (1992) CCR employs stationarity transformations of the data to get least 
squares distribution that are free of non-scalar nuisance parameters and suitable for 
asymptotic Chi-square testing. In the above equations specifications,  ttt uuu 21 ,   is 
strictly stationary with zero mean and finite covariance matrix  . In general cases, 
  is not block-diagonal and the tu process is weakly dependent, implying that the 
OLS estimator is not efficient. 
 
Following Park’s (1992) advice the first step is to obtain the innovation estimates 
  ttt uuu 21 ˆ,ˆˆ . The corresponding consistent estimates of the long-run covariance 
matrices ˆ  and ˆ  are obtained next. The next step is to extract the column of ˆ  
corresponding to the one-sided covariance matrix of tu :  
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(3.3.4)        






22
12
2 ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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Hence, the transformed series can be written as: 
(3.3.5)          ttt uXX ˆˆˆ 21*

           
(3.3.6)        
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


      
Where   are estimates of the cointegrating equation coefficients, which are 
asymptotically equivalent to the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates. These 
transformations asymptotically eradicate the endogeneity due to the long-run 
correlation of the cointegrating equation errors and the stochastic regressors 
innovations, as well as the asymptotic bias caused by the contemporaneous correlation 
between the regression and stochastic regressor errors. Therefore, CCR estimates are 
fully efficient and have unbiased asymptotic properties: 
(3.3.7)        


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

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
 
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t
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Where 






 

 ttt DXZ 1
** , . 
 
Since CCR estimators follow asymptotic distributions that can be essentially 
considered as normal distribution, the corresponding standard errors are valid to test 
for Wald coefficient restrictions. Defining the scalar estimator as: 
(3.3.8)         21
1
2212112.1
ˆˆˆˆˆ    
According to Hansen (1992a), the Wald statistic for the null hypothesis rR  can 
be specified as: 
(3.3.9)              rRRRVrRW    ˆˆˆ 1  
With: 
(3.3.10)         
1
1
2.1
ˆˆ


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

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

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T
t
ttZZV   
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 ˆV  has an asymptotic 2g -distribution, with g being the number of restrictions 
imposed by R. 
 
 
3.3.3. Dynamic OLS/DLS 
 
The CCR cointegration is applied first in this study in order to be consistent with the 
previous literature. However, the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) estimator 
is an alternative cointegrating regression estimator which is advocated by Stock and 
Watson (1993) using the models proposed by Inder (1993). Montalvo (1995) points 
out that the DOLS estimator performs systematically better than the CCR estimator 
for small-sample performance.  
 
DOLS is a single equation estimator of cointegration relationships, but it can handle 
unbalanced regression in which the variables have different orders of integration. The 
DOLS method augments the cointegrating regression using leads and lags of 
differences of independent variables to obtain efficient estimates and standard errors 
that are valid for hypothesis testing through Wald statistics. The DOLS is 
asymptotically equivalent to Johansen (1988) estimator of cointegration when 
variables in the system are I(1) and there is a single cointegrating vector (Arghyrou 
and Luintel 2007). The DOLS cointegrating regression can be specified as: 
(3.3.11)        t
r
jqj
jttt vXXy 1
0,
 

   
 
By augmenting the cointegrating regression with q lags and r leads of tX , the 
resulting cointegrating equation error term is orthogonal to the entire history of the 
stochastic innovations. The leads and lags of tX  
eliminate asymptotically any 
possible bias to endogeneity or serial correlation (Montalvo 1995). Details of DOLS 
cointegration approach with Newey-West HAC robust standard errors are provided in 
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Section 2.3.1.2 of Chapter 2. 
 
 
3.3.4. Panel Cointegrating Regression and Structural Breaks 
 
As pointed out by Montalvo (1995), the DOLS estimator performs systematically 
better than the CCR estimator for small-sample performance. It can also be applied to 
panel cointegration constructions. For example, consider the following panel setting 
with fixed effects: 
(3.3.12)        it
r
jqj
jitittiit uXXy  


0,
  
Similar to the time series DOLS/DGLS, the order of difference for the lead and lag 
terms are specified according to the order of integration of itX , which are used to 
control for any endogenous feedback and the nuisance parameters. Newey and West 
(1987) HAC is also used to control the presence of both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form under the panel framework. 
 
Under the panel DOLS construction, shifts in different regimes can be assessed 
through the tests of structural breaks in the cointegrating relationship. Break dates are 
identified using the sequential Wald test (Quintos 1995) with controlling time and 
cross-sectional fixed effects. The corresponding auxiliary regression for the stability 
test for panel data can be expressed as: 
(3.3.14)          itit
r
qj
jitittiit uDXXXy 

 

   
With: 
(3.3.15)        bttifD 1  
               bttif  0  
Where bt  represents the break date. The null hypothesis of no structural break 
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through the whole sample   0:0 H  is also tested sequentially over the whole 
sample period. The test Wald test statistic follows  12  distribution.  
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3.4.  Data and Preliminary Considerations 
 
This chapter investigates the effect of the term structure of interest rates on the 
exchange rate for sixteen emerging economies, which are: Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, 
Poland, South Africa, Taiwan, Chile, Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey. These emerging economies are 
chosen from FTSE advanced and secondary emerging countries. China, Colombia, 
Morocco, and United Arab Emirates are excluded from this analysis because of the 
data limitations. The data series are obtained monthly from Datastream over March 
1993 to March 2011. This is done because the data for the British one-month interest 
rate are available from March 1993. The United Kingdom is considered as a foreign 
country and the nominal exchange rate is expressed as the price of the U.K. pound in 
terms of each currency of the emerging economies, respectively. The consumer price 
index is used as the price level for each country. Thus, the real exchange rate is 
measured as the nominal exchange rate, times the U.K. price level, divided by the 
corresponding domestic price level. The data series of one-month and three-month 
interest rates are also obtained from Datastream. The one-month and three-month 
interbank rates are used for Hungary, Poland, South Africa, Czech Republic, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. The one- 
and three-month deposit rates are collected for Taiwan, India, Malaysia and 
Philippines. While for Mexico the one- and three-month interest rates are the rates of 
Treasury Bill (CETE) for 28 days and 91 days, respectively. All of the data are not 
seasonally adjusted. The inflation rate is calculated from the data of the corresponding 
consumer price index for each country, respectively. Therefore, the real interest rates 
are equal to the nominal interest rates minus the expected inflation that obtained using 
a Vector Autoregression (VAR), as well as under perfect foresight assumption. Both 
of these details are discussed below. 
 
Bansal and Dahlquist (Bansal and Dahlquist 2000) point out that many emerging 
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countries were only accessible for international investors from the early 1990s. The 
data base used here reflects this point. Thus, for these emerging economies, data are 
included as and when they become available. Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 in Appendix I 
at the end of this chapter report the inclusion date and basic descriptive statistics for 
the sample economies. 
 
The complete sample contains 217 monthly observations over the period March 1993 
to March 2011 for Mexico, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand; while Russia only has 
data available from May 1995 to May 1999. Expect for Russia all of these emerging 
economies have a similar pattern of interest rates and inflation (though with different 
magnitudes). The reason why Russia’s pattern of interest rates and inflation is 
dissimilar might be the short sample periods which contain more volatile data for the 
late-1990s. Both exchange rates and interest rates are relatively stable. The mean 
value of the three-month interest rate is slightly higher than its corresponding 
one-month interest rate for every country except for Brazil, Hungary, Chile and 
Indonesia which have a relatively higher one-month interest rate on average. 
 
The real interest rates are needed to model the relationship between the exchange rate 
and the term structure of interest rates. Thus, the expected inflation estimate has to be 
constructed. One method to achieve the expectation estimation is through a VAR 
model. Following Byeon and Ogaki (1999), a VAR of order five for the one-month 
nominal interest rate, the three-month nominal interest rate, and the inflation rate was 
estimated for every single economy over the respective sample period in order to 
obtain the three-period ahead forecast of the inflation rate in each period. Then, the 
three-month real interest rate specified in the model is calculated as the three-month 
nominal interest rate minus the corresponding inflation forecast. An alternative 
approach to achieve the expected inflation is based on the assumption of perfect 
foresight, which states that individuals are able to make correct and precise 
predictions about future inflation. Perfect foresight is a widely applied in dynamic 
economic models to yield an equilibrium solution without uncertainty. Therefore, one 
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can easily calculate the three-month real interest rate differential,  *,3,3 tt rr  , which 
can then be used to capture the influence of the persistent shock te  of the interest 
rate with longer duration. 
 
In addition, the normalised one-period interest rate tNr , , which is the negative risk 
premium for the three-month bonds, can be used to measure the effect of the 
temporary shock of interest rate. Following Ogaki and Santaella (Ogaki and Santaella 
1999) and Byeon and Ogaki (1999), this normalised one-period interest rate is 
specified as: 
(3.4.1)         

 
2
0
,3,1,
3
1
k
tktttN rrEr ,       
The normalised one-month interest rate captures the deviation of one-month interest 
rates from the three-month interest rate, with tr ,1  
and tr ,3  denoting the one-month 
and three-month nominal interest rates, respectively. The one period and two periods 
ahead forecasts of one-month interest rates are obtained from the VAR model 
estimation of order five for one-month nominal interest rate, three-month nominal 
interest rate, and inflation for every single country. An alternative to this approach is 
to use actual interest rates for one period and two periods ahead to proxy for the 
expected interest rates under perfect foresight. 
 
Table 3-3 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter reports the basic descriptive 
statistics of the three-month real interest rate differentials,  *,3,3 tt rr  , as well as the 
normalised one-month interest rate differentials,  *,, tNtN rr  , with expectations from 
VAR and under perfect foresight, respectively.  
 
All these emerging countries seem to have similar patterns for normalised one-month 
interest rate differential and three-month real interest differential. Once again, Russia 
is an exception to this rule because it contains relatively fewer observations. Although 
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Taiwan and Chile have negative three-month real interest differentials in average 
values, they share a similar trend with that of the other economies studied. For most 
economies both the nominalised one-month interest rate and the three-month real 
interest rate differentials have relatively large standard deviations. Thus, it is 
necessary to check the stationarity for each interest rate differentials as well as for the 
exchange rate, respectively, for every sample economy. The augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(Dickey and Fuller 1979) approach is applied to test for the unit root. Table 3-4 
reports the unit root test results for normalised one-month interest rate differential 
 *,, tNtN rr  , and three-month real interest rate differential  *,3,3 tt rr  , respectively, for 
every single economy. The natural logarithm of real exchange rate tsln  (which is 
calculated as a nominal exchange rate, multiplied by the U.K. price level, divided by 
the domestic price level) is also tested. A constant term is included in the test 
regressions.  
 
Table 3-4 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter reports the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test results for the log real exchange rate, the normalised 
one-month interest rate differential, and the three-month real interest rate differential, 
respectively. A constant term is included in the regressions with lag length 
automatically selected based on SIC for each series. The first column contains results 
for the log real exchange rate tsln . One can easily observe that for most cases, the 
null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected at 5% level. This implies that the log 
real exchange rates are not stationary for most countries, except for Brazil, Hungary, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Russia, and Turkey. For the normalised one-month interest 
rate differentials,  *,, tNtN rr  , stationarity is obtained for all sample economies under 
perfect foresight assumption, and thirteen out of sixteen economies with VAR 
expectations at 5% level. Nevertheless, according to the results presented in the last 
two columns in Table 3-4, the three-month real interest rate differentials,  *,3,3 tt rr   
are not stationary for most of these economies expect for: Hungary and Russia with 
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VAR expectations; and Taiwan, Malaysia and Russia under perfect foresight. Thus, it 
is necessary to implement the unit root test on each series in first difference, 
respectively, to obtain their orders of integration for further analysis. The results are 
reposted in Table 3-5 below. 
 
The results in Table 3-5 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter show evidence of 
stationary first difference of each series at 5% level. Combining these results with the 
results in Table 3-4 shows that for series in levels one can conclude that majority of 
the emerging economies have their log real exchange rates being I(1) series, except 
for Brazil, Hungary, Chile, Czech Republic, Russia and Turkey which have I(0) series. 
The normalised interest rate differentials are I(0) for all sample economies with 
expectations obtained under perfect foresight assumption, and for most of these 
economies (except for Brazil, South Africa and Russia) with expectations achieved 
from a VAR estimation. The three-month real interest rate differentials are I(1) except 
for: Hungary and Russia with VAR expectations; and, Taiwan, Malaysia and Russia 
under perfect foresight.  
 
Since some of the emerging economies contain relative short sample periods, analysis 
with individual country may not be that powerful. Hence, it is necessary and 
important to take into account the panel data constructions for all the emerging 
countries in the sample separately, as well as for the advanced and secondary 
emerging economies. Thus, the first step is also to look at the order of integration for 
each variable, but within the panel setting: 
 
Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter report the panel unit 
root test results of LLC (details provided in Appendix II in Chapter 2). Although the 
null hypothesis of the unit root cannot be rejected for log real exchange rate and 
three-month real interest rate differential in levels, it is rejected in favour of 
stationarity for both of them in first differences. This implies that the log real 
exchange rate and the three-month real interest rate differential are I(1) series. At the 
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same time, the unit root hypothesis is rejected for the normalised one-period interest 
rate differential in levels; thereby, indicating that the normalised one-period interest 
rate differential is a stationary series.  
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3.5.  The Economic Model Specification 
 
In the empirical analysis the reduced form of the model (i.e. Equation (3.2.1)
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  ) is employed in order to find 
stylised facts about the relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure 
of interest rates. The important features of the data that were described in Section 3.4 
are taken into consideration at this point. This approach is consistent with Ogaki and 
Santaella’s (1999) model. The model itself is specified as: 
(3.5.1)            ttNtNttt rrrrq   *,,*,3,3  
Where tq represents the real exchange rate,  *,3,3 tt rr   is the difference between 
three-month domestic and foreign real interest rates. It captures the impact of the 
interest rate shock with longer duration, te , in the model. Meanwhile, the normalised 
one-period interest rate differential, denoted as  *,, tNtN rr  , is employed in Equation 
(3.5.1) in order to capture the effect of the temporary interest rate shock in the model, 
t . 
 
In this chapter Equation (3.5.1) is considered as a cointegrating regression because the 
null hypothesis, which states that the first difference of the real exchange rate has a 
unit root, is rejected for most emerging economies included in the sample. Thus, both 
Park’s (1992) CCR and Stock and Watson’s (1993) DOLS are applied to analyse this 
relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates for 
every individual economy. CCR is widely used in the empirical work in this area, so 
we will apply it here to be consistent with the literature. DOLS is considered as a 
more powerful methodology in analysing cointegrating relationship but it has not yet 
been widely used in this area, thus we will take consideration of both CCR and DOLS 
in order to check their consistency and so achieve robustness. However, different 
specifications are adopted among countries because the orders of differences for the 
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leads and lags of the independent variables are chosen based on the orders of 
integration of the corresponding regressors. More specifically, both the three-month 
real interest rate differential and the normalised one-period interest rate differential 
are stationary in Hungary under rational expectation from VAR estimation, and with 
expectations under perfect foresight in Mexico, Taiwan Malaysia and Russia, so no 
first difference terms are needed to estimate the relationship between the exchange 
rate and the term structure of interest rates. However, for Brazil and South Africa with 
VAR expectations, where they are I(1) series for both three-month real interest rate 
differential and normalised one-period interest rate differential, the DOLS equation 
specification is written as:  
(3.5.2)    
        t
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2
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33  
Where   represents the first difference. Meanwhile, in Russia, the three-month real 
interest differential is stationary while the normalised one-period interest differential 
is I(1) with VAR expectations, thus: 
(3.5.3)              t
j
jtNNjtNNtt
rrrrrrq   


2
2
***
33  
And for the other countries in this study the three-month interest differential is I(1) 
and the normalised one-period interest rate differential is I(0) with VAR expectations 
and/or expectations under perfect foresight. Therefore, we can specify the following 
equation: 
(3.5.4)              t
j
jtjtNNtt
rrrrrrq   


2
2
*
33
**
33  
 
In the standard models,   is expected to be negative, while the sign of   can be 
either positive or negative. If the indirect complementarity between the one-period 
domestic and foreign bonds dominates their corresponding direct substitutability, then 
  is positive, and vice versa.  
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Clearly, DOLS is able to handle the unbalanced regression in which variables have 
different orders of integration (as described in Section 3.3) and it is emphasised as a 
better procedure to handle the cointegration relationship for relatively smaller samples 
than the CCR. Furthermore, DOLS is also valid for analysis of panel cointegrating 
relationship that controls for both time and cross-section fixed effects: 
(3.5.5)              it
j
jititNNittiit urrrrrrq 





 
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
2
2
*
33
**
33   
 
Shifts in different regime can be assessed through the tests of structural breaks in the 
cointegrating relationship (as discussed in Section 3.3). The corresponding auxiliary 
regression (3.3.14) is applied for the stability test under panel data framework. The 
Wald test statistic is reliable in testing the joint significance of coefficient estimates. 
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3.6.  Empirical Results 
 
Table 3-8 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter reports both CCR and DOLS results 
for the empirical relationship between the real exchange rate and the term structure of 
interest rates. The whole sample period is used for each individual economy, although 
some of these economies include relatively small numbers of observations. It can be 
seen that CCR and DOLS provide similar and consistent cointegrating relationships 
among emerging economies, and the results seem to be consistent with the 
expectations obtained from both the VAR model and under perfect foresight. These 
results provide evidence that the term structure of interest rates matters for the 
exchange rate in the emerging economies. The point estimate of  , which is the 
coefficient of the three-month real interest rate differential, is negative and 
statistically significantly different from zero at a 5% level for many emerging 
economies. Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in the interest rate 
appreciates the exchange rate. The negative   is consistent with this standard 
direction, and it is also consistent with the theoretical model and discussions in 
Section 3.2. Nonetheless, there are a few exceptions. Among the advanced emerging 
economies, Taiwan has positive  , but it could not provide much information 
because this coefficient estimate is insignificantly different from zero even at a 10% 
level. A few countries in the secondary category (such as Chile, India, Pakistan and 
Philippines) show positive and statistically significant estimates of  . This might be 
happening because their sample periods are relatively short. For example, data are 
available from September 2002 for Pakistan and November 2000 for the Philippines. 
According to conventional wisdom an increase in the normalised one-period interest 
rate differential is supposed to be associated with an appreciation in the exchange rate, 
implying that   is expected to be negative. However, there is an alternative 
explanation which comes from the theoretical model that was discussed in Section 3.2: 
the exchange rate would depreciate if the indirect complementarity dominates the 
direct substitutability and therefore, one would observe a positive  . For Brazil, 
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Mexico, Taiwan and Chile, we have obtained negative and statistically significant 
estimates of  . While for Malaysia and Philippines, positive and statistically 
significant estimates of   are yielded. These results imply that there is an indirect 
complementarity which dominates the direct substitutability in the currency market in 
these countries. It is also worth noticing that these results are not sensitive with 
expectations obtained from either VAR or under perfect foresight. 
 
A few countries contain limited observations and they show an insignificant 
relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates; for 
example, Russia only has 49 observations available from May 1995 to May 1999 in 
this analysis. It is difficult to reach a substantial conclusion with so short a sample 
period. Hence, the panel data analysis is implemented with fixed effects controlling 
for time and cross-section characteristics in order to get rid of the small sample bias 
and so achieve more powerful results and capture properties for the whole emerging 
economy.  
 
Table 3-9 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter reports the results from panel DOLS 
estimations for all of the emerging countries, as well as for advanced and secondary 
emerging economies. Negative and statistically significant estimates of   are 
obtained with panel data constructions. This is consistent with the standard models of 
exchange rate and term structure of interest rates and supports the theory that was 
discussed in Section 3.2. Thus, a rise in the three-month real interest rate differential 
will lead to exchange rate appreciation in both advanced and secondary emerging 
economies. In the third and sixth columns of Table 3-9, one can observe negative and 
statistically significant point estimates of   for the whole sample and each 
subsample, with expectations obtained from both the VAR estimation and under 
perfect foresight. This illustrates that for the emerging economies, the indirect 
complementarity dominates the direct substitutability to make the   estimates 
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inconsistent with traditional wisdom. In summary, increases in the interest rate 
differential will, ceteris paribus, be associated with domestic currency appreciation in 
both the short-run term and the long-run. 
 
In the 1990s a number of emerging economies, influenced by the currency collapses 
which happened in that decade, had been moving toward floating exchange rate 
regimes. For instance, Brazil set its currency into an independently floating regime 
following its own currency crisis in 1999, which in turn had been caused by the 1997 
Asian crisis and the 1998 Russia crisis. The Peso crawling peg was abandoned in 
Mexico in 1994, and from then on Mexico has adopted a floating exchange rate 
regime. Another example is Chile, whose exchange rate was classified as managed 
floating since 1997. Chile finally allowed its currency to float in 1999. Therefore, it is 
natural to examine the possible structural breaks in emerging economy cases. Dummy 
variables are included for both interest rate differentials to detect the break points 
during the sample period. Figure 3-1, Figure 3-2, and Figure 3-3 provide the Wald 
statistics for joint significance of coefficients to show the structural breaks for all 
emerging countries with VAR expectations, as well as for the advanced and 
secondary emerging countries. Figure 3-4, Figure 3-5 and Figure3-6 draw the same 
statistics but under perfect foresight. The 
2  test results for corresponding 
coefficient restrictions are graphed with 5% and 10% critical values in the same plot. 
The points above corresponding lines of critical values indicate the presence of 
structural breaks. Thus, it is clear that in all of the cases the breaks appear mainly in 
the 1990s, especially around 1997 when the Asian crisis financial erupted. For 
instance, taking the whole sample with VAR expectation, the 
2 test statistics are 
above their 5% critical value from December 1994 to March 1995, August 1996, and 
from March to April, June to September and November to December 1997. It is also 
worth noticing that there are fewer structural breaks for advanced emerging countries, 
indicating that the cointegrating relationship between the exchange rate and the term 
structure of interest rates is more stable in advanced emerging economies when 
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compared to their secondary counterparts.  
 
Figure 3-1: Structural breaks for all emerging economies with VAR expectation 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Structural breaks for advanced emerging economies with VAR 
expectation 
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Figure 3-3: Structural breaks for secondary emerging economies with VAR 
expectation 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Structural breaks for all emerging economies with perfect foresight 
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Figure 3-5: Structural breaks for advanced emerging economies with perfect 
foresight 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Structural breaks for secondary emerging economies with perfect 
foresight 
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relationship with controlling these breaking points.  
 
There are similar but different break points among subsamples according to Figures 
above. Table 3-10 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter reports panel DOLS 
cointegrating regression results controlling the structural breaks for the whole sample, 
and the advanced and secondary emerging economies. The second and fifth columns 
of Table 3-10 present the estimates of  . It is noteworthy that the coefficient of the 
three-month real interest rate differential continues to be statistically significantly 
negative. Similarly, the estimates of coefficient   also remain negative and 
statistically significant at a 5% level. By making a comparison between each 
subsample it can be seen that the qualitative relation of the term structure of interest 
rate differentials to the exchange rate is maintained while the quantitative relation 
slightly changes when taking consideration of the specific structural breaks. At the 
same time, the 
2R  values are slightly higher when taking into account the structural 
breaks in the panel cointegrating relationship between the exchange rate and the term 
structure of interest rates.   
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3.7.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigates the relationship between exchange rate and the term 
structure of interest rates by regressing the log of real exchange rate on the 
three-month interest rate differential and normalised one-month interest rate 
differential for emerging economies. It extends Ogaki and Santaella’s (1999) work by 
including more countries and treating the emerging economies as a whole market 
through a panel framework. Empirically, both CCR and DOLS methodologies are 
applied in analysis for every individual country and under panel construction, the 
structural breaks are further taken into consideration.  
 
The relationship between exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates has 
important policy implications. It could help the monetary authority to control the 
changes of the exchange rates through interest rate channel. According to the 
economic model, when a monetary authority chooses to increase the domestic 
short-term interest rate, the reaction of the domestic long-term interest rate determines 
how the exchange rate changes. More specifically, if the increase in the domestic 
short-term interest rate causes a rise in the domestic long-term interest rate then the 
domestic currency will appreciate, which is consistent with the standard theory with 
risk neutral investors. However, if the long-term interest rate remains unchanged then 
the increase in the domestic short-term interest rate will lead to a depreciation in the 
domestic currency and the relationship between the exchange rate and the term 
structure of interest rates become less explicit.  
 
The empirical results show evidence of the economic model and imply that the term 
structure of interest rates plays an important role in determining the exchange rate and 
they enrich the literature by providing these evidences for emerging economies. 
Negative slope coefficient estimates are found for the long-term interest differentials 
for most emerging countries, and they are statistically significant, although there are a 
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few exceptions with positive and insignificant coefficient estimates. This result is 
consistent with traditional wisdom as well as standard exchange rate models. The sign 
of the slope coefficient for the short-term interest rate depends on the complicated 
relationship between the short-term interest rate, the long-term interest rate, and the 
exchange rate. Taking South Africa and Philippines as an example, it can be seen that 
a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate is obtained for the 
short-term interest rate differential, implying that the indirect complementarity 
between the domestic short-term bonds and the foreign bonds dominates. Nonetheless, 
the corresponding slope coefficient for the short-term interest rate is statistically 
significant but negative, which indicates that the direct substitutability of those two 
assets dominates instead for some of the other emerging countries, (such as Brazil and 
Mexico). By taking emerging economies as a whole market under panel construction 
it is found that negative and significant slope coefficients are obtained for both 
short-term and long-term interest rate differentials. In addition to previous studies, the 
robustness of these results is checked using different cointegration methods as well as 
under different assuptions for expectations. However, the use of the three-month real 
interest rate differential and the normalized one-month interest rate differential might 
not be enough to describle for the whole picture of the term structure of interest rates; 
hence futher analysis on this point could be persued in this area.  
 
Because the exchange rate regimes of most emerging economies have been changing, 
the structural breaks are taken into account in this study in order to examine the 
stability of the cointegrating relation between the exchange rate and the term structure 
of interest rates. The evidence shows parameter stability for this cointegrating 
regression of the real exchange change rate on the three-month real interest rate 
differential and normalised one-month interest rate differential, indicating that this 
cointegrating relationship is stable despite exchange regime changes in the emerging 
markets. 
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Appendix I 
 
Table 3-1: Summary statistics of exchange rate and inflation 
 Inclusion sample Exchange rate Inflation 
 Start date End date Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Advanced:       
Brazil 04/2000 03/2011 0.273571 (0.063694) 0.566351 (0.500992) 
Hungary 09/1995 03/2011 0.002930 (0.000549) 0.681279 (0.737132) 
Mexico 03/1993 03/2011 0.076379 (0.044697) 0.817061 (0.985102) 
Poland 06/1993 03/2011 0.197334 (0.048022) 0.697845 (0.940852) 
South Africa 02/2002 01/2011 0.078237 (0.009601) 0.405873 (0.471046) 
Taiwan 03/1993 03/2011 0.019779 (0.002926) 0.121709 (0.877511) 
Secondary:       
Chile 01/1994 03/2011 0.001188 (0.000234) 0.344344 (0.441981) 
Czech Republic 03/1993 03/2011 0.023336 (0.005197) 0.439627 (0.869296) 
India 12/1998 02/2011 0.013276 (0.001089) 0.460775 (0.839118) 
Indonesia 03/1996 03/2011 0.000087 (0.000061) 0.899728 (1.654452) 
Malaysia 03/1993 03/2011 0.185156 (0.042751) 0.219820 (0.409320) 
Pakistan 09/2002 03/2011 0.008735 (0.001117) 0.831175 (0.877470) 
Philippines 11/2000 03/2011 0.011989 (0.001678) 0.422772 (0.460937) 
Russia 05/1995 05/1999 0.099345 (0.038005) 3.283671 (5.686642) 
Thailand 03/1993 03/2011 0.018170 (0.004502) 0.283270 (0.549120) 
Turkey 08/2002 03/2011 0.401860 (0.026705) 0.873298 (0.901006) 
The table presents the summary statistics of the exchange rates and inflation in a monthly 
horizon. Standard deviations (S.D.) are reposted in parenthesis. The start and end dates specify 
the sample included for each emerging country, respectively. 
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Table 3-2: Summary statistics of interest rates 
 Inclusion sample 1-month interest rate 3-month interest rate 
 Start date End date Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Advanced:       
Brazil 04/2000 03/2011 15.65371 (4.806670) 15.34295 (5.138012) 
Hungary 09/1995 03/2011 11.97358 (6.067097) 11.90043 (6.005512) 
Mexico 03/1993 03/2011 12.99083 (8.374507) 13.48700 (8.644602) 
Poland 06/1993 03/2011 13.28131 (9.333692) 13.44832 (9.470059) 
South Africa 02/2002 01/2011 8.891954 (2.261888) 9.082074 (2.299683) 
Taiwan 03/1993 03/2011 3.059240 (1.956607) 3.283272 (2.136994) 
Secondary:       
Chile 01/1994 03/2011 0.581498 (0.391223) 0.459130 (0.230938) 
Czech Republic 04/1992 03/2011 6.254605 (4.940647) 6.352851 (4.717140) 
India 12/1998 02/2011 7.050000 (2.087270) 7.559388 (2.143538) 
Indonesia 03/1996 03/2011 15.02727 (12.41896) 14.73995 (10.42117) 
Malaysia 03/1993 03/2011 4.191244 (1.929682) 4.266820 (1.936152) 
Pakistan 09/2002 03/2011 8.379903 (4.088360) 8.659466 (4.154053) 
Philippines 11/2000 03/2011 4.270112 (1.363546) 4.370008 (1.290433) 
Russia 05/1995 05/1999 56.49776 (30.84537) 55.60714 (26.25544) 
Thailand 03/1993 03/2011 6.119023 (5.664786) 6.164396 (5.432170) 
Turkey 08/2002 03/2011 19.67686 (11.29451) 20.12151 (11.65720) 
The table presents the summary statistics of the one- and three-month interest rates on a monthly 
horizon. Standard deviations (S.D.) are reposted in parenthesis. The start and end dates specify 
the sample included for each emerging country, respectively. 
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Table 3-3: A summary of statistic interest rate differentials 
 Normalised 
1-month interest 
rate differential, 
 AtNtN rr *,,   
Normalised 
1-month interest 
rate differential, 
 BtNtN rr *,,   
3-month real 
interest rate 
differential, 
 Att rr *,3,3   
3-month real 
interest rate 
differential, 
 Btt rr *,3,3   
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Advanced:         
Brazil 0.4618 (1.3576) 0.4369 (1.4572) 12.179 (5.4711) 12.124 (5.3337) 
Hungary 0.0858 (0.3130) 0.0657 (0.5777) 7.4523 (4.3412) 7.7677 (4.8632) 
Mexico -0.4211 (1.2105) -0.4401 (2.1167) 9.0177 (7.0514) 9.0896 (7.0273) 
Poland -0.1382 (0.3995) -0.1681 (0.5897) 8.8225 (7.4543) 9.1752 (7.8288) 
South Africa -0.1059 (0.2833) -0.1124 (0.3588) 6.3118 (2.9109) 6.4313 (2.8140) 
Taiwan -0.1143 (0.2877) -0.1289 (0.3477) -0.5406 (1.5214) -0.4727 (1.7735) 
Secondary:         
Chile 0.2335 (0.2349) 0.2400 (0.2857) -3.5602 (2.0732) -3.5661 (2.1189) 
Czech Rep. 0.0381 (0.4834) 0.0031 (1.0507) 1.9032 (3.3914) 2.0779 (3.6858) 
India -0.3577 (0.3546) -0.3674 (0.5208) 3.9695 (1.6608) 4.0163 (1.8279) 
Indonesia 0.3914 (3.4395) 0.3662 (3.7755) 10.463 (9.3914) 10.450 (9.3365) 
Malaysia 0.0195 (0.2164) 0.0192 (0.3236) 0.3404 (1.8433) 0.4020 (1.9393) 
Pakistan -0.0543 (0.4326) -0.0672 (0.5681) 5.4115 (4.3396) 5.3893 (4.3850) 
Philippines -0.0039 (0.2636) 0.0084 (0.3614) 1.4778 (2.0605) 1.5074 (2.0264) 
Russia 2.8207 (15.684) -0.3733 (20.503) 41.776 (19.737) 47.065 (25.729) 
Thailand 0.0351 (0.5447) 0.0364 (0.9550) 2.1716 (4.3874) 2.2529 (4.4340) 
Turkey -0.6422 (1.0751) -0.7060 (1.4193) 15.967 (10.051) 17.199 (11.458) 
The table presents the summary statistics of the normalised one-month interest rate differential 
and three-month real interest rate differential on a monthly horizon with standard deviations 
reposted in parenthesis. 
A
 represents interest rate differential with expectations obtained from 
VAR model estimation of order five for one-month nominal interest rate, three-month nominal 
interest rate, and inflation. 
B
 stands for interest differentical with expectations under perfect 
foresight assumption. 
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Table 3-4: Unit root tests of variables in levels 
 
tqln   
A
tNtN rr
*
,,    
B
tNtN rr
*
,,    
A
tt rr
*
,3,3    
B
tt rr
*
,3,3   
Advanced:      
Brazil -9.37887*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.83919* 
[0.0558] 
-3.29208** 
[0.0173] 
-1.41085 
[0.5751] 
-1.53008 
[0.5153] 
Hungary -4.26919*** 
[0.0007] 
-10.3854*** 
[0.0000] 
-8.31950*** 
[0.0000] 
-3.76693*** 
[0.0039] 
-2.61595* 
[0.0917] 
Mexico -1.47402 
[0.5450] 
-6.13481*** 
[0.0000] 
-9.17267*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.86895* 
[0.0508] 
-1.68890 
[0.4354] 
Poland -1.60533 
[0.4781] 
-3.94595*** 
[0.0021] 
-7.99163*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.49735 
[0.1176] 
-1.51047 
[0.4354] 
South Africa -2.03183 
[0.2730] 
-2.02754 
[0.2748] 
-3.55899*** 
[0.0078] 
-1.23885 
[0.6552] 
-1.51047 
[0.5246] 
Taiwan -0.84847 
[0.8027] 
-3.06115** 
[0.0311] 
-3.19684** 
[0.0215] 
-2.30991 
[0.1698] 
-2.94374** 
[0.0421] 
Secondary:      
Chile -5.26615*** 
[0.0000] 
-4.57263*** 
[0.0002] 
-3.78502*** 
[0.0036] 
-0.95602 
[0.7685] 
-2.33018 
[0.1636] 
Czech Rep. -3.20581** 
[0.0210] 
-5.14215*** 
[0.0000] 
-5.70168*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.40199 
[0.1424] 
-2.66700* 
[0.0816] 
India -0.81109 
[0.8135] 
-6.33329*** 
[0.0000] 
-6.74321*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.22381 
[0.1989] 
-2.12702 
[0.2345] 
Indonesia -2.15051 
[0.2254] 
-3.93776*** 
[0.0022] 
-4.14552*** 
[0.0011] 
-1.97592 
[0.2973] 
-2.17584 
[0.2159] 
Malaysia -1.85179 
[0.3548] 
-8.12272*** 
[0.0000] 
-5.88139*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.14291 
[0.2282] 
-2.95789** 
[0.0406] 
Pakistan 1.23700 
[0.9983] 
-6.05307*** 
[0.0000] 
-7.94025*** 
[0.0000] 
-0.11540 
[0.9439] 
0.21299 
[0.9321] 
Philippines -1.05305 -4.18270*** -4.86286*** -1.68117 -2.77719* 
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tqln   
A
tNtN rr
*
,,    
B
tNtN rr
*
,,    
A
tt rr
*
,3,3    
B
tt rr
*
,3,3   
[0.7341] [0.0011] [0.0001] [0.4382] [0.0649] 
Russia -7.55483*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.37931 
[0.1537] 
-4.18159*** 
[0.0018] 
-4.03704*** 
[0.0030] 
-3.73239*** 
[0.0065] 
Thailand -1.60474 
[0.4784] 
-3.59197*** 
[0.0067] 
-4.38707*** 
[0.0004] 
-2.78097* 
[0.0628] 
-2.28685 
[0.1772] 
Turkey -13.0511*** 
[0.0000] 
-5.13171*** 
[0.0000] 
-5.70450*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.63246* 
[0.0900] 
-2.48672 
[0.1217] 
This table presents the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of unit root for real exchange 
rate
tq  , normalised one-month interest rate differential and three-month real interest rate 
differential, respectively. Lag lengths are automatically selected based on Schwarz Information 
Criterion. 
A
 represents interest rate differential with expectations obtained from VAR model 
estimation of order five for one-month nominal interest rate, three-month nominal interest rate 
and, inflation. 
B
 stands for interest differentical with expectations under perfect foresight 
assumption. P-values are reposted within brackets beneath the corresponding t-statistics. * 
represents significance at 10% level, ** stands for significance at 5% level and *** indicates 
significance at 1% level. 
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Table 3-5: Unit root tests of variables in 1
st
 differences 
 
tqln   
A
tNtN rr
*
,,    
B
tNtN rr
*
,,    
A
tt rr
*
,3,3    
B
tt rr
*
,3,3   
Advanced:      
Brazil -12.1838*** 
[0.0000] 
-15.0612*** 
[0.0000] 
-14.0362*** 
[0.0000] 
-14.1187*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.8645*** 
[0.0000] 
Hungary -1.94567** 
[0.0496] 
-12.0465*** 
[0.0000] 
-10.9560*** 
[0.0000] 
-14.5697*** 
[0.0000] 
-3.00423*** 
[0.0028] 
Mexico -8.37374*** 
[0.0000] 
-16.5392*** 
[0.0000] 
-10.1746*** 
[0.0000] 
-15.8981*** 
[0.0000] 
-15.9688*** 
[0.0000] 
Poland -13.5032*** 
[0.0000] 
-15.9445*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.5388*** 
[0.0000] 
-6.63451*** 
[0.0000] 
-4.27316*** 
[0.0000] 
South 
Africa 
-10.9183*** 
[0.0000] 
-10.6862*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.4036*** 
[0.0000] 
-8.80211*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.7054*** 
[0.0000] 
Taiwan -17.6784*** 
[0.0000] 
-15.8473*** 
[0.0000] 
-16.8741*** 
[0.0000] 
-14.5965*** 
[0.0000] 
-14.0178*** 
[0.0000] 
Secondary:      
Chile -12.5330*** 
[0.0000] 
-11.9085*** 
[0.0000] 
-14.7011*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.0786*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.87626*** 
[0.0042] 
Czech Rep. -3.32233*** 
[0.0010] 
-14.8011*** 
[0.0000] 
-11.4151*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.0564*** 
[0.0000] 
-3.80623*** 
[0.0002] 
India -2.25725** 
[0.0235] 
-10.0640*** 
[0.0000] 
-8.01679*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.0329*** 
[0.0000] 
-2.78272*** 
[0.0056] 
Indonesia -3.14592*** 
[0.0018] 
-6.15995*** 
[0.0000] 
-11.3495*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.3230*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.1505*** 
[0.0000] 
Malaysia -15.2705*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.3256*** 
[0.0000] 
-15.0007*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.0257*** 
[0.0000] 
-18.4658*** 
[0.0000] 
Pakistan -4.02808*** 
[0.0001] 
-10.6811*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.8298*** 
[0.0000] 
-9.88325*** 
[0.0000] 
-16.1161*** 
[0.0000] 
Philippines -14.1478*** -11.5879*** -8.611780*** -8.46244*** -2.35263*** 
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tqln   
A
tNtN rr
*
,,    
B
tNtN rr
*
,,    
A
tt rr
*
,3,3    
B
tt rr
*
,3,3   
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0187] 
Russia -2.15426** 
[0.0304] 
-10.6513*** 
[0.0000] 
-9.38066*** 
[0.0000] 
-9.01079*** 
[0.0000] 
-10.3798*** 
[0.0000] 
Thailand -14.7844*** 
[0.0000] 
-7.44902*** 
[0.0000] 
-11.3220*** 
[0.0000] 
-6.73272*** 
[0.0000] 
-15.7936*** 
[0.0000] 
Turkey -3.03986*** 
[0.0025] 
-11.5267*** 
[0.0000] 
-12.1462*** 
[0.0000] 
-10.1213*** 
[0.0000] 
-11.2911*** 
[0.0000] 
The table presents results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of unit root for the changes of the 
real exchange rate, the normalised one-month interest rate differential, and the three-month real 
interest rate differential, respectively. Lag lengths are automatically selected based on Schwarz 
Information Criterion. 
A
 represents interest rate differential with expectations obtained from 
VAR model estimation of order five for one-month nominal interest rate, three-month nominal 
interest rate, and inflation. 
B
 stands for interest differentical with expectations under perfect 
foresight assumption. P-values are reposted within brackets beneath the corresponding 
t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** represents significance at 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at 1% level. 
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Table 3-6: Panel unit root tests of variables in levels 
 
tsln   
A
tNtN rr
*
,,    
B
tNtN rr
*
,,    
A
tt rr
*
,3,3    
B
tt rr
*
,3,3   
All 138.549 
[1.0000] 
-15.4596*** 
[0.0000] 
-21.3847*** 
[0.0000] 
-1.01090 
[0.1560] 
-1.01840 
[0.1542] 
Advanced 243.004 
[1.0000] 
-11.9211*** 
[0.0000] 
-17.5452*** 
[0.0000] 
-0.48313 
[0.3145] 
0.16870 
[0.5670] 
Secondary 16.5022 
[1.0000] 
-10.5774*** 
[0.0000] 
-13.9393*** 
[0.0000] 
-0.96235 
[0.1679] 
-1.47656* 
[0.0699] 
The null hypothesis of panel unit root is tested using Levin, Lin and Chu test with maximum lags. 
Lag length selection is based on SIC. Newey-west bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel is 
applied.
 A
 represents interest rate differential with expectations obtained from VAR model 
estimation of order five for the one-month nominal interest rate, the three-month nominal 
interest rate, and inflation. 
B
 stands for interest differentical with expectations under perfect 
foresight assumption. P-values are reposted within brackets beneath the corresponding 
t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** represents significance at 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3-7: Panel unit root tests of variables in 1st differences 
 
tqln   
A
tNtN rr
*
,,    
B
tNtN rr
*
,,    
A
tt rr
*
,3,3    
B
tt rr
*
,3,3   
All -23.7939*** 
[0.0000] 
-43.2268*** 
[0.0000] 
-46.6847*** 
[0.0000] 
-41.3147*** 
[0.0000] 
-44.0820*** 
[0.0000] 
Advanced -17.3677*** 
[0.0000] 
-30.4967*** 
[0.0000] 
-30.9088*** 
[0.0000] 
-28.7014*** 
[0.0000] 
-26.9928*** 
[0.0000] 
Secondary -16.0816*** 
[0.0000] 
-30.8187*** 
[0.0000] 
-35.3867*** 
[0.0000] 
-29.9532*** 
[0.0000] 
-34.9172*** 
[0.0000] 
The null hypothesis of panel unit root is tested using Levin, Lin and Chu test with maximum lags. 
Lag length selection is based on SIC. Newey-west bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel is 
applied.
 A
 represents interest rate differential with expectations obtained from VAR model 
estimation of order five for the one-month nominal interest rate, the three-month nominal 
interest rate, and inflation. 
B
 stands for interest differentical with expectations under perfect 
foresight assumption. P-values are reposted within brackets beneath the corresponding 
t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** represents significance at 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at 1% level. 
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Table 3-8: CCR and DOLS results 
 CCR    DOLS    
 
Expectations from 
VAR 
Expectations under 
Perfect Foresight 
Expectations from 
VAR 
Expectations under 
Perfect Foresight 
Economy ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ
 
ˆ
 
ˆ  ˆ  
Advanced:         
Brazil -0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.008*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.005*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.003* 
(0.0016) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0017 
(0.0014) 
Hungary -0.122 
(0.0771) 
3.816** 
(1.6597) 
-0.080 
(0.0848) 
1.316** 
(0.5806) 
-0.286*** 
(0.0301) 
0.442 
(0.3269) 
-0.287*** 
(0.0288) 
0.337* 
(0.1866) 
Mexico -0.355*** 
(0.0808) 
-1.673** 
(0.7675) 
-0.229*** 
(0.0591) 
-0.322 
(0.3737) 
-0.197*** 
(0.0408) 
-0.902** 
(0.4293) 
-0.127*** 
(0.0201) 
-0.193*** 
(0.0474) 
Poland -0.024*** 
(0.0082) 
0.252 
(0.1634) 
-0.031*** 
(0.0054) 
0.059 
(0.0787) 
-0.029*** 
(0.0026) 
0.074 
(0.0491) 
-0.031*** 
(0.0025) 
0.048 
(0.0312) 
South 
Africa 
-0.011 
(0.0262) 
0.349 
(0.3420) 
-0.028 
(0.0286) 
-0.121 
(0.2621) 
0.007 
(0.0080) 
0.219*** 
(0.0727) 
-0.007 
(0.0117) 
-0.013 
(0.0786) 
Taiwan 0.029 
(0.0449) 
-0.676*** 
(0.1707) 
0.028 
(0.0560) 
-0.585*** 
(0.1743) 
0.027 
(0.0189) 
-0.583*** 
(0.0854) 
0.021 
(0.0156) 
-0.392*** 
(0.0683) 
Secondary:         
Chile 0.169*** 
(0.0704) 
-1.172*** 
(0.3932) 
0.193*** 
(0.0663) 
-0.958*** 
(0.3638) 
0.146*** 
(0.0424) 
-0.741* 
(0.4470) 
0.164*** 
(0.0386) 
-0.511 
(0.3446) 
Czech Rep. -0.084*** 
(0.0222) 
0.070 
(0.1739) 
-0.083*** 
(0.0219) 
0.017 
(0.0661) 
-0.072*** 
(0.0128) 
0.129 
(0.1057) 
-0.069*** 
(0.0120) 
0.042 
(0.0405) 
India 0.087*** 
(0.0173) 
1.135* 
(0.6731) 
0.041*** 
(0.0140) 
0.825 
(0.6099) 
0.048 
(0.0383) 
0.004 
(0.1860) 
0.045 
(0.0374) 
-0.050 
(0.1232) 
Indonesia -0.509*** 
(0.1823) 
0.156 
(0.5993) 
-0.432* 
(0.2234) 
-0.611 
(0.6319) 
-0.298*** 
(0.0873) 
0.231 
(0.2551) 
-0.0217*** 
(0.0639) 
-0.238 
(0.2515) 
Malaysia 0.050 
(0.0386) 
0.855 
(0.5357) 
0.067 
(0.0412) 
0.869*** 
(0.2883) 
0.021 
(0.0130) 
0.215** 
(0.1072) 
0.031*** 
(0.0111) 
0.183*** 
(0.0616) 
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 CCR    DOLS    
 
Expectations from 
VAR 
Expectations under 
Perfect Foresight 
Expectations from 
VAR 
Expectations under 
Perfect Foresight 
Economy ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ  ˆ
 
ˆ
 
ˆ  ˆ  
Pakistan 0.137*** 
(0.0117) 
0.017 
(0.1403) 
0.134*** 
(0.0092) 
0.117 
(0.0879) 
0.127*** 
(0.0068) 
0.021 
(0.0647) 
0.124*** 
(0.0060) 
0.060 
(0.0392) 
Philippines 0.220* 
(0.1323) 
6.084*** 
(1.7635) 
0.016 
(0.2637) 
0.543 
(1.2087) 
-0.044 
(0.0246) 
0.463* 
(0.2873) 
-0.035 
(0.0260) 
0.114 
(0.1625) 
Russia -0.006 
(0.0087) 
0.015 
(0.0115) 
-0.012 
(0.0092) 
0.015** 
(0.0061) 
-0.002 
(0.0025) 
0.010 
(0.0084) 
-0.016* 
(0.0084) 
0.007 
(0.0092) 
Thailand -0.045* 
(0.0268) 
-0.061 
(0.2639) 
-0.027 
(0.0297) 
0.068 
(0.1755) 
-0.0170*** 
(0.0046) 
0.117 
(0.0884) 
-0.017*** 
(0.0048) 
0.043 
(0.0352) 
Turkey -0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.002* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0002**** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
This table reports the cointegrating relationship between the real exchange rate and the term structure of interest 
rates     ttNtNttt rrrrq   *,,*,3,3 . Both CCR and DOLS estimation results are provided with standard 
errors beneath the corresponding coefficient estimates. Newey-West is used to control heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** represents significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 
1% level. 
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Table 3-9: Panel DOLS results 
 Expectations from VAR Expectations under Perfect Foresight 
Economy ˆ  ˆ  2R
 
ˆ  ˆ  2R
 
All -0.041204*** 
(0.010321) 
-0.079138*** 
(0.024127) 
87.0% -0.030666*** 
(0.009923) 
-0.072643*** 
(0.0174240) 
86.3% 
Advanced  -0.030648*** 
(0.004660) 
-0.441093*** 
(0.046374) 
95.1% -0.0271024*** 
(0.004983) 
-0.141173*** 
(0.031704) 
94.5% 
Secondary  -0.065097*** 
(0.015236) 
-0.057181** 
(0.024766) 
86.5% -0.047110*** 
(0.014086) 
-0.069600*** 
(0.017995) 
85.7% 
This table presents coefficient estimates of DOLS regression (3.5.5)  
      it
j
jititNNittiit urrrrrrs 





 


2
2
*
33
**
33 
 under panel data constructions with fixed effects for 
all emerging economy, advanced and secondary emerging economy, respectively. Cross-section 
SUR is applied to control heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis beneath the corresponding coefficient estimates. * denotes significance at 10% 
level, ** represents significance at 5% level and *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 3-10: Panel DOLS results with structural breaks 
 Expectations from VAR Expectations under Perfect Foresight 
Economy ˆ  ˆ  2R
 
ˆ  ˆ  2R
 
All -0.033570*** 
(0.010496) 
-0.084970*** 
(0.026509) 
87.5% -0.026230*** 
(0.010142) 
-0.081784*** 
(0.018915) 
86.5% 
Advanced  -0.030445*** 
(0.004771) 
-0.406425*** 
(0.046419) 
95.2% -0.023000*** 
(0.005034) 
-0.141907*** 
(0.033227) 
94.6% 
Secondary  -0.062218*** 
(0.015370) 
-0.078413** 
(0.031755) 
87.6% -0.037822** 
(0.014913) 
-0.081115*** 
(0.021671) 
86.4% 
This table presents coefficient estimates of DOLS regressions under panel data constructions 
with fixed effects for all emerging economy, advanced and secondary emerging economy, 
respectively. Dummy variables are used for all the periods with Wald statiscs significant at 5% to 
control structural breaks. Cross-section SUR is applied to control heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis beneath corresponding coefficient 
estimates. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** represents significance at 5% level and *** 
stands for significance at 1% level, respectively. 
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Chapter 4 Security Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Various empirical studies have provided evidence that the nominal interest rates and 
term structure of interest rates forecast the stock and bond returns. For example, Cox 
et al. (1985) provide a theory of the term structure of interest rates. Campbell (1987) 
states that the term structure of interest rates predicts stock returns and shows the 
importance of the nominal interest rates uncertainty in pricing both short-term and 
long-term assets by estimating a model of asset returns with a fixed-weighted 
“benchmark” portfolio of bills, bonds and stocks. Campbell and Shiller (1991b) 
demonstrate that the long rate tends to fall and the short rate tends to rise when the 
yield spread between the long-term and short-term interest rates is relatively high. 
Recently, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) show that the return-forecasting factor, which 
is a tent-shaped combination of forward rates, is countercyclical and predicts stock 
returns. They also find that this single factor positively forecasts future excess returns 
on different maturity bonds with a high value of R
2
.  
 
The standard asset pricing models, which describe the relation between risk and 
expected returns, predict that the expected excess return on an asset can be expressed 
as the product of the asset’s systematic risk and the price of the risk in equilibrium. 
Thus, as Viceira (2007a) pointed out, the time variation in expected bond excess 
returns is determined by the time variation in the aggregate price of risk and/or the 
quantity of bond risk based on these models. Fama and French (1989b) find evidence 
that common components exist in the time variation of bond and stock expected 
returns. Campbell and Cochrance (1999) set up consumption based models using 
external habit information and suggest that the time variation in the expected excess 
returns on bonds is partially explained by a time-varying aggregate price of risk. 
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Furthermore, Wachter (2006) finds that there is a positive forecasting relation between 
the yield spread and future excess returns of bonds which is generated by the external 
habit preferences. 
 
This chapter extends the research in this area by examining whether the security risk, 
defined as the quantity of security risk, is also time-varying. It will also ask whether 
this time variation can be explained by the short-term interest rates and yield spread, 
which are the variables correlated with the time variation in security excess returns. 
Viceira (2007b) provides a similar analysis on bond risk, but only for the U.S. bond 
market. This chapter adds to Viceira’s (2007b) study by investigating the relationship 
between security risk and the nominal term structure of interest rates for each 
individual country in the G7, as well as under panel construction. If the expected 
excess returns of securities change in response to the time variation in risk terms, then 
it is natural to expect that the variables of term structure of interest rates could help to 
explain changes in security risk because they forecast security excess returns. 
 
In this chapter, we focus on the second moments of bond and stock returns. There are 
various previous studies in this area which have attempted to allocate the determinants 
of the comovement of bond and stock returns, such as Barsky (1989), Shiller and 
Beltratti (1992), Campbell and Ammer (1993a), Andersen et al. (2005a) and Boyd et 
al. (2005). The well-known standard CAPM suggests that in the stock market the risk 
of an asset can be measured as the covariance of the returns on the aggregate market 
portfolio and that asset. For the bond market this CAPM implies that the covariance 
of bond returns with stock returns could be one proxy for bond risk. Therefore, we use 
the second moments (such as the realised volatility of bond returns, the realised 
covariance of bond returns with stock returns, and the realised bond beta) as proxies 
for bond risk. Meanwhile, the unconditional comovement of bond and stock returns, 
which is measured as the realised covariance of bond returns with stock returns, is 
also taken into account. Thus, the details of using these second moments are discussed 
and the relationship between the time variation in these second moments and the 
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variables that proxy for business conditions for G7 economies is examined in this 
chapter. 
 
The empirical studies conducted in this current chapter show that there is a systematic 
variation in the security risk, which is consistent with the traditional wisdom. Both the 
bond return volatility and the covariance between bond and stock returns seem to be 
persistent and mean-reverting processes. This study also shows evidence that 
generally the short-term nominal interest rate forecasts positively the realised bond 
return volatility, the realised covariance of bond returns with stock returns, as well as 
the bond CAPM beta for most G7 economies over the sample period. These findings 
are consistent with Viceira (2007b), whose research focused only on the U.S. 
economy. In addition, these results add to the empirical evidence on time variation in 
term structure of interest rates forecasting time variation in stock return volatility and 
exchange rate volatility. 
 
Viceira (2007b) shows solid empirical evidence that yield spread positively affects 
bond excess returns, she also argued that there is a positive relation between the 
changes in the stock return volatility as well as exchange rate volatility and interest 
rates movements. Hence, it is worthwhile to further examine the effects of the 
short-term interest rate and the term structure of nominal interest rates on the time 
variation in the second moments of security returns. If these effects exist then the 
interest rate policy will be important in reducing the stock and bond market volatility. 
However, to date little empirical work has been done in this area. Viceira’s (2007b) 
research of this relationship was limited to the U.S. Therefore, it is interesting to ask if 
the results for the US are robust and whether this is also the case for other developed 
economies. This current study contributes to research in this area in several points. 
Firstly, this chapter theoretically discusses the foundation for the application of the 
realised second moments in modelling the dynamics and it empirically examines the 
relationship between the time variation in the security risk (as measured by these 
realised second moments) and the time variation in the term structure of interest rates 
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for G7 economies. Secondly, this study provides further empirical evidence of the 
effect of the short-term rate on second moments of security returns for the G7 
economies as a whole, with analysis under panel construction. This also shows that 
the yield spread is also a statistically significant determinant in forecasting the time 
variation in security risk. In addition, the effects of the recent financial crisis on the 
relationship between time variation in security risk and time variation in the term 
structure of interest rates is also examined to confirm the stability through the sample 
period. The empirical results suggest that this relation has been changed significantly 
after the economic crisis. The relationship between the second moments of security 
returns and interest rates became at odds as the economy fell apart.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 summarises and discusses 
the relevant previous literature. Section 4.3 describes the measures of the realised 
second moments of bond and stock returns, it also discusses the descriptive statistics 
of data and variables that are used in this study. The empirical model specifications 
and the main results are presented in Section 4.4. And finally, Section 4.5 concludes 
this chapter.  
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4.2. Literature Review 
 
There are numerous empirical studies on the time variation of expected returns on 
both bonds and stocks. For example, Fama and French (1989b) find a risk premium 
that is related to longer-term aspects of business conditions in expected returns of 
stocks and long-term bonds. They also show that the variation in that premium is 
stronger for stocks than for bonds and is also stronger for low-grade bonds than for 
high-grade bonds, indicating that the expected returns are lower when economic 
conditions are strong, and vice versa. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) implement a 
consumption-based model with a slow-moving external habit added to the standard 
constant relative risk aversion utility function in order to generate long-horizon 
predictability of excess returns on stocks and bonds, and persistent movement in 
return volatility. They show evidence of the procyclical variation of stock prices as 
well as the countercyclical variation of the volatility in stock market. Their model 
states that expected returns and return volatility rise when consumption decreases, and 
it suggests a time-varying price of risk to explain the time-series behaviour of 
aggregate stock returns. More recently, Wachter (2006) generalises Campbell and 
Cochrane’s (1999) model by introducing an exogenous inflation process and allowing 
surplus consumption to influence the risk-free rate. They report a positive relation 
between bond excess return and yield spread. In addition, Viceira (2007b) investigates 
the time-varying properties of the quantity of bond risk and tests whether this time 
variation can also be explained by the variables which are used to explain the bond 
excess returns. As might be expected, he reports a positive relationship between 
short-term rate, yield spread, and bond risk.  
 
Previous research also pays attention to the comovement of stock and bond returns. 
Campbell (1986) was one of the earliest studies and he uses a general equilibrium 
representative agent exchange model to study the asset pricing of bonds and stocks. 
He elucidates that the real bonds do not necessarily yield less than stocks when they 
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have same maturity date and are held to maturity. He also finds that stocks with 
greater payoff uncertainty do not have greater return uncertainty over short holding 
period. Fama and French (1989b) suggest that the forecasts of excess returns of stocks 
and bonds are correlated. Campbell and Ammer (1993a) account for the variance of 
stock returns jointly with that of long-term bond returns, as well as the covariance 
between returns of stocks and bonds. They show that stock excess returns are greatly 
influenced by news about stock future excess returns, while bond excess returns are 
largely determined by news about future inflation. More recently, Andersen et al. 
(2005a) find that high-frequency stocks, bonds, and exchange rates respond to 
macroeconomic news differently over the business cycle. They suggest that this can 
help to explain the time-varying correlation between stocks and bond returns, as well 
as the relatively small equity market news effect when averaged across recessions and 
expansions. Boyd et al. (2005) also show that a business cycle component exists in the 
variation of the second moments of stock returns.  
 
The realised second moment of returns has been used to study risks since the 1970s. 
For example, Officer (1973) used it to examine the market-factor variability from 
1897 to 1969 for the New York Stock Exchange. Later, Merton (1980) applied the 
same method to estimate the expected market returns in equilibrium models. Schwert 
(1989) analysed the relation of stock volatility with macroeconomic volatility, 
financial leverage, and stock trading activity. He shows evidence that the stock return 
variability was high during the Great Depression of 1929 to 1939, which is consistent 
with the results found in Officer (1973). In more recent works this method has been 
reinvigorated. For example, Andersen et al. (2003) provides a general framework to 
model and forecast daily and lower frequency volatilities and correlations. They point 
out that the use of realised volatility constructed from high-frequency intraday returns 
permits the use of traditional time series procedures for modelling and forecasting. 
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) use realised covariance to analyse 
multivariate high frequency financial data, econometrically studying how high 
frequency regressions and covariance change through time.  
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Glosten et al. (1993a) analysed the relation between the expected value and the 
volatility of stock excess return and find evidence that there is a negative relation 
between conditional expected monthly return and conditional variance of monthly 
return. Glosten et al. (1993a) also showed that the nominal short-term interest rate 
helps to forecast the volatility in the stock market because it reflects inflation 
uncertainty, which is considered to be correlated with aggregate economic uncertainty. 
If the short rate can be considered as a proxy for inflation uncertainty and economic 
uncertainty, then it is natural to expect that the short rate can also predict the volatility 
in the bond market. 
 
Therefore, the main focus of this study is to fill the gaps in the literature by finding 
out whether the second moments of bond and stock returns are time-varying and 
whether the term structure of nominal interest rates can help to forecast this time 
variation in bond and stock return volatility and the covariance of bond and stock 
returns and the bond CAPM beta.  
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4.3. Empirical Measures of Security Risk 
 
One of the basic empirical measures of security risk is to use the realised second 
moments of the bond and stock returns. This measure is recommended by Officer 
(1973), Merton (1980), French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987), Schwert (1989) and 
Viceira (2007b) and many other research papers. In this chapter, the realised volatility 
of bond returns, the realised volatility of stock returns, the realised covariance of bond 
and stock returns, and CAPM beta are used as a proxy for bond risk. These realised 
second moment measurements have also been widely used in the context of stock 
returns as well as exchange rates, such as Andersen et al. (2003), Barndorff –Nielsen 
and Shephard (2004) and Andersen et al. (2005b). 
 
By definition, the realised volatility of bond returns can be measured as the integrated 
instantaneous volatility, that is: 
(4.3.1)          


Dt
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dBB r
n
nt
1
2
,
2 1,  
Where  Dtt ,1 denotes the daily returns between the time t and t+n, with only working 
days included.
 dB
r , denotes the log returns of bond on day d. Thus, the realised 
volatility of bond returns – the variance of the bond returns – equals to the average 
value of the squares of bond daily returns over a certain period. More pecifically, it is 
calculated by the sum of the squares of bond daily returns in a certain period divided 
by the number of days included in that period. This measure is consistent with Viceira 
(2007b). Similarly, the realised volatility of stock returns between t and t+n can be 
specified as: 
(4.3.2)          


Dt
td
dSS r
n
nt
1
2
,
2 1,          
With dSr , denotes the log returns of stock on day d. Thus, the realised covariance 
between the bond and stock returns can be written as: 
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(4.3.3)          

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Alternatively, there are also some normalised measures of the covariance of bond and 
stock returns, such as correlation and beta. The realised bond CAPM beta is used as a 
proxy for bond risk. The realized bond CAMP beta is measured as:  
(4.3.4)         
 
 nt
nt
nt
S
BS
SB
,
,
,
2
,
,


         
 
These realised second moments are based on the daily returns of bonds and stocks 
which were obtained from Datastream for G7 countries. The time series analysis is 
applied to each individual developed economy, respectively. The sample period is 
included from January 1st 1991 to April 18th 2011. The stock and bond returns are 
calculated from their daily price indices. Consistent with Viceira (2007b), the 
five-year constant maturity bond is the main focus in this empirical study. All the 
tables of data statistics are reported in Appendix I at the end of this chapter. 
 
Table 4-1 represents the realised volatility of stock returns during the period January 
1st 1991 to April 18th 2011 for the G7 countries, respectively. The results show 
similar patterns of realised stock return volatility for these developed economies. 
Generally, the mean of the realised stock return volatility increases with the horizon of 
spreads for Canada, France, Japan and UK, while the minimum mean value of the 
realized volatility of stock returns are obtained at one-year horizon for Germany, Italy 
and the U.S. However, the standard deviation decreases at the longest horizon, except 
for Canada.  
 
In addition, basic descriptive statistics of the realised volatility of bond returns, the 
realised covariance of bond and stock returns, and CAPM beta are reported in Tables 
4-2, 4-3 and 4-4 for G7 countries for the sample period. 
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Over the sample period, the bond return is much more stable than corresponding stock 
return, which is consistent with traditional wisdom. The bond return becomes less 
volatile as the investment horizon spreads. Meanwhile, the corresponding standard 
deviation also decreases for each economy. It is worth noting that, with the exception 
Japan, the covariances between the returns on bonds and stocks are positive in 
short-horizon but they turn negative in the long-horizon. Furthermore, the CAPM beta 
tends to have the same trend as the covariance of daily bond returns with daily stock 
returns. Figure 4-1 plots the three-month rolling estimate of bond CAPM betas over 
the sample period computed using daily returns on bonds and stocks.  
 
Figure 4-1: CAPM beta of bonds 
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show that the low full sample estimates of bond betas for these countries hide 
considerable variation over time. It also can be seen that the bond betas show time 
varying heteroskedasticity with periods of low bond betas followed by periods of high 
betas. This implies that some of the variation might be systematic. Combined with 
tables of descriptive statistics above, one can observe considerable variation in the 
comovement of bond and stock returns. In addition to the bond CAPM beta, both the 
realised bond volatility and the realised covariance of bond returns with stock returns 
have relatively large standard deviations. The standard deviation also appears to be 
greater in the short-horizon than in the long-horizon. Table 4-5 below reports the 
correlation of the second moments:  
 
As expected, Table 4-5 shows that, with the exception of Italy, the bond return 
volatility in G7 countries is less volatile to its mean than stock return volatility. Table 
4-5 also presents the correlation of the realised second moments for the G7 countries. 
Generally, the realised bond CAPM beta is negatively correlated with the realised 
volatility of stock returns. Again, Japan is an exception. This implies that times of 
high volatility in the stock market tend to coincide with times of low covariance 
between bond and stock returns. This result is consistent with conventional wisdom as 
well as recent literature, such as Viceira’s (2007b) research for the U.S. Except for 
Canada and Japan, the correlation between bond return volatility and stock return 
volatility is positive for G7 countries, indicating that times of high volatility in the 
bond market tend to coincide with times of high stock market volatility. However, the 
correlation between bond CAPM beta and bond return volatility is positive for Canada, 
France, Italy, and the UK, which implies that the times of high volatility in the bond 
market tend to coincide with times of increased comovement between bond and stock 
returns for these countries. In contrast, this correlation is negative for Germany, Japan 
and the U.S. 
 
In order to eliminate the small sample biasedness and obtain more robust results, one 
could treat G7 countries as a whole market because they are under a similar economic 
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environment. Table 4-6 below reports the descriptive statistics and properties under 
panel construction: 
 
Finally, Table 4-6 summarises the statistics of the second moment measurements 
under panel construction for G7 economies as a whole. Firstly, the stock market is 
more volatile than the bond market. In addition, the realised stock return volatility is 
more volatile to its mean than the realised bond return volatility, especially in the 
short-horizon. Secondly, the realised bond CAPM beta is negatively correlated with 
the realised stock return volatility at -23.1% to -50.8% from short-horizon to 
long-horizon. However, the realised bond CAPM beta is positively correlated with the 
realised bond return volatility in the 33.3%-65.6% range. Meanwhile, the correlation 
between the realised volatility of bond returns and the realised volatility of stock 
returns is also positive, with the exception of the longest horizon. These results 
elucidate that times of high volatility in the bond market tend to coincide with times 
of high volatility in the stock market. Furthermore, times of high volatility in the bond 
market also tend to coincide with times of increased comovement between bond and 
stock returns, which is consistent with that for individual economy in G7.  
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4.4. The Model Specifications and the Main Empirical Results 
4.4.1. Time Series Analysis 
 
This section explores whether the term structure of interest rates have significant 
effects on the bond risk, which is measured as the realised second moments of bond 
returns. Specifically, this chapter examines the effects of the short-term nominal 
interest rate as well as the yield spread between long-term nominal bonds and the 
short-term nominal interest rate on the realised volatility of bond returns, the realised 
covariance between bond and stock returns, and the bond CAPM betas, respectively. 
In addition, the corresponding forecasting regressions for the realised volatility of 
stock returns are also present for completeness.  
 
This chapter examines whether the time variation in bond risk is related to time 
variation in the term structure of interest rate. Firstly, the realised covariance at 
horizons up to sixty months between bond and stock returns are regressed onto a 
constant, the lagged value of the realised covariance, the lagged short-term interest 
rate, and the lagged yield spread. The short-term interest proxies for economic 
uncertainty and yield spread proxies for business conditions. These two variables are 
commonly used to represent the term structure of interest rates and they are proved to 
be the main factors in determing the security returns. The regression can be specified 
follow Viceira’s (2007b) study as: 
(4.4.1)                  tsprttrtnt SBSB ,, ,  
Where  tSB,  measures the lagged realised covariance of bond returns with stock 
returns. The short rate  ttr  is the log yield on the one-month Treasury Bill and the 
spread  tspr  measures the difference between the log yield on a five-year constant 
maturity bond and the log yield on the Treasury Bill. Hence, Equation (4.4.1) is a 
forcasting regression of the future covariance of bond and stock returns in terms of the 
corresponding covariance, interest rate and yield spread at the current period. 
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Secondly, the realised bond CAPM betas at horizons up to five years are also 
regressed onto the same regressors that were used in the realised covariance 
regressions, which follows Viceira’s (2007b) equation specification: 
(4.4.2)                  tsprttrtnt SBSB ,, ,  
Where  tSB,  presents the lagged realised bond CAPM beta. 
 
In addition, the regressions of the realised bond return volatility as well as stock 
return volatility on lagged short-term interest rate and yield spread are also taken into 
consideration. These predictive regressions taken from Viceira’s (2007b) can be 
respectively written as: 
(4.4.3)                  tsprttrtnt BB
22 ,  
And: 
(4.4.4)                  tsprttrtnt SS
22 ,  
Where  tB
2  and  tS
2
 
define the lagged realised volatility of bond and stock 
returns, respectively. 
 
Tables 4-7 to 4-20, provided in Appendix I at the end of this chapter, report the results 
of the regressions of realised second moments measured at horizons of up to three 
years expressed as the equations above for every single country in the G7. Panel I in 
Table 4-7 presents forecasting regression results for  ntSB ,, , the realised covariance 
of bond and stock returns that are defined in Equation (4.3.3) at different horizons for 
Canada. Panel II in Table 4-7 presents the results for  ntSB ,, , the corresponding 
realised CAPM beta of bond returns that is defined in Equation (4.3.4) for Canada. 
Table 4-8 presents the predictive regression results for log bond return volatility 
(Panel III) and for log stock return volatility (Panel IV) for Canada. The subsequent 
Tables 4-9 to 4-20 report similar regression results for other sample countries. All of 
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these tables report the coefficient estimates with the Newey-West HAC standard 
errors.The 
2R of the regression estimation is also reported.  
 
Table 4-7 shows that the yield spread has a positive effect on forecasting the realized 
covariance of bond and stock returns at horizons up to thirty-six months for Canada. 
The coefficient estimate on the yield spread is statistically significant up to a horizon 
of thirty-six months. It indicates that the yield spread is a siginificant factor in 
determing the realized bond covariance at different horizons within three years. 
Meanwhile, the yield spread also positively forecasts the bond CAPM beta and the 
corresponding coefficient estimate on the yield spread is statistically significant at all 
horizons in the bond CAPM beta predictive regression for Canada. Thus, all these 
measures of bond risk with different horizons could be positively explained by the 
yield spread. Fama and French (1989b) provide empirical evidence that the yield 
spread is high around business cycle troughs while it is low near business cycle peaks. 
Consequently, one can consider the yield spread as a proxy for countercyclical time 
variation in bond risk. Hence, these results indicate that there is countercyclical 
variation in the comovement of bond returns with stock returns in Canada. In addition, 
there is also strong evidence that the short rate positively forecasts the realised 
covariance of bond and stock returns, as well as the bond CAPM beta for Canada, 
except at a horizon of sixty months. The corresponding slope coefficient is 
statistically significant in both predictive regressions.  
 
Additionally, Table 4-8 presents that there is also evidence that the yield spread is 
related to the movements in volatilities of bond returns and stock returns. The slope 
coefficient estimate of the yield spread in the predictive regressions for bond return 
volatility is statistically significant and positive except at the sixty-month horizon, 
which is statistically significant but negative. In the predictive regression for stock 
return volatility for Canada the slope estimate of the yield spread is negative at all 
horizons and it is statistically significant. The estimates of the coefficient on the short 
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rate in the forecasting regressions for bond return volatility are all statistically 
significant at all horizons; however, the short rate forecasts negatively the stock return 
volatility. Since the short rate is proved to move procyclically, these results imply that 
the short rate captures a procyclical component in the time variation in the bond risk 
for Canada. 
 
Table 4-7 and Table 4-8 also show that the lagged value of the second moment is 
statistically significant in forecasting the realised covariance of bond and stock returns, 
the bond CAPM beta, and the realised bond and stock return volatilities. This result 
implies the consistence in the movements of bond and stock risks. Additionally, the 
intercepts of the second moment predictive regressions are negative and highly 
significant for realized covariance and bond CAPM beta, although they are not 
reported here to save space.  
 
Figure 4-2: The realised 3-month bond beta (left axis) and the short rate (right axis) for 
Canada 
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Figure 4-3: The realised 3-month bond beta (left axis) and the yield spread (right axis) 
for Canada 
 
 
Figure 4-2 plots the time series of the three-month bond CAPM beta and the nominal 
short rate on one-month Treasury bill for Canada. Figure 4-3 draws the time series of 
the three-month bond CAPM beta as well as the yield spread between short- and 
long-term bonds. In addition, Table 4-8 reports that the 
2R of the regression of bond 
CAPM beta is 63.1% for Canada. Therefore, these results suggest that the movements 
in the term structure of interest rates capture a large fraction of the total variability in 
the realised bond risk, although these term structure variables have difficulties in 
fitting the last part of the sample. 
 
The results of forecasting regressions for second moments are similar for France, 
Germany, Italy and UK. There are only a few differences of note. The yield spread has 
a positive effect on forecasting the realised covariance of bond returns with stock 
returns at all horizons for France, Germany, Italy and UK. The coefficient estimate on 
the yield spread is statistically significant, with the exception of France at the six 
month horizon. At the same time, the yield spread also positively forecasts the bond 
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CAPM beta, except for Germany at the six-month horizon and Italy at the thirty-six 
month horizon where the coefficients are negative but insignificant, the corresponding 
coefficients for France at the six month horizon and the twelve month horizon are 
further expectations which are negative but significant. The yield spread also 
positively forecasts the bond return volatility for Italy and UK at all horizons; 
however, it negatively but significantly forecasts the bond return volatility for France 
at six, twelve and sixty month horizons and for Germany at all horizons. Similarly to 
Canada, the short rate has similar effects on stock and bond return volatilities for 
France, Italy and UK, although it tends to have negative effects on the bond return 
volatility for Germany at most horizons.  
 
Table 4-15 shows that the yield spread forecasts positively the realised covariance of 
bond and stock returns and its normalisation given by the bond CAPM beta, except at 
sixty-month horizon for the realised covariance and the twelve-month horizon for the 
bond CAPM beta for Japan. However, the slope coefficient of the yield spread in the 
regressions for bond CAPM is not statistically significant for Japan, except at the 
sixty month horizon. Meanwhile, the estimates of the coefficient on short rate in the 
forecasting regressions for the second moments are statistically significant but 
negative for covariance and bond beta in Japan. In the U.S. economy the yield spread 
and the short rate forecasts negatively the bond return volatility as well as the stock 
return volatility, and the corresponding coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant. 
 
 
4.4.2. Panel Analysis 
 
Parameters estimated in the time series for these economies might be completed with 
imprecision because of the relative short sample periods included. In order to provide 
more robust estimates of the relation between the bond risk and the term structure of 
interest rates, in this chapter we estimate the relationship in a panel framework and 
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report the results in Appendix I.  
 
Table 4-21 shows that the yield spread forecasts positively both the realised 
covariance of bond and stock returns and the bond CAPM beta for the G7 economies. 
This result is consistent with the results from the time series analysis for each 
individual country. The coefficient estimate on the yield spread is statistically 
significant at all horizons in the covariance predictive regression, and it is significant 
up to a horizon of thirty-six months in the bond beta regression. These results imply a 
countercyclical variation in the comovement of bond returns with stock returns. In 
addition, the short rate has positive and statistically significant effect on predicting 
both the covariance of bond and stock returns as well as the bond CAPM beta, except 
at the twelve-month horizon for the bond CAPM beta.  
 
Table 4-22 provides strong evidence that the yield spread is related to movements in 
bond return volatility. The corresponding coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at all horizons. The yield spread has a statistically significant but negative 
effect on stock return volatility in long-horizon. Nonetheless, the short rate positively 
forecasts the volatility of stock returns and the volatility of bond returns. These results 
are consistent with previous evidence of stock return volatility and they extend the 
literature to the bond return volatility. Since the short rate also significantly positively 
forecasts the covariance of bond and stock returns, these results suggest that the short 
rate captures a procyclical component in the time variation of the second moments of 
bond returns. 
 
The lagged value of the second moment has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on forecasting corresponding bond risk, except at the sixty-month horizon for 
covariance between bond and stock returns and the sixty-month horizon for stock 
return volatility. The intercept, although not reported here to save space, also has a 
statistically significant but negative effect on the bond risk prediction, which indicates 
that times of low short-term interest rates and a flat yield curve tend to coincide with 
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periods of low or negative second moments.  
 
Figure 4-4: The Mean of the realised 3-month bond beta (left axis) and the mean of short 
rate (right axis) for G7 
 
 
Figure 4-5: The mean of the realised 3-month bond beta (left axis) and the mean of the 
yield spread (right axis) for G7 
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Figure 4-4 plots the mean of the realised three-month bond CAPM beta and the mean 
of the log yield of the one-month Treasury bill across the G7 economies. Figure 4-5 
plots the mean of the realised three-month bond CAPM beta against the mean of the 
yield spread. It can be observed that both the short rate and the yield spread are 
related to the bond risk measured as bond CAPM beta, although as expected the short 
rate is relatively flatter among the period. Both figures suggest that the term structure 
variables capture the general direction of the bond CAPM beta.  
 
The recent financial crisis erupted in 2007, since when the short-term nominal interest 
rates have decreased dramatically in the U.S. which has been followed by a long 
period of low short-term nominal interest rates in the G7. This trend can be seen in 
Figure 4-4. This chapter also examines whether the relationship between the security 
risk and the term structure of interest rates is stable following the crisis. A dummy 
variable is used to capture the effects of the short rate and the yield spread on the 
second moments of bond and stock returns. Table 4-23 and 4-24 report regressions 
similar to those shown13606141019 in Table 4-21 and 4-22, except that they add an 
extra term that interacts each regressor with the dummy variable, which is equal to 
zero between January 1st 1991 and December 31st 2006 and which is equal to one 
between January 1st 2007 to April 18th 2011. Panel I in Table 23 shows the results for 
regressions of realised covariance between bond and stock returns. Panel II in Table 
4-23 reposts the results for the realised bond CAPM beta. Panels III and IV in Table 
4-24 report the regression results for realized bond and stock return volatility, 
respectively. Only horizons up to twelve months are taken into consideration since the 
subperiod is not long enough to obtain reliable results for changes in longer horizons.  
 
Table 4-23 and Table 4-24 show that the coefficients on the short rate in the 
covariance, bond CAPM beta, and stock return volatility regressions is significantly 
smaller in the post-crisis period than that in the earlier period. The coefficient on the 
short rate interaction term is negative and statistically large in magnitude. The 
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coefficient of the yield spread tends to have the same trend for covariance and bond 
CAPM beta regressions. These results indicate that the relationship between the 
secutiry risk and the term structure of interest rates have been considerably changed 
since the recent financial crisis in 2007. In contrast, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms of the short rate and the yield spread are statistically significant and positive in 
bond return volatility regression. The bond and stock risk has become hard to forecast 
in the post-2007 period. Taking alternative measurements of bond risk into 
consideration for instance, the term structure of interest rates positively forecasts 
realised bond CAPM betas but negatively forecasts realised bond return volatility.  
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyses the time variation in the realised covariance of bond returns 
with stock returns, the bond CAPM beta, and the realised volatility of bond returns 
and stock returns, respectively. It shows that these second moments are systematically 
related to changes in the term structure of nominal interest rates.  
 
There is an empirical stylised fact in that the time variation in the expected excess 
returns of long-term bonds is persistent and positively related to the time variation in 
the yield spread. Viceira (2007b) further argues that the time variation in the bond risk 
is also positively related to the changes in the yield spread for the U.S. economy. We 
provide additional empirical evidence that the time variation in bond risk (which is 
measured as realised covariance of bond returns with stock returns, bond CAPM beta, 
and realised bond return volatility) is statistically significantly and positively related 
with the movement in the yield spread for most G7 economies over the period January 
1991 to April 2011.  
 
There is also another empirical stylised fact in that the short-term nominal interest 
rates play an important role in forecasting the stock return volatility as well as the 
exchange rate volatility. This chapter extends this in order to examine the relationship 
between the short rate and the bond return volatility as well as the stock return 
volatility. This shows that the short-term nominal interest rate is also statistically 
significant in predicting the time variation in bond risk and stock risk, such as the 
realised covariance of bond returns with stock returns, the bond CAPM beta and the 
realised volatilities of bond returns and stock returns. The short rate is considered to 
be a proxy for economic uncertainty and the yield spread tends to be a proxy for 
business conditions; hence, these results imply that the central bank could control 
volatility of the bond and stock markets through adjustments of the interest rate 
policiy. 
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Furthermore, as another extension of the literature, this chapter also provides strong 
empirical evidence of the effect of the short-term interest rate on time variation in the 
second moments of bond and stock returns for the G7 economies as a whole with 
analysis under panel construction. The yield spread is another statistically significant 
determinant in forecasting the time variation in bond and stock risks. In addition, the 
effects of the recent financial crisis on the relationship between time variation in bond 
and stock risks and time variation in the term structure of interest rates is also taken 
into consideration in order to confirm their stability throughout the sample period. 
The empirical results suggest that this relation has been changed significantly 
following the 2007 economic crisis. The relationship between the second moments of 
bond and stock returns and interest rates became at odds as the economy fell apart.  
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Appendix I 
 
Table 4-1: The realised volatility of stock returns 
Economy Stock Return Volatility,  ntS ,
2  
 3-month 6-month 12-month 36-month 60-month 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Canada 0.870 (0.746) 0.877 (0.647) 0.886 (0.563) 1.025 (0.647) 1.311 (0.836) 
France 1.306 (1.233) 1.308 (1.072) 1.304 (0.922) 1.360 (0.688) 1.491 (0.508) 
Germany 1.321 (0.999) 1.318 (0.837) 1.291 (0.701) 1.343 (0.601) 1.533 (0.579) 
Italy 1.562 (1.209) 1.561 (1.007) 1.549 (0.841) 1.560 (0.593) 1.648 (0.445) 
Japan 1.389 (0.796) 1.396 (0.609) 1.396 (0.472) 1.444 (0.443) 1.566 (0.418) 
UK 0.845 (0.825) 0.848 (0.730) 0.849 (0.623) 0.926 (0.514) 1.074 (0.471) 
US 0.976 (0.920) 0.975 (0.815) 0.970 (0.733) 1.060 (0.675) 1.265 (0.608) 
This table reports the basic statistics of the realised volatility of stock returns for G7 countries, 
respectively. These volatilities whichh are defined in Equation (4.3.1) are calculated based on the 
daily log returns on stocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
Table 4-2: The realised volatility of bond returns 
Economy Bond Return Volatility,  ntB ,
2  
 3-month 6-month 12-month 36-month 60-month 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Canada 0.079 (0.059) 0.079 (0.049) 0.078 (0.043) 0.073 (0.036) 0.068 (0.028) 
France 0.044 (0.028) 0.044 (0.023) 0.044 (0.019) 0.044 (0.014) 0.043 (0.009) 
Germany 0.037 (0.022) 0.038 (0.027) 0.038 (0.014) 0.039 (0.008) 0.041 (0.005) 
Italy 0.076 (0.087) 0.076 (0.078) 0.076 (0.070) 0.070 (0.059) 0.061 (0.044) 
Japan 0.029 (0.029) 0.029 (0.025) 0.029 (0.020) 0.029 (0.014) 0.028 (0.012) 
UK 0.053 (0.049) 0.052 (0.041) 0.052 (0.032) 0.051 (0.024) 0.049 (0.018) 
US 0.069 (0.035) 0.069 (0.029) 0.069 (0.024) 0.072 (0.019) 0.038 (0.067) 
This table reports the basic statistics of the realised volatility of bond returns for G7 countries, 
respectively. These volatilities which are defined in Equation (4.3.2) are calculated based on the 
daily log returns on five-year constant maturity bonds.  
 
Table 4-3: The realised covariance of bond and stock returns 
Economy Covariance of bond and stock returns,  ntSB ,,  
 3-month 6-month 12-month 36-month 60-month 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Canada 0.027 (0.092) 0.027 (0.081) 0.027 (0.071) 0.016 (0.066) -0.003 (0.068) 
France 0.007 (0.123) 0.006 (0.114) 0.005 (0.107) -0.010 (0.096) -0.031 (0.087) 
Germany 0.010 (0.078) 0.009 (0.070) 0.016 (0.126) -0.002 (0.053) -0.020 (0.058) 
Italy 0.056 (0.152) 0.056 (0.138) 0.055 (0.129) 0.039 (0.119) 0.020 (0.103) 
Japan -0.029 (0.152) -0.030 (0.038) -0.032 (0.029) -0.039 (0.021) -0.042 (0.020) 
UK 0.017 (0.112) 0.016 (0.098) 0.016 (0.087) 0.001 (0.075) -0.018 (0.069) 
US -0.013 (0.121) -0.013 (0.111) -0.014 (0.099) -0.028 (0.087) -0.051 (0.084) 
This table reports the basic statistics of the realised covariance of bond and stock returns for G7 
countries, respectively. These covariances defined in Equation (4.3.3) are calculated based on the 
daily log returns on the five-year constant maturity bonds and the log daily returns of stocks.  
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Table 4-4: CAPM beta 
Economy CAPM beta,  ntSB ,,  
 3-month 6-month 12-month 36-month 60-month 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Canada 0.083 (0.144) 0.082 (0.136) 0.080 (0.132) 0.058 (0.117) 0.033 (0.096) 
France 0.044 (0.100) 0.041 (0.096) 0.038 (0.094) -0.010 (0.096) -0.002 (0.077) 
Germany 0.034 (0.067) 0.032 (0.062) 0.029 (0.057) -0.001 (0.035) -0.001 (0.040) 
Italy 0.034 (0.092) 0.034 (0.086) 0.033 (0.083) 0.019 (0.080) 0.007 (0.068) 
Japan -0.025 (0.037) -0.026 (0.030) -0.027 (0.025) -0.030 (0.017) -0.028 (0.012) 
UK 0.070 (0.137) 0.070 (0.132) 0.070 (0.129) 0.044 (0.121) 0.016 (0.100) 
US 0.049 (0.129) 0.047 (0.123) 0.044 (0.119) 0.018 (0.112) -0.011 (0.089) 
This table reports the basic statistics of CAPM beta for G7 countries, respectively. These betas 
defined in Equation (4.3.4) are calculated based on the daily log returns on the five-year constant 
maturity bonds and the log daily returns of stocks.  
 
Table 4-5: Three-month realized bond beta and volatility of bond and stock returns 
Economy MeanDS ..  Correlation (%) 
  mtSB 3,,   mtB 3,
2   mtS 3,
2  
2
, & BSB   
2
, & SSB   
22 & SB   
Canada 2.710 0.738 1.867 67.7 -23.1 -0.9 
France 5.795 0.634 1.110 30.9 -33.2 31.5 
Germany 6.269 0.620 1.190 -3.2 -34.9 44.5 
Italy 4.108 1.118 0.977 62.8 -2.2 18.0 
Japan -1.229 1.029 1.076 -20.8 10.7 -2.0 
UK 3.453 0.877 1.358 49.4 -30.2 27.2 
US 10.004 0.685 1.583 -25.6 -28.5 65.6 
This table reports the alternative statistics of the three-month realised bond CAPM beta and the 
volatility of bond and stock returns for G7 countries, respectively. These betas are calculated 
based on the daily log returns on the five-year constant maturity bonds and the log daily returns 
of stocks. 
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Table 4-6: The realised second moments under panel construction 
 3-month 6-month 12-month 36-month 60-month 
2
S  Mean 1.504 1.511 1.522 1.487 1.413 
2
S  S.D./Mean 1.318 1.111 0.926 0.622 0.423 
2
B  Mean 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.055 0.047 
2
B  S.D./Mean 0.937 0.841 0.747 0.621 0.762 
SB,  Mean 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.004 0.002 
SB,  S.D./Mean 6.065 5.915 5.719 24.262 40.119 
 2, , BSBCorr   (%) 33.3 34.5 37.2 46.2 65.6 
 2, , SSBCorr   (%) -23.1 -28.5 -35.4 -50.2 -50.8 
 22 , SBCorr   (%) 20.3 18.6 17.0 1.6 -22.3 
This table reports the statistics of the realized stock return volatility, the realised bond return 
volatility, the realised covariance between returns on bond and stock, and the realised bond 
CAPM beta for the whole G7 market. These betas are calculated based on the daily log returns 
on the five-year constant maturity bonds and the log daily returns of stocks. 
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Table 4-7: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for Canada 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.389291*** 
(0.049830) 
0.020854*** 
(0.003368) 
0.026563*** 
(0.006455) 
38.0% 
6 
0.323483*** 
(0.043430) 
0.025145*** 
(0.002683) 
0.027353*** 
(0.005432) 
41.9% 
12 
0.440628*** 
(0.039471) 
0.021593*** 
(0.002185) 
0.032783*** 
(0.004470) 
53.8% 
36 
0.038381 
(0.058161) 
0.025028*** 
(0.002437) 
0.063978*** 
(0.003741) 
55.1% 
60 
0.261413*** 
(0.036241) 
0.015699*** 
(0.002016) 
0.031366*** 
(0.002232) 
61.3% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.606563*** 
(0.046736) 
0.017961*** 
(0.002812) 
0.021890*** 
(0.006454) 
63.1% 
6 
0.565920*** 
(0.046078) 
0.023400*** 
(0.002726) 
0.021040*** 
(0.006677) 
66.4% 
12 
0.467475*** 
(0.052124) 
0.030369*** 
(0.003468) 
0.026930*** 
(0.006256) 
64.8% 
36 
0.155447*** 
(0.037627) 
0.025154*** 
(0.003557) 
0.038891*** 
(0.004814) 
52.6% 
60 
0.128309*** 
(0.008696) 
-0.001981*** 
(0.000941) 
0.004830** 
(0.001355) 
67.3% 
Table 4-7 reports the overlapping regressions of realized covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with AIC maxlags. 
Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-8: Volatility forecasting regression for Canada 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.240675*** 
(0.042057) 
0008166*** 
(0.001235) 
0.019716*** 
(0.003369) 
25.7% 
6 
0.208623*** 
(0.049376) 
0.010254*** 
(0.001039) 
0.019460*** 
(0.002703) 
36.2% 
12 
0.293369*** 
(0.056025) 
0.008620*** 
(0.001308) 
0.013402*** 
(0.002483) 
43.5% 
36 
-0.085587*** 
(0.031000) 
0.011962*** 
(0.000792) 
0.011979*** 
(0.001080) 
54.8% 
60 
0.145578*** 
(0.005441) 
0.002378*** 
(0.000169) 
-0.000829*** 
(0.000253) 
81.2% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.393110*** 
(0.077042) 
-0.258347*** 
(0.064164) 
-0.405189*** 
(0.116782) 
24.3% 
6 
0.308796*** 
(0.042615) 
-0.291675*** 
(0.060519) 
-0.545114*** 
(0.102663) 
22.1% 
12 
0.129578*** 
(0.033566) 
-0.405567*** 
(0.063487) 
-0.834051*** 
(0.108348) 
22.2% 
36 
-0.965802*** 
(0.079053) 
-0.352120*** 
(0.038270) 
-1.102046*** 
(0.065085) 
47.7% 
60 
-1.231877*** 
(0.085505) 
-0.780651*** 
(0.040846) 
-0.776281*** 
(0.055302) 
54.6% 
Table 4-8 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with 
AIC maxlags. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parentheses. * presents 
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significicance at 1%.  
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Table 4-9: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for France 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.550426*** 
(0.049230) 
0.015304*** 
(0.002841) 
0.018037*** 
(0.006060) 
45.9% 
6 
0.695697*** 
(0.051207) 
0.005658** 
(0.002795) 
0.003477 
(0.005257) 
57.1% 
12 
0.592198*** 
(0.050995) 
0.011800*** 
(0.003164) 
0.015001*** 
(0.005892) 
49.8% 
36 
0.184809*** 
(0.049691) 
0.024628*** 
(0.003631) 
0.053453*** 
(0.007497) 
32.7% 
60 
0.150264*** 
(0.022100) 
0.010931*** 
(0.002561) 
0.026733*** 
(0.003716) 
41.3% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.737279*** 
(0.034232) 
0.008079*** 
(0.001996) 
0.004063 
(0.004307) 
75.6% 
6 
0.837415*** 
(0.026751) 
0.003164** 
(0.001475) 
-0.008863** 
(0.003032) 
85.9% 
12 
0.767556*** 
(0.032338) 
0.006381*** 
(0.001802) 
-0.009046*** 
(0.003289) 
84.7% 
36 
0.184809*** 
(0.049691) 
0.024628*** 
(0.003631) 
0.053453*** 
(0.007497) 
32.7% 
60 
0.233214*** 
(0.006426) 
0.001595*** 
(0.000654) 
0.005473*** 
(0.001073) 
86.5% 
Table 4-9 reports overlapping regressions of realised covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with AIC maxlags. 
Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-10: Volatility forecasting regression for France 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.437158*** 
(0.044925) 
0.001611** 
(0.000852) 
-0.000923 
(0.001717) 
25.9% 
6 
0.373881*** 
(0.045330) 
0.001695** 
(0.000756) 
-0.003605** 
(0.001789) 
29.6% 
12 
0.199349*** 
(0.036919) 
0.003048*** 
(0.000512) 
-0.003884** 
(0.001620) 
36.5% 
36 
-0.604882*** 
(0.028326) 
0.006510*** 
(0.000347) 
0.001547** 
(0.000649) 
64.6% 
60 
0.043333* 
(0.023962) 
-0.002154*** 
(0.000220) 
-0.002205*** 
(0.000522) 
19.6% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.418261*** 
(0.055230) 
-0.048146* 
(0.028443) 
-0.059265 
(0.077555) 
18.9% 
6 
0.357919*** 
(0.039926) 
-0.029823 
(0.024342) 
-0.022583 
(0.065378) 
14.0% 
12 
0.239890*** 
(0.040092) 
-0.097120*** 
(0.030709) 
-0.173293*** 
(0.069462) 
8.9% 
36 
-0.593396*** 
(0.045546) 
-0.205637*** 
(0.030323) 
-0.389412*** 
(0.056949) 
27.3% 
60 
-0.744518*** 
(0.039413) 
-0.299230*** 
(0.020948) 
-0.331997*** 
(0.028853) 
54.5% 
Table 4-10 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with 
AIC maxlags. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents 
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-11: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for Germany 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.483749*** 
(0.052397) 
0.014188*** 
(0.002745) 
0.030252*** 
(0.008010) 
37.6% 
6 
0.708919*** 
(0.041881) 
0.000963 
(0.002124) 
0.011276** 
(0.005751) 
54.2% 
12 
0.555935*** 
(0.040312) 
0.021361*** 
(0.005006) 
0.070889*** 
(0.012055) 
44.4% 
36 
-0.112666 
(0.073406) 
0.015790*** 
(0.004429) 
0.082257*** 
(0.005625) 
39.5% 
60 
0.558559*** 
(0.072321) 
0.018457*** 
(0.002935) 
0.028343*** 
(0.003189) 
55.6% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.734982*** 
(0.044522) 
0.003581*** 
(0.001280) 
0.004260 
(0.003244) 
58.9% 
6 
0.797110*** 
(0.037548) 
0.001572 
(0.001265) 
-0.002476 
(0.003187) 
61.9% 
12 
0.475501*** 
(0.053587) 
0.012736*** 
(0.001740) 
0.016837*** 
(0.004039) 
41.1% 
36 
-0.145996** 
(0.056845) 
0.014972*** 
(0.001881) 
0.038543*** 
(0.002637) 
38.3% 
60 
0.326672** 
(0.020830) 
0.005263** 
(0.000772) 
0.010466** 
(0.001316) 
71.3% 
Table 4-11 reports overlapping regressions of realised covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with AIC maxlags. 
Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-12: Volatility forecasting regression for Germany 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.514442*** 
(0.039993) 
-0.001880*** 
(0.000511) 
-0.005178*** 
(0.001299) 
29.1% 
6 
0.301184** 
(0.125332) 
-0.002167*** 
(0.000528) 
-0.007294*** 
(0.001363) 
11.5% 
12 
0.312953*** 
(0.044035) 
-0.000677 
(0.000569) 
-0.008168*** 
(0.001290) 
16.5% 
36 
-0.639373*** 
(0.057397) 
0.004375*** 
(0.000339) 
-0.001991*** 
(0.000425) 
62.8% 
60 
-0.030061 
(0.089377) 
-0.003118*** 
(0.000319) 
-0.001577*** 
(0.000459) 
21.2% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.329257*** 
(0.044949) 
-0.185729*** 
(0.060606) 
-0.622320*** 
(0.208518) 
20.5% 
6 
0.294845*** 
(0.037502) 
-0.192934*** 
(0.046537) 
-0.630465*** 
(0.155100) 
20.5% 
12 
0.221144*** 
(0.028540) 
-0.252675*** 
(0.044574) 
-0.785272*** 
(0.119330) 
23.4% 
36 
-0.880362*** 
(0.053021) 
-0.153617*** 
(0.045349) 
-0.894259*** 
(0.052067) 
51.1% 
60 
-0.736919*** 
(0.053470) 
-0.494067*** 
(0.032108) 
-0.411875*** 
(0.041437) 
47.0% 
Table 4-12 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with 
AIC maxlags. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents 
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% land *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-13: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for Italy 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.379672*** 
(0.052522) 
0.015593*** 
(0.002226) 
0.032605*** 
(0.006077) 
39.9% 
6 
0.513343*** 
(0.044230) 
0.012405*** 
(0.002005) 
0.024455*** 
(0.004841) 
52.4% 
12 
0.349196*** 
(0.049135) 
0.018268*** 
(0.001896) 
0.041308*** 
(0.005217) 
55.2% 
36 
0.060153 
(0.040281) 
0.023981*** 
(0.001888) 
0.022523*** 
(0.002317) 
68.8% 
60 
-0.107756*** 
(0.013506) 
0.017839*** 
(0.000663) 
0.0048048*** 
(0.001451) 
69.5% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.597263*** 
(0.033725) 
0.006795*** 
(0.000986) 
0.014835*** 
(0.002504) 
63.2% 
6 
0.663075*** 
(0.032623) 
0.006498*** 
(0.000940) 
0.015537*** 
(0.002056) 
74.7% 
12 
0.552341*** 
(0.033835) 
0.008997*** 
(0.000934) 
0.023935*** 
(0.002010) 
75.4% 
36 
0.105504*** 
(0.029988) 
0.015805*** 
(0.001113) 
0.016861*** 
(0.001751) 
75.8% 
60 
0.007214 
(0.024320) 
0.008210*** 
(0.000610) 
-0.002101 
(0.001300) 
54.9% 
Table 4-13 reports overlapping regressions of realised covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with AIC maxlags. 
Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-14: Volatility forecasting regression for Italy 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.380806*** 
(0.065415) 
0.008296*** 
(0.001588) 
0.010486*** 
(0.003184) 
45.8% 
6 
0.264269*** 
(0.081319) 
0.010312*** 
(0.001914) 
0.007937** 
(0.003120) 
52.5% 
12 
0.133206* 
(0.079848) 
0.012948*** 
(0.001514) 
0.010204*** 
(0.003139) 
66.2% 
36 
-0.244201*** 
(0.034528) 
0.011354*** 
(0.000844) 
0.010098*** 
(0.000916) 
54.3% 
60 
0.011729 
(0.008227) 
-0.000196 
(0.000309) 
0.000032 
(0.000413) 
0.4% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.374963*** 
(0.039554) 
-0.021232 
(0.013768) 
-0.277783*** 
(0.076376) 
15.9% 
6 
0.374603*** 
(0.035561) 
-0.015377 
(0.011257) 
-0.341756*** 
(0.059011) 
16.3% 
12 
0.328941*** 
(0.034379) 
-0.015346 
(0.010784) 
-0.498625*** 
(0.054345) 
17.6% 
36 
-0.580429*** 
(0.053606) 
0.078584*** 
(0.008962) 
-0.282824*** 
(0.023531) 
42.3% 
60 
-1.526194*** 
(0.031627) 
0.007270 
(0.006359) 
-0.136312*** 
(0.020882) 
87.6% 
Table 4-14 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with 
AIC maxlags. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents 
significance at 10%，** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-15: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for Japan 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.428545*** 
(0.039769) 
-0.027376*** 
(0.005170) 
0.024255*** 
(0.005141) 
29.5% 
6 
0.477005*** 
(0.040945) 
-0.025557*** 
(0.004075) 
0.022436*** 
(0.004489) 
37.2% 
12 
0.193624*** 
(0.039276) 
-0.029246*** 
(0.003847) 
0.027130*** 
(0.004480) 
18.8% 
36 
0.836620*** 
(0.083118) 
-0.005138** 
(0.002281) 
0.020819*** 
(0.003353) 
17.9% 
60 
-1.305677*** 
(0.064095) 
0.053401*** 
(0.005850) 
-0.002067 
(0.002222) 
63.8% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.255539*** 
(0.047243) 
-0.014717*** 
(0.003848) 
0.002116 
(0.004712) 
16.4% 
6 
0.378529*** 
(0.052308) 
-0.006994** 
(0.002807) 
0.000726 
(0.003511) 
23.5% 
12 
0.485262*** 
(0.044708) 
-0.000887 
(0.001726) 
-0.000863 
(0.002194) 
30.3% 
36 
-0.182098*** 
(0.036202) 
-0.004437*** 
(0.001092) 
0.001576 
(0.001666) 
5.5% 
60 
-0.938650*** 
(0.031678) 
0.002340 
(0.002522) 
0.006994*** 
(0.000910) 
86.2% 
Table 4-15 reports overlapping regressions of realised covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with AIC maxlags. 
Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-16: Volatility forecasting regression for Japan 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.345993*** 
(0.062135) 
0.008338** 
(0.003455) 
0.003030 
(0.002209) 
20.8% 
6 
0.277116*** 
(0.050524) 
0.010710*** 
(0.003058) 
0.001892 
(0.002043) 
22.3% 
12 
0.120732*** 
(0.003070) 
0.014651*** 
(0.001039) 
0.002835* 
(0.001744) 
26.6% 
36 
0.173311*** 
(0.032918) 
0.005088*** 
(0.000657) 
0.009477*** 
(0.001274) 
41.9% 
60 
0.001760 
(0.027486) 
0.021925*** 
(0.002900) 
0.007150*** 
(0.001010) 
61.8% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.209658*** 
(0.049324) 
0.793570*** 
(0.241865) 
-1.372658*** 
(0.295811) 
12.7% 
6 
0.242471*** 
(0.053265) 
0.822378*** 
(0.170327) 
-1.217192*** 
(0.183474) 
17.0% 
12 
0.004427 
(0.035651) 
0.923922*** 
(0.161409) 
-1.637358*** 
(0.203609) 
19.9% 
36 
-1.455248*** 
(0.097947) 
0.009544 
(0.059927) 
-0.746922*** 
(0.098606) 
37.6% 
60 
-0.624184*** 
(0.104838) 
-1.244115*** 
(0.150238) 
0.221250*** 
(0.052644) 
15.2% 
Table 4-16 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with 
AIC maxlags. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents 
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-17: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for the U.K. 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.274334*** 
(0.049824) 
0.027078*** 
(0.003196) 
0.046550*** 
(0.005694) 
37.7% 
6 
0.452184*** 
(0.058823) 
0.018704*** 
(0.003120) 
0.032679*** 
(0.004347) 
50.2% 
12 
0.292944*** 
(0.063815) 
0.023290*** 
(0.004416) 
0.045927*** 
(0.004698) 
46.5% 
36 
0.053438 
(0.120452) 
0.020375*** 
(0.007387) 
0.043778*** 
(0.005933) 
43.9% 
60 
0.706663*** 
(0.034566) 
-0.023539*** 
(0.002436) 
0.004481** 
(0.001655) 
79.0% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.552072*** 
(0.052230) 
0.021018*** 
(0.003556) 
0.037842*** 
(0.006849) 
69.1% 
6 
0.505226*** 
(0.049137) 
0.026269*** 
(0.003452) 
0.042122*** 
(0.006736) 
73.2% 
12 
0.511317*** 
(0.057471) 
0.026128*** 
(0.003838) 
0.043213*** 
(0.0006526) 
75.5% 
36 
0.155192** 
(0.071983) 
0.016243*** 
(0.006893) 
0.046240*** 
(0.006107) 
59.7% 
60 
0.194444*** 
(0.007496) 
-0.004133** 
(0.000724) 
0.004868*** 
(0.000863) 
87.0% 
Table 4-17 reports overlaping regressions of realised covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with AIC maxlags. 
Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-18: Volatility forecasting regression for the U.K. 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.387827*** 
(0.067303) 
0.003579** 
(0.001350) 
0.004231*** 
(0.002220) 
19.8% 
6 
0.287327*** 
(0.056361) 
0.005147*** 
(0.000982) 
0.002934 
(0.002108) 
16.0% 
12 
0.282569*** 
(0.059931) 
0.006481*** 
(0.000799) 
0.001315 
(0.002070) 
20.7% 
36 
-0.661095*** 
(0.056098) 
0.018173*** 
(0.001027) 
0.015771*** 
(0.001149) 
36.6% 
60 
-0.134129*** 
(0.042603) 
0.004636*** 
(0.000671) 
0.001233*** 
(0.000523) 
14.0% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.410367*** 
(0.061433) 
-0.085377*** 
(0.019549) 
-0.308345*** 
(0.066097) 
23.3% 
6 
0.402769*** 
(0.048683) 
-0.050781*** 
(0.016396) 
-0.328659*** 
(0.049268) 
22.8% 
12 
0.355476*** 
(0.046419) 
-0.045410** 
(0.022469) 
-0.453546*** 
(0.050754) 
24.6% 
36 
-1.336954*** 
(0.080042) 
-0.462339*** 
(0.036079) 
-0.517095*** 
(0.023235) 
56.6% 
60 
0.183154 
(0.117331) 
0.040983 
(0.042068) 
-0.211464*** 
(0.025698) 
24.3% 
Table 4-18 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with 
AIC maxlags. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents 
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-19: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for the U.S. 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.607278*** 
(0.064057) 
0.013589*** 
(0.004340) 
0.013717*** 
(0.006078) 
48.0% 
6 
0.555152*** 
(0.076356) 
0.012061*** 
(0.004627) 
0.017102*** 
(0.006663) 
41.2% 
12 
0.325540*** 
(0.064458) 
0.028334*** 
(0.006339) 
0.052929*** 
(0.008846) 
31.5% 
36 
0.224463*** 
(0.110836) 
0.019195** 
(0.007126) 
0.101496*** 
(0.006918) 
44.4% 
60 
0.893231*** 
(0.046669) 
-0.023340*** 
(0.003457) 
0.007159 
(0.004996) 
56.3% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.704207*** 
(0.039850) 
0.011934*** 
(0.002863) 
0.018965*** 
(0.004650) 
65.6% 
6 
0.771709*** 
(0.047132) 
0.004315* 
(0.002687) 
0.018111*** 
(0.003945) 
67.0% 
12 
0.770365*** 
(0.043405) 
-0.002103 
(0.003379) 
0.024010*** 
(0.005513) 
57.7% 
36 
0.337031*** 
(0.030971) 
0.009506*** 
(0.002932) 
0.047684*** 
(0.005784) 
54.1% 
60 
0.286363*** 
(0.013713) 
-0.001742** 
(0.000864) 
0.000573 
(0.001502) 
78.5% 
Table 4-19 reports overlapping regressions of realised covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with AIC maxlags. 
Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-20: Volatility forecasting regression for the U.S. 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.475903*** 
(0.055182) 
-0.008118*** 
(0.001073) 
-0.007939*** 
(0.002075) 
38.8% 
6 
0.578961*** 
(0.058273) 
-0.004863*** 
(0.001000) 
-0.009128*** 
(0.002032) 
42.9% 
12 
0.176589** 
(0.063415) 
-0.010703*** 
(0.001593) 
-0.014387*** 
(0.002501) 
21.1% 
36 
-1.438742*** 
(0.054887) 
-0.012158*** 
(0.000617) 
-0.015961*** 
(0.001472) 
62.9% 
60 
-0.340794*** 
(0.051360) 
0.038246*** 
(0.001867) 
0.039527*** 
(0.003924) 
61.1% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.446547*** 
(0.07005) 
-0.133466** 
(0.054555) 
-0.161201*** 
(0.063322) 
24.5% 
6 
0.304599*** 
(0.051799) 
-0.171723*** 
(0.055963) 
-0.227307*** 
(0.058954) 
15.5% 
12 
0.095558* 
(0.051468) 
-0.298415*** 
(0.073640) 
-0.559281*** 
(0.087782) 
13.3% 
36 
-0.312436*** 
(0.073651) 
-0.103080** 
(0.037667) 
-0.807098 
(0.046092) 
51.6% 
60 
-0.530275*** 
(0.053348) 
-0.137734*** 
(0.029506) 
-0.271203*** 
(0.047990) 
21.1% 
Table 4-20 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t). Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance are applied with 
AIC maxlags. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents 
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
  
185 
 
Table 4-21: Covariance and bond beta forecasting regression for G7 in panel framework 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.363855*** 
(0.007677) 
0.010750*** 
(0.000668) 
0.009747*** 
(0.001074) 
79.5% 
6 
0.429585*** 
(0.007942) 
0.008962*** 
(0.000531) 
0.007853*** 
(0.000849) 
84.0% 
12 
0.543097*** 
(0.010383) 
0.003711*** 
(0.000483) 
0.009227*** 
(0.000839) 
84.0% 
36 
0.142449*** 
(0.011123) 
0.008724*** 
(0.000476) 
0.024564*** 
(0.000717) 
85.0% 
60 
-0.062812*** 
(0.007031) 
0.001762*** 
(0.000414) 
0.004317*** 
(0.000695) 
83.9% 
Panel II: CAPM beta regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.587554*** 
(0.005847) 
0.001608*** 
(0.000340) 
0.005923*** 
(0.000600) 
82.8% 
6 
0.633637 
(0.005586) 
0.000495** 
(0.000284) 
0.005425*** 
(0.000509) 
86.8% 
12 
0.612807*** 
(0.005827) 
-0.000951*** 
(0.000289) 
0.007762*** 
(0.000486) 
88.1% 
36 
0.233708*** 
(0.007085) 
0.001964*** 
(0.000246) 
0.015956*** 
(0.000571) 
80.4% 
60 
0.039903*** 
(0.002898) 
0.001161*** 
(0.000206) 
0.000151 
(0.000361) 
86.6% 
Table 4-21 reports overlapping regressions of realised covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield 
spread, spr(t), under panel construction. Fixed effects are applied with cross-section SUR 
controlling for heteroskedasticity and cross-section correlation. Corresponding standard errors 
are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% 
and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-22: Volatility forecasting regression for G7 in panel framework 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.430431*** 
(0.007360) 
0.007670*** 
(0.000285) 
0.013480*** 
(0.000473) 
70.7% 
6 
0.495173*** 
(0.007311) 
0.006830*** 
(0.000244) 
0.010358*** 
(0.000413) 
74.3% 
12 
0.473033*** 
(0.008176) 
0.008132*** 
(0.000213) 
0.011782*** 
(0.000348) 
77.5% 
36 
0.218168*** 
(0.008948) 
0.002802*** 
(0.000238) 
0.003919*** 
(0.000301) 
74.5% 
60 
-0.265100*** 
(0.012649) 
0.003338*** 
(0.000378) 
-0.006951*** 
(0.000562) 
52.2% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon (months) Lagged tr(t) spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.414459*** 
(0.008629) 
0.042533*** 
(0.005221) 
0.005040 
(0.008822) 
89.2% 
6 
0.392957*** 
(0.009021) 
0.047158*** 
(0.004525) 
0.003405 
(0.007534) 
89.4% 
12 
0.259587*** 
(0.010339) 
0.066650*** 
(0.004033) 
0.005948 
(0.006865) 
88.3% 
36 
0.339774*** 
(0.012046) 
0.084863*** 
(0.002490) 
-0.086878*** 
(0.005293) 
89.2% 
60 
-0.216186*** 
(0.009121) 
0.040002*** 
(0.003412) 
-0.103220*** 
(0.007373) 
79.8% 
Table 4-22 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatilities (Panel III) and 
stock return volatilities (Panel IV) onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, tr(t) 
and the yield spread, spr(t), under panel construction. Fixed effects are applied with cross-section 
SUR controlling for heteroskedasticity and cross-section correlation. Corresponding standard 
errors are reported within parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 
5% and *** indicates significance at 1%.  
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Table 4-23: Stability of covariance and bond beta predictive regressions 
Panel I: Covariance regression 
Horizon 
(months) 
Lagged dum*Lagged tr(t) dum*tr(t) spr(t) dum*spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.3449*** 
(0.00940) 
0.0362** 
(0.01487) 
0.0102*** 
(0.00069) 
-0.0113*** 
(0.00120) 
0.0104*** 
(0.00109) 
-0.0215*** 
(0.00208) 
79.7% 
6 
0.3975*** 
(0.00941) 
0.0621*** 
(0.01519) 
0.0087*** 
(0.00055) 
-0.0130*** 
(0.00099) 
0.0079*** 
(0.00086) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.00181) 
84.2% 
12 
0.2863*** 
(0.01203) 
0.4372*** 
(0.01827) 
0.0082*** 
(0.00047) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.00101) 
0.0070*** 
(0.00077) 
0.0236*** 
(0.00168) 
85.8% 
Panel II: Bond CAPM beta regression 
Horizon 
(months) 
Lagged dum*Lagged tr(t) dum*tr(t) spr(t) dum*spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.5608*** 
(0.00624) 
0.1623*** 
(0.01847) 
0.0011*** 
(0.00034) 
-0.0078*** 
(0.00077) 
0.0062*** 
(0.00061) 
-0.0134*** 
(0.00133) 
83.0% 
6 
0.6080*** 
(0.00594) 
0.1491*** 
(0.01797) 
0.00006 
(0.00029) 
-0.0081*** 
(0.00062) 
0.0054*** 
(0.00052) 
-0.0113*** 
(0.00111) 
87.0% 
12 
0.5985*** 
(0.00593) 
0.0843*** 
(0.02747) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.00029) 
-0.0085*** 
(0.00062) 
0.0074*** 
(0.00049) 
-0.0083*** 
(0.00120) 
88.2% 
Table 4-23 reports the overlapping regressions of realissed covariances (Panel I) and bond CAPM 
betas (Panel II) under panel construction onto a constant, their own lagged value, the treasury rate, 
tr(t) and the yield spread, spr(t), as well as the dummy variable, dum, which is equal to zero between 
January 1st 1991 and December 31st  2006, and which is equal to one between January 1st 2007 to 
January 18th 2011. Fixed effects are applied with cross-section SUR controlling for heteroskedasticity 
and cross-section correlation. Corresponding standard errors are reported within parenthesis. * 
presents significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%. 
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Table 4-24: Stability of volatility forecasting regression 
Panel III: Bond return volatility regression 
Horizon 
(months) 
Lagged dum*Lagged tr(t) dum*tr(t) spr(t) dum*spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.3392*** 
(0.00845) 
0.2877*** 
(0.01665) 
0.0097*** 
(0.00030) 
0.0027*** 
(0.00044) 
0.0162*** 
(0.00049) 
0.0024** 
(0.00096) 
71.5% 
6 
0.3507*** 
(0.00831) 
0.4474*** 
(0.01601) 
0.0098*** 
(0.00025) 
0.0037*** 
(0.000360 
0.0152*** 
(0.00042) 
-0.0009 
(0.00086) 
76.0% 
12 
0.2289*** 
(0.000716) 
0.1972*** 
(0.01830) 
0.0128*** 
(0.00021) 
0.0107*** 
(0.00031) 
0.0190*** 
(0.00032) 
0.0142*** 
(0.00079) 
75.6% 
Panel IV: Stock return volatility regression 
Horizon 
(months) 
Lagged dum*Lagged tr(t) dum*tr(t) spr(t) dum*spr(t) R
2
 
3 
0.4276*** 
(0.01057) 
-0.0506*** 
(0.01648) 
0.0423*** 
(0.00531) 
-0.1332*** 
(0.01114) 
-0.0416*** 
(0.00882) 
0.2267*** 
(0.01863) 
89.5% 
6 
0.4154*** 
(0.01056) 
-0.0795*** 
(0.01702) 
0.0455*** 
(0.00453) 
-0.1340*** 
(0.00931) 
-0.0458*** 
(0.00745) 
0.2376*** 
(0.01598) 
89.8% 
12 
0.2864*** 
(0.01180) 
-0.0959*** 
(0.02011) 
0.0683*** 
(0.00399) 
-0.0845*** 
(0.00820) 
-0.0432*** 
(0.00676) 
0.3282*** 
(0.01426) 
88.9% 
Table 4-24 reports overlapping regressions of realised bond return volatility (Panel III) and stock 
return volatility (Panel IV) under panel construction onto a constant, their own lagged value, the 
treasury rate, tr(t) and the yield spread, spr(t), as well as the dummy variable, dum, which is equal to 
zero between January 1st 1991 and December 31st  2006, and which is equal to one between January 
1st 2007 to January 18th 2011. Fixed effects are applied with cross-section SUR controlling for 
heteroskedasticity and cross-section correlation. Corresponding standard errors are reported within 
parenthesis. * presents significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5% and *** indicates 
significance at 1%. 
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Chapter 5  Directors’ Pay and Firm Performance in the UK, 
2004-2009 
 
5.1.   Introduction 
 
Recently, the compensation of Executive Directors has attracted worldwide public 
attention and media interest. Of particular concern has been the compensation of a 
number of high profile chief executives. For example, in the U.S. a CNN Money 
report which was titled “CEO pay: Sky high gets even higher” showed that the 
average pay ratio of CEO-to-worker has been leaping from year to year. In 2004, for 
example, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio reached 431-to-1, while it was only 42-to-1 in 
1982 and 107-to-1 in 1990. Meanwhile, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) point out that 
according to the research of Harvard University on the pay of the top five executives’ 
from across a large set of public companies, the earnings of those executives 
amounted to approximately 10% of their companies’ earnings during 2001 to 2003, 
which was almost double of what was during the period of 1993 to 1995. In 2007, 
although the companies slowed down and some companies saw huge drops in their 
profitability, “their CEO pay still chugged to yet more dizzying height”. For instance, 
Stan O’Neal, Merrill Lynch’s former boss, left with a package of $159m after losing 
$8 billion (Tanugi 2009). Treasury Secretary Geithner (2009) from the US commented 
on 10th June 2009, that “this financial crisis had many significant causes, but 
executive compensation practices were a contributing factor.” 
  
In the UK, the generous executive pay package and its rapid increase has led to an 
increasing level of public anger in the past two decades. In 1995 the chief executive of 
British Gas received a pay rise of over 75%. Public debate about executive 
compensation has consequently erupted following a number of such large increases in 
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executive pay. In the U.K. the average CEO-to-employee pay ratio has increased from 
47-to-1 to 128-to-1 over a decade according to commentators’ reports, whereas 
management guru Peter Drucker proposed that this ratio should be no larger than 
20-to-1 in the U.K.  In another example, in 1999 Vodafone’s shareholders tried to 
block a £10m bonus to its CEO. Many directors who are responsible for setting 
executive compensation packages believe that those packages need trimming. More 
recently, during the recovery from financial crisis several large public firms have 
taken reconsideration about their executive compensation structures. For example, 
Shell announced in 2010 that they will freeze executive directors’ salaries for a year. 
Meanwhile, HSBC has shifted the emphasis from performance-related pay to fixed 
income, although there are reports of 30% to 40% salary rises for the top executives at 
HSBC which are reported by Nick Tapazio (2010) from CIMA (Charted Institute of 
Management Accountants). 
 
In this chapter we will aim to examine the relationship between directors’ emolument 
and corporate performance of the chief executive, the highest paid director, and the 
whole board of large public firms in the U.K. over the period 2004-2009. In 
comparison to the U.S., empirical studies on directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance are rather limited and very few have analysed the pay of both the CEO 
and the highest paid director. Cadbury’s (1992) report significantly improved the 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration. Greenbury’s (1995) report further suggested 
scrutiny over the constructing of the directors’ pay additional to full disclosure. 
Moreover, Hampel’s (1998) report emphasised the inclusion of detailed remuneration 
information in a company’s annual report. Higgs (2003) highlighted the important role 
of non-executive directors on setting remuneration packages. Since this point research 
on executive compensation has started to become easier and it has attracted much 
attention. For example, Conyon (1997) takes a sample of top director remuneration 
packages within 213 large UK firms recorded from 1988 to 1993 in order to estimate 
the innovations of corporate governance. He finds a positive relationship between 
director compensation and shareholder returns. He also shows the influence of 
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remuneration committees, which are responsible for setting executives’ compensation, 
on director compensation. Conyon and Murphy (2000) investigated CEO pay and 
incentives for both U.S. and U.K. companies. They indicate that in 1997 CEO pay in 
the U.S. was higher than that in the U.K., while controlling for economic determinants 
for the compensation package. Gregg et al. (2005) finds an asymmetric relationship 
between executive cash compensation and corporate performance with relatively high 
and low corporate returns, and suggests that overall there is little relationship between 
pay and performance. Additionally, Ozkan (2007) uses a hand-collected data set of 
390 non-financial companies and has identified a significantly positive relationship 
between corporate performance and CEO cash compensation, but an insignificant 
relationship for total compensation. Meanwhile, Girma et al. (2007) reports that there 
is a weak link between CEO compensation and performance for U.K. companies over 
the period 1981 to 1996. Therefore, it can be seen that the evidence from previous 
studies relating to the directors’ remuneration and corporate performance in the U.K. 
is mixed. 
 
In this chapter, firstly, we will reconsider the basic pay-performance relationship by 
re-examining the link between directors’ pay and firm performance with the most 
recent data of FTSE 350 companies over the period 2004 to 2009. In order to shed a 
new light on this pay-performance relationship we will extend the scope by 
empirically analysing the compensation packages of not only the CEO but also of the 
highest paid director and the whole board of those corporations. 
 
A key contribution of this chapter is to evaluate the directors’ compensation for CEO 
(both cash and total pay), the highest paid director, and the whole board of directors 
among FTSE 350 firms for the sample period 2004 to 2009, and for the pre-crisis 
subsample period of 2004 to 2006 and the post-crisis period of 2008 to 2009. In the 
empirical estimations this study will control for a comprehensive set of variables, 
such as: firm size, board size, financial leverage. Secondly, we will also analyse the 
differences in pay-performance relationship among industries and between firms with 
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different dividend payout policies. Thirdly, we will investigate the impacts of the 
latest financial crisis which erupted in mid-2007 on the corporate pay-performance 
relationship. This can be seen as one of the main contributions in this chapter. Last but 
not least, this chapter will also shed a light on the influence of remuneration policy on 
corporate returns and growth opportunities because this has rarely been examined in 
the previous studies. Another contribution of this study is that it will use a fixed 
effects method to implement panel data estimation with the inclusion of both white 
diagonal and cross-section SUR to control for the observation specific 
heteroskedasticity and cross-section correlation. Although the panel estimation with 
fixed effects has been applied in several previous studies, few of them have taken 
account of heteroskedasticity and cross-section correlation problems through 
estimations. In addition, the bootstrapping methodology is applied in this study in 
order to check the robustness of the findings. There are in addition two further 
contributions of this chapter. The first contribution is that this study will analyse the 
pay-performance relationship for both CEO and highest paid director in the firm and 
compare and discuss the difference, whereas the previous studies have only examined 
one counterpart. The second contribution of this study is that besides the effect of firm 
performance on directors’ pay it will also look at this pay-performance relationship 
through the opposite direction in order to consider how the directors’ remuneration 
policy influences the firm’s performance.  
 
In this chapter the empirical results indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the directors’ pay and corporate performance for CEO cash and 
total compensation, as well as remuneration for highest paid director and whole board, 
respectively. The findings in this study support the idea that U.K. corporate 
governance reports have been effective at constructing a closer link between pay and 
performance. In agreement with most of the previous studies, this study finds that a 
firm’s size plays an important role in determining the directors’ remuneration 
packages, while board size does not have a significant impact. Additionally, this study 
will show that firms from different industries have significantly different relationships 
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between pay and performance for CEOs, highest paid directors, and the total board. 
Companies in the financial industry have the strongest link between their directors’ 
pay and corporate performance. However, for CEO compensation only, firms with 
different dividend policies generate significantly different magnitudes in the 
pay-performance relationship. Firms with higher dividend payout ratios have a 
weaker link between CEO total pay and performance.  
 
In this chapter we also find that the relationship between the directors’ remuneration 
and a firm’s performance has weakened after the fiscal year 2007. Because of the data 
limitation, this study could only examine the relationship with observation in two 
years after the financial crisis. These results indicate that the latest financial crisis, 
which first erupted in the middle of 2007, has had a crucial impact on the 
pay-performance relationship among the largest firms in the U.K. The economy has 
not yet fully recovered and our results demonstrate that the link between directors’ 
remuneration and a firm’s performance has broken down because many of these firms 
have faced sharp decreases in returns, and even bankruptcies, without similar 
significant changes happening in their directors’ compensation packages. Nonetheless, 
our analysis suggests that the directors’ pay has a positive and significant influence on 
a firm’s returns and growth opportunities.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 summarises the agency theory, 
important governance reports, and the previous empirical literature. Econometric 
methodologies are discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the data and 
variables being used. Section 5.5 outlines the modelling framework which is used to 
analyse the relationship between the directors’ pay and corporate performance. The 
empirical findings are presented and discussed in Section 5.6. And finally, Section 5.7 
concludes this chapter.
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5.2. Theory and The Literature 
5.2.1. Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory has been considered as the basis for guiding the research on the 
relationship of directors’ pay and corporate performance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), Roth and O’Donnell (1996), Murphy (1999), Miller, Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia (2002), McKnight and Tomkins (2004)). Under the principal-agent 
framework, the principal (i.e. the shareholders) would like to set a contract to attract 
the agent (known as the CEO or other executive directors). If the shareholders had 
complete information about the actions of the CEO or the senior directors as well as 
the investment opportunities, then in a perfect world there would be a perfectly 
enforceable contract between the principal and the agent. However, because of the 
information asymmetry the shareholders cannot fully observe the managerial actions 
and do not know which of these actions will truly increase the shareholders’ wealth. 
Thus, in these circumstances, according to agency theory, compensation packages 
have to be designed to align the interests of the directors, especially executive 
directors, to those of the shareholders.  
 
There are three fundamental behavioural assumptions which are required within a 
principal-agent framework, which is that both the principal and the agent are:  
1. Rational,  
2. Self-interested; and, 
3. The agent is effort-averse and risk-averse (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
Under these assumptions, conflicts of interest between the two parties arise because 
both attempt to maximise their own utilities without taking consideration of the 
counterpart’s welfare. Shareholders simply want the CEO and directors to act to get a 
certain expected return, while the CEO and directors may only care about their own 
gains through particular activities. Thus, given the presence of information asymmetry, 
a hidden-action (i.e. moral hazard) occurs. That is, the CEO or senior director would 
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act to maximise their compensation without taking account of the shareholders’ 
objectives (Baiman (1990), Eisenhardt (1989), Nilakant and Rao (1994), Milkovich 
and Bloom (1998)). More specifically, the principal’s pay-off can be defined as a 
function of output minus the pay to the agent, and the agent’s pay-off can be defined 
as a function of remuneration minus the cost-of-effort to construct a principal-agent 
framework. Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), the model could be specified 
as below: 
 
The agent’s problem:      xcwUE
x
max  
                      rwewUts .. ,    2,~ wwNw   
                        yygw    
                       xy ,    2,0~  N     
A constant absolute risk averse (CARA) utility function,   rwewU  is defined here 
because the agent is assumed to be risk averse according to agency theory.  w is 
defined as the wealth of the agent and it is assumed to be normally distributed, which 
is,  2,~ wwNw  .  Wealth w contains two parts, the fixed salary   and the 
incentive pay which can be defined as a proportion of y (which is the output level that 
can be observed by the principal). The output level y is determined by the agent’s 
effort x and a random component  2,0~  N . Using the properties of a normal 
function and an exponential function, the agent’s problem becomes how to use the 
effort level x to maximize  xcrx  2
2
2


 . Therefore, the first derivative can 
be simply specified as    xc . 
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Meanwhile, the principal’s problem can be stated as: 
  wyE
x
max  
                      xyts ..  
                         yygw    
                            *UxcwUE   
                           xc  
Where U* is defined as the agent’s reservation utility level, which is determined 
exogenously. With respect to x, the first order condition can be written as 
  21
1


xcr 
 . Thus, the wealth of the agent (which could be measured as 
remuneration) is simply:  
                      
 
y
xcr
w
21
1



  
 
From the model specification above, we can observe the following aspects: 
1. Remuneration depends on both base pay and incentive pay.  
2. There are two constrains that the principal has to face in order to design the 
optimal contract. One is the participation (or individual rationality) constraint 
which requires the principal to set a certain contract to attract some agent with 
the remuneration at least equal to the opportunities that the agent could get 
from outside. The other constraint is to align the agent’s own interests to those 
of the principal’s.   
3. In addition to the base salary, the incentive pay is determined by three factors, 
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including: the level of agent’s risk aversion, the cost of effort provided by the 
agent, and the variability of the firm’s performance.  
4. It can be observed in the model that the agent’s remuneration will increase 
with the improvement in the firm performance, and decrease with the firm risk, 
while other factors are fixed.  
5. As the risk aversion and/or marginal cost-of-effort (  xc   is the slope of the 
marginal cost of effort) increases, the incentive pay decreases; thus, the 
remuneration level decreases. 
 
The executives, or the top managers (i.e. the agent), are considered as risk averse in 
the literature. Under this assumption, the executives would like their remuneration to 
be less risky (Harris and Raviv 1979), which indicates that the executives will want 
their fixed cash compensation to contribute more in the remuneration package when 
compared to the equity-based incentive compensation. Meanwhile, since both the 
compensation and the human capital are related to the firm’s performance then it is 
assumed that the executives would take action to reduce the firm’s risk, which might 
reduce the firm’s value at the same time, in order to reduce their own risk (Amihud 
and Lev 1981). On the other hand, the shareholders (i.e. the principal) are risk neutral 
because they can diversify their firm-specific risk simply by holding diversified 
portfolios (Mehran 1994). Thus, incongruence occurs between the shareholders and 
executives because the shareholders’ utility is assumed to be long-term holding 
portfolios while the executives’ utility is assumed to be in terms of human capital and 
short-term gain (McKnight and Tomkins 2004). The shareholders want to maximise 
the firm value while the executives tend to reduce their compensation risk by taking 
action that may reduce the return in the mean time. Two suggestions have been made 
in the literature: the first is to tie the executives’ compensation to the firm’s 
performance directly (as discussed in Grossman and Hart (1983) for instance) and the 
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second is to use more equity-based compensation (which is discussed in Jensen and 
Murphy (1990)). Hence, given the principal-agent framework, the firm risk (negative 
related to compensation) as well as the performance (positive related to compensation) 
should be taken into account when analysing the determinants of the executives’ 
remuneration packages. 
 
Additionally, apart from agency theory, some other elements might be important to 
determine the executives’ pay. For instance, according to the theory of empirical 
regularity the corporate sales can be treated as one of the important factors in 
constructing the executives’ compensation contracts. The intuition of linking firm size 
to remuneration is the theory of labour market efficiency, which suggests that 
relatively large companies will require and could be able to design more attractive 
contracts to recruit more talented and capable executives. Meanwhile, as Cole et 
al.(2006) have suggested, financial leverage could be taken into account when 
determining executive pay. 
 
 
5.2.2. Several Important Reports 
 
Several important reports were issued in the U.K. in the 1990s, such as: Cadbury 
(1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998). These reports focus on corporate 
governance issues and they advocated governance changes. The Cadbury Committee 
was set up in 1991 following the Conservative government’s requirement for 
corporate governance which aimed to allay public concerns over the failure to relate 
executive pay to a firm’s performance, such as: ‘creative accounting’ practices which 
try to obfuscate the calculation of shareholder values, a number of high-profile CEOs 
who appeared to deliberately discourage financial transparency, and the rapid growth 
of executive compensation without corresponding success in their companies 
(Cadbury 1992). The Combined Code, also called ‘Code of Best Practice’, was 
established following the Cadbury report to enable the shareholders to monitor 
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corporate executives more efficiently, thus aligning the interests of the executive 
agents to those of the shareholder principals. Cadbury (1992) required the 
establishment of remuneration committees in firms to take responsibility for setting 
executive pay, which is transferred from managers. It also recommended disclosure of 
the elements of compensation packages, decentralisation of control by splitting 
functions of the CEO and the chair of the board, and the independence of 
non-executives on the board by fixing the duration of their contracts without 
automatic renewal. The London Stock Exchange endorsed the Cadbury Code and 
ensured its compliance among publicly traded firms. According to the survey by 
Conyon (1997), the overwhelming majority of large U.K. companies implemented the 
Cadbury Code rapidly and widely.  
 
The Greenbury report (1995) responded to public and shareholder concerns about the 
rapid increases of the directors’ remuneration, the large amounts of compensation paid 
to some departing directors, and also some of the wider concerns about accountability 
for directors’ remuneration, especially in industries within a less competitive 
environment. ‘The key themes are accountability, responsibility, full disclosure, 
alignment of director and shareholder interests and improved company performance.’ 
The Greenbury report recommended that the board of directors should establish a 
remuneration committee, which consists exclusively of non-executive directors who 
have no personal financial interest, to deal with the potential conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and directors. The remuneration committee should make a 
report to shareholders each year, and this report forms a part of the company’s annual 
report. This report should provide the full details of all elements in the directors’ 
remuneration packages, such as: basic salary, annual bonuses, long-term incentive 
schemes and benefits in kind, as well as the company’s directors’ remuneration policy, 
including levels, comparator groups of companies, performance criteria, pension 
provision, and contracts of service. Greenbury (1995) required the directors’ 
remuneration packages to be designed to align the directors’ interests to those of 
shareholders, to attract and motivate directors of a high quality, and to make the 
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directors take into account the performance of their own and other comparable 
companies. The Greenbury (1995) report recommended the use of performance-based 
compensation, such as annual bonuses and long-term incentive schemes, it also 
required that the directors should be eligible and performance conditions should be 
relevant to improve the business. In addition, the movement of share prices and other 
indicators should not be considered as a factor to design performance-based 
compensation because it might reflect inflation or other general movements in the 
market. With the power and influence of the London Stock Exchange and investor 
institutions, the Greenbury Code with all of these recommendations has been rapidly 
and widely implemented among British companies, especially in listed companies. 
 
The Hampel (1998) report highlighted the importance of corporate governance and 
full disclosure was considered to be the most significant element. The Hampel report 
reviewed the Cadbury code as well as a number of relevant issues in the Greenbury 
report and it took careful reconsideration of the roles of directors, shareholders and 
auditors in corporate governance. Hampel recommended that the boards in the listed 
companies should play the role of leadership and control effectively. The chairman of 
the board and the chief executive officer were recommended to have distinct 
responsibilities. Any combination of the roles of these two should be publicly 
explained because a separation is felt to be necessary to avoid the board becoming 
dominated by one individual, as Cadbury (1992) pointed out. The board should be 
balanced with executive and non-executive directors, it should supply sufficient 
information in a timely fashion, and its directors should be re-elected at regular 
intervals. The directors’ remuneration plays an important part in the process of 
corporate governance. Companies need to have a formal and transparent procedure for 
developing a remuneration policy and fixing remuneration packages. Hampel (1998) 
emphasised the need for U.S. style disclosure in a company’s annual report which 
should contain both a statement of remuneration policy and detailed remuneration 
information for each individual director. This form of disclosure allows for more 
specific analysis of a company’s performance, governance practice, and compensation 
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policy. Hampel’s (1998) recommendations also form a part of the London Stock 
Exchange combined code, which all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
must abide by. According to the recommendations of these three reports the directors’ 
remuneration is expected to be ‘sufficient to attract and retain the directors needed to 
run the company successfully, but should not be more than is necessary’; and also 
‘the remuneration of executive directors should link rewards to corporate and 
individual performance’. 
 
In addition, the Higgs (2003) report focused on the role and effectiveness of 
non-executive directors. It emphasised that the non-executive directors should 
‘contribute to and constructively challenge development of company strategy’ and 
‘scrutinise management performance’. Although Hampel (1998) recommended the 
balance of executive and non-executive directors, Higgs (2003) highlighted that at 
least half of the board (excluding the chairman) should be comprised of independent 
non-executive directors. The remuneration committee should consist entirely of 
independent non-executive directors who are responsible for setting the chairman’s 
and the executive directors’ remunerations. Higgs (2003) also suggested that 
companies should construct a transparent procedure for their remuneration policy 
development and they should fix the remuneration of individual directors. Moreover, 
as in the previous reports, Higgs (2003) recommended that the rewards in executive 
directors’ compensation packages should be linked to corporate performance.  
 
In summary, these reports have all played a very important role in improving the 
transparency of the directors’ remuneration for U.K. companies. It is nearly 
impossible to analyse executive compensation in Britain before the 1990s because of 
the difficulty of getting data and information which is a consequence of the poor 
disclosure of remuneration packages for U.K. companies. After Cadbury (1992) the 
annual reports of UK firms have been required to include detailed information about 
their directors’ remuneration, which makes it much easier to evaluate the 
remuneration policy and total compensation packages. 
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5.2.3. Empirical Literature 
 
Recently, a considerable amount of research has been done to identify the 
determinants of directors’ remuneration packages, such as: Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
Conyon (1997), and Gregg et al (2005). One of the fundamental hypotheses tests in 
the empirical literature is to examine for the presence of a significantly positive 
relationship between executive compensation and a firm’s performance. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) in their seminar work in the U.S. examined the 2,213 CEOs listed in 
Executive Compensation Survey during the period 1974 to 1986. They found that 
there is no significant relationship between executive compensation and corporate 
performance. Since then, the lack of empirical regularity has been identified and 
widely estimated in the U.S. For example, Milkovich and Bloom (1998) extend the 
research in this area by taking account of the business risk (both systematic and 
unsystematic risk) and they suggest that those firms with higher business risk will 
tend to deemphasise their incentive pay and will rely more on the base pay in the 
compensation packages. They also find that firms who face higher risk and use a 
greater proportion of incentive pay will attain lower performance.  
 
More recently, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) report that managerial compensation 
not only relates to the firm’s risk but it will also influence their investment and debt 
policies. In their study Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) used data on executive 
compensation for firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400 and S&P Smallcap 600 
covering the period 1992-2002, and obtain a strong causal relationship.  
 
Compared to the US, the literature in the UK is relatively limited until the 1990s, 
culminating in the influential reports issued by the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) 
and Hampel (1998) (Conyon and Murphy 2000). The table (Table I) below extends 
the results provided by Peck and Conyon (1998), and Conyon and Sadler (2001) and 
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it also shows some recent evidence on directors’ emoluments and firm performance 
relationship for the UK, as well as some important research for the US. Following the 
Cadbury (1992) report (which recommends the setting up of the remuneration and 
audit committee which mainly consists of non-executive directors) the disclosure of 
the executive compensation packages has been improved significantly. The Greenbury 
(1995) report makes further recommendations to improve: the disclosure of executive 
pay, the scrutiny over the constructing of the executive pay, and the numbers and 
responsibilities of the non-executive directors on the board. Meanwhile, the Hampel 
(1998) report emphasises the independence of the non-executives on the board. 
Conyon (1997) takes a sample of top director remuneration packages within 213 large 
UK firms recorded from 1988 to 1993 in order to estimate the innovations of the 
corporate governance. He finds a positive relationship between director compensation 
and shareholder returns. He also shows the influence of remuneration committees 
(which are responsible for setting executives’ compensation) on director 
compensation. Conyon and Murphy (2000) investigate CEO pay and incentives for 
both US and UK companies. They indicate that for 1997, CEO pay in the U.S was 
higher than that in the UK (while controlling for economic determinants for the 
compensation package). In addition, companies in the U.S. relied more heavily on 
incentive compensation. Gregg et al.(2005) finds an asymmetric relationship between 
executive cash compensation and corporate performance with relatively high and low 
corporate returns, and suggests that overall there is little relationship between pay and 
performance. In addition, Ozkan (2007) uses a hand-collected data set of 390 
non-financial companies and identifies a significantly positive relationship between 
corporate performance and CEO cash compensation, but an insignificant relationship 
for total compensation. In this chapter, we reconsider the pay-performance 
relationship by re-examining the link between executive pay and firm performance 
with the most recent data of FTSE 350 companies during the period 2004-2009, and 
we will then try to allocate the determinants of the directors’ remuneration.  
 
Another relative issue besides the determination of the director pay is how the pay of 
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the executives and the whole board of directors influences the performance of the 
company. There are few empirical studies focusing on the effect of executive 
remuneration on firm value, and the results of these works are often conflicting. For 
example, Mehran (1995) finds that the corporate performance is positively related to 
the equity-based compensation. We will extend this previous research in order to 
examine total compensation and the compensation for the whole board. In addition, 
this study uses improved econometric methodologies to examine the pay-performance 
relationship. This chapter achieves robust results with more recent data for the largest 
companies in the U.K. 
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Table I: Some evidence of the pay-performance relationship  
Study Data Compensation measure Performance measure Estimated coefficient 
(s.e.) [t’s] 
Remarks 
Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) 
U.S. data on 2213 
CEOs, 
1974-86 
(1) Change in salary and bonus 
of CEO 
(2) Change in CEO total pay 
Change in shareholder 
return dated at (a) period t 
and (b) period t-1 
(1a) 0.0000139 [8.4] 
(1b) 0.0000080 [5.5] 
(2a) 0.0000235 [5.2] 
(2b) 0.0000094 [2.4] 
Performance effects 
regarded as small 
Main (1991) 512 U.K. 
companies, 
1969-89 
Change in salary and bonus of 
highest-paid director 
Stock market return 0.038 (0.012)  
Gregg et al. (1993) 288 U.K. 
companies, 
1983-91 
Change in highest-paid 
director’s remuneration 
(salary+bonus) 
Change in shareholder 
returns 
1983-88: 0.027 [2.112] 
1989-91: -0.024 [1.102] 
Time heterogeneity in 
performance effect on 
compensation 
Disappears after 1988 
Main and Johnston 
(1993) 
220 U.K. 
companies, 
1990 
Salary and bonus of 
highest-paid director 
Risk adjusted market 
return 
0.100 (0.135) Cross section evidence 
Conyon and Leech 
(1994) 
294 U.K. 
companies, 
1983-86 
Change highest director pay 
(salary+bonus)  
(a) Shareholder wealth in 
period t-1 
(b) Change in shareholder 
wealth in period t-1 
(a) 0.006565 (0.003601) 
(b) 0.059003 (0.020096) 
Effects of governance 
discussed 
Conyon and Gregg 169 U.K. Change in salary and bonus of Shareholder return 1985-87: 0.076 (0.032)  
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Study Data Compensation measure Performance measure Estimated coefficient 
(s.e.) [t’s] 
Remarks 
(1994) 
 
companies, 
1985-90 
highest-paid director 1988-90: 0.020 (0.036) 
Conyon(1995) 28 U.K. privatised 
companies, 
1990-94 
Change in salary and bonus of 
highest-paid director 
(1) Total shareholder 
return 
(2) Return on shareholders’ 
equity 
(3) Return on long-term 
capital in period t-1 
(1) -0.0001025 
(0.0009154) 
(2) -0.0000006 
(0.0056089) 
(3) 0.0039333 
(0.0042299) 
 
Smith and Szymanski 
(1995) 
51 quoted U.K. 
companies, 
1981-91 
All directors’ remuneration 
(basic salary + performance 
related pay + benefits) 
Earnings per share Cross section:0.03 (0.10) 
Time series: 0.03 (0.24) 
Argue for the need to 
include effect of average 
executive pay as an 
‘outside option’ 
Mehran (1995) 153 
randomly-selected 
manufacturing firms 
in 1979-80 
(1) % of CEOs’ equity-based 
compensation 
(2) % of CEOs’ shares and 
stock options outstanding 
(a) Tobin’s Q 
(b) Return on assets 
(a1) 0.361*** (3.500) 
(b1) 1.876** (2.323) 
(a2) 8.394*** (3.982) 
(b2) 11.664** (2.115) 
 
Main et al. (1996) 60 large U.K. 
companies,  
1983-89 
Board emoluments, highest 
paid director remuneration and 
CEO compensation 
(1) Salary and bonus 
Share performance For Board 
(1) 0.151 (0.115) 
(2) 0.713 (0.264) 
For CEO: 
Dynamic Models include 
sector performance terms  
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Study Data Compensation measure Performance measure Estimated coefficient 
(s.e.) [t’s] 
Remarks 
(2) Total remuneration 
(including stock options) 
(1) 0.146 (0.113) 
(2) 0.729 (0.282) 
Conyon (1997) 213 large U.K. 
companies,  
1988-93 
Changes in compensation of 
highest paid director (salary + 
bonus) 
Shareholder return 0.060602 (0.019921) Outcomes ambiguous 
Conyon and Peck 
(1998) 
94 FTSE 100 
companies,  
1991-94 
Changes in salary and bonus of 
highest-paid director in 
companies where: 
(1) Proportion of outside 
directors on remuneration 
committee is above the median 
(2) Same proportion is below 
median 
Shareholder return (1) 0.088 (0.047) 
(2) 0.033 (0.087) 
Data derived directly 
from annual reports 
Board structure effects 
on pay evaluated 
Outcome ambiguous 
 
Hall and Liebman 
(1998) 
478 U.S. companies,  
1980-94 
(1) Change in CEO salary and 
bonus 
(2) Change in CEO salary, 
bonus and option grants 
Shareholder return dated 
at: (a) period t; and, (b) 
period t-1 
(1a) 0.1630 (0.0116) 
(1b) 0.0596 (0.0105) 
(2a) 0.2799 (0.0224) 
(2b) -0.0156 (0.0236) 
 
Conyon (1998) 40 small to medium 
sized companies, 
1985-92 
Change in remuneration of the 
highest-paid director 
(1) Profits per employee 
(2) Sales growth 
(1) 0.0026 [0.87] 
(2) 0.245 [1.17] 
Controls for CEO 
turnover 
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Study Data Compensation measure Performance measure Estimated coefficient 
(s.e.) [t’s] 
Remarks 
Milkovich and Bloom 
(1998) 
Over 500 U.S. 
companies, 1981-88 
(1) Manager’s incentive pay 
(2) Manager’s base pay 
(a) Total shareholder return (a1) 0.14 (0.20) 
(a2) 0.04*** (0.02) 
Relationship between 
managerial 
Compensation and firm 
risk also taken into 
account 
Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) 
1500 U.S. 
companies, 1993-96 
(1) Change in salary, bonus and 
value of current option grants 
of CEO 
(2) Change in salary, bonus, 
value of current option grants, 
value of option and equity 
holdings of CEO. 
Change in shareholder 
wealth 
(1) 0.432 (0.053) 
(2) 1.036 (0.313) 
Model also considers 
other compensation 
measures and extends 
analysis to other 
executives 
Benito and Conyon 
(1999) 
1093 quoted U.K. 
companies, 1985-94 
Salary, bonus and benefits of 
highest-paid director 
(1) Shareholder return in 
period t-1 
(2) Relative stock price 
performance in period t-1 
Fixed effects: 
(1) 0.0671 (0.0201) 
(2) -0.0394 (0.0492) 
Random effects: 
(1) 0.0762 (0.0193) 
(2) -0.0642 (0.0476) 
Little board governance 
effects found 
Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) 
510 U.K. firms and 
1666 U.S. firms in 
Change in CEO salary+bonus Shareholder return 0.1213 [2.0] (1) Models and compares 
pay-performance 
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Study Data Compensation measure Performance measure Estimated coefficient 
(s.e.) [t’s] 
Remarks 
fiscal year 1997 sensitivity in the US and 
the UK: UK mean 
2.33%; median 0.25% 
US mean 4.18%; median 
1.48% 
(2) Models CEO 
incentives 
Conyon and Sadler 
(2001) 
100 large U.K. 
companies in 1997 
(1) Total board 
pay-for-performance sensitivity 
(2) Total board PPS squared 
(a) Shareholder return (a1) 0.0868** (0.0364) 
(a2) -0.0030* (0.0016) 
(1) Quantile regression 
estimation 
(2) PPS and 
organizational level 
examined 
Conyon et al. (2001) 100 U.K. companies 
for fiscal year 
1997-98 
(1) Executives’ cash 
compensation 
(2) Executives’ incentive 
compensation 
(3) Executives’ total 
compensation 
Shareholder return (1) 0.4199*** (0.1122) 
(2) 0.8268** (0.3371) 
(3) 0.3794*** (0.1276) 
Focus on the relationship 
between corporate 
tournaments and 
executive compensation 
Carpenter and 
Sanders (2002) 
199 U.S. firms, 1992 (1) CEO pay structure 
(2) Top management team 
(a) ROA (a1) 6.98*  
(a2) 18.04** 
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Study Data Compensation measure Performance measure Estimated coefficient 
(s.e.) [t’s] 
Remarks 
(TMT) external alignment 
(3) TMT internal alignment 
(a3) 7.82*** 
Miller et (2002) 441 publicly traded 
firms, 1994-98 
(1) Pay mix, calculated as total 
variable pay (bonuses, LTIP, 
and stock option awards) 
divided by total pay 
(2) Average total compensation 
(a) Total stock return 
1994-98 
(b) Systematic market risk 
(c) Unsystematic market 
risk 
(d) Systematic income risk 
(e) Unsystematic income 
risk 
(1a) 0.33*** (7.24) 
(1b) 0.15*** (3.17) 
(1c) 0.11** (2.04) 
(1d) -0.02 (-0.46) 
(1e) 0.05 (1.04)  
(2a) 0.40*** (9.09) 
(2b) 0.17*** (3.56) 
(2c) 0.23*** (4.64) 
(2d) 0.05 (1.06) 
(2e) 0.19*** (3.89) 
 
McKnight and 
Tomkins (2004) 
228 U.K. publicly 
held firms, 1992-97 
CEO (1) salary, (2) bonus, (3) 
salary and bonus, (4) share 
options and (5) total pay 
Shareholder return (1) 0.02 [0.75] 
(2) 0.21***[3.4] 
(3) 0.03 [0.66] 
(4) 5.9**** [13.2] 
(5) -0.19 [-1.6] 
Models also include 
slope dummies of CEO 
tenure and age 
Gregg et al. (2005) 415 FTSE 350 
companies, 
1994-2002 
(1) Total board cash 
compensation 
(2) Highest paid director cash 
Total shareholder retur (1) 0.0686** (0.0167) 
(2) 0.068** (0.0180) 
Different measures of 
returns included: market 
adjusted return and 
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Study Data Compensation measure Performance measure Estimated coefficient 
(s.e.) [t’s] 
Remarks 
compensation industry adjusted return 
Ozkan (2006) 414 large U.K. 
companies for fiscal 
year 2003/2004. 
(1) CEO cash compensation. 
(2) CEO equity-based 
compensation 
(3) CEO total compensation 
(a) Stock return 
(b) Tobin’s Q 
(1a) 31.393 [0.85] 
(1b) 41.881* [1.64] 
(2a) -27.436 [-0.44] 
(2b) 38.755 [1.25] 
(3a) 30.853 [0.50] 
(3b) 75.771* [1.64] 
Corporate governance 
mechanisms included 
Outcome ambiguous 
Girma et al. (2007) 992 companies, 
1981-96 
CEO pay growth (1) Profit growth 
(pre-Cadbury) 
(2) profit growth 
(post-Cadbury) 
(1) 0.001* [2.30] 
(2) 0.001* [2.19] 
Aiming to test the effects 
of Cadbury report 
Outcomes ambiguous 
Ozkan (2007) 390 U.K. 
non-financial firms, 
1999-2005 
(1) CEO’s cash compensation 
(2) CEO’s total compensation 
(a) Shareholder return 
(b) Tobin’s Q 
(1a) 0.077* (1.90) 
(1b) -0.0002 (-0.04) 
(2a) 0.080 (1.31) 
(2b) 0.027 (1.08) 
GMM estimation method 
applied 
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5.3. Methodology 
 
Panel data sets combine time series and cross sections. They are commonly used in 
economics because they contain a rich source of information about the economy. Panel data 
estimation allows us to exploit time series variation in the directors’ remuneration, corporate 
performance, and other relevant variables. It controls for unobserved time-invariant 
firm-specific effects in order to eliminate a potential source of omitted variable bias. 
 
 
5.3.1. Fixed Effects with White Diagonal 
 
The panel model with period and cross-section specific effects can be written as: 
                        itittiit Xy    
The White cross-section methodology is used to derive the robust covariances. It treats the 
pool regression as a multivariate regression, where there is an equation for each cross-section. 
It then calculates White-type robust standard errors for the system of equations. The 
coefficient covariance estimator can be written as: 
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Where the leading term is a degrees of freedom adjustment depending on the total number of 
observations in the stacked data, N* is the total number of stacked observations, and K* is the 
total number of estimated parameters. 
 
This estimator is robust to cross-section (contemporaneous) correlation as well as different 
error variances in each cross-section. Specifically, the unconditional contemporaneous 
variance matrix   MttE   is unrestricted and the conditional variance matrix 
 *ttt XE    can depend on *tX in arbitrary, unknown fashion (Wooldridge 2002). By 
applying this method it is possible to control for the problem of cross-section correlation, 
which might appear under panel constructions. 
 
Alternatively, the White period method is robust to arbitrary serial correlation and 
time-varying variances in the disturbances. The coefficient covariances are calculated using: 
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where the summations are taken over individual s and individual stacked data instead of 
periods. 
 
The White period robust coefficient variance estimator is designed to accommodate arbitrary 
serial correlation and time varying variances in the disturbances. The corresponding 
multivariate regression (with an equation for each period) allows the unconditional variance 
matrix   TiiE   to be unrestricted, and the conditional variance matrix  *iii XE    
may depend on *iX  
in general fashion. 
 
In contrast, the White (diagonal) method is robust to observation specific heteroskedasticity 
in the disturbances but it is not robust to the correlation between residuals for different 
observations. The coefficient asymptotic variance is estimated as: 
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This method allows the unconditional variance matrix   E  to be unrestricted 
diagonal matrix, and the conditional variances  *2 iit XE  to depend on *iX  in general 
fashion. Note that this method is both more general and more restrictive than the previous 
approaches. It is more general in that observations in the same cross-section or period may 
have different variances, it is more restrictive in that off-diagonal variances are restricted to 
be zero. 
 
 
5.3.2. Fixed Effects with Cross-section SUR 
The structure allows for condition between the contemporaneous residuals for cross-section i 
and j, but it restricts residuals in different periods to be uncorrelated. More specifically, it 
assumes that: 
                            ijtjtit XE  *  
                            0* tjtis XE   
For all i, j,s and t with ts  . Note that the contemporaneous covariances do not vary over t.  
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Using the period specific residual vectors, we may rewrite this assumption as: 
                             Mttt XE  *  
For all t, where: 
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This is termed as a Cross-section SUR specification since it involves covariances across 
cross-sections as in a seemingly unrelated regressions type framework, where each equation 
corresponds to a cross-section. 
 
Cross-section SUR weighted least squares on this specification (sometimes referred to as the 
Parks estimator) is simply the feasible GLS estimator for systems where the residuals are 
both cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated. Residuals are 
employed from first stage estimates to form an estimate of M , and then in the second stage 
feasible GLS is performed. 
 
However, there are potential pitfalls associated with the SUR/Parks estimation (Beck and 
Katz 1995). For instance, if we have a cross-section SUR specification with a large number 
of cross-sections and a small number of time periods then it is quite likely that the estimated 
residual correlation matrix will be non-singular so that feasible GLS is not possible. 
 
By applying panel estimation with Cross-section SUR, we could also control for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneously correlation in our equation estimations.  
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5.4. Data and Variables 
5.4.1. Sample 
 
Two main data sources have been used in the analysis: the Thomson One Banker and FAME 
(Financial Analysis Made Easy). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 350 U.K. 
companies from both financial and non-financial sectors that constitute List of the FTSE 350 
stock index over the period 2004 to 2009. We include data not only of the CEO compensation 
but also the remuneration of highest paid director as well as the whole board in the company 
for the sample period. The CEO compensation data include base salary, bonus and the other 
compensation, which covers other annual compensation and long term compensation, such as: 
Restricted Stock, Stock Options & Rights Grant, Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs). Share 
options are also included in other compensation. Only those companies with consecutive 
CEO compensation data for no less than three years between 2004 and 2009 are included in 
our sample. In addition, this study requires that data for explanatory variables in the model 
(such as board size, price volatility and financial leverage) should also be available. Since the 
compensation for the highest paid director may not always coincide with that for the CEO in 
a company (Girma et al. 2007), we will adopt both and if required can treat one as the check 
of robustness for the other.  
 
 
5.4.2. Compensation Variables 
 
The CEO compensation includes annual base salaries, bonus, and other cash and long term 
compensation that is paid by the firm to the officer on a long term basis. This includes the 
values of restricted stock, stock options and rights grand, long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) 
and all other compensation. Compared to the CEO pay in the U.S., the share option grants 
plays a much less important role in the total compensation package of a typical British CEO 
(10% in the U.K. vs. 42% in the U.S. in 1997). Meanwhile, the CEOs in the U.S. own much 
larger fractions of their firm’s stock (0.29% in 1997) than do CEOs in the U.K. (0.05% in 
1997) (Conyon and Murphy 2000). Coyon and Murphy (2000) also show that although the 
cash compensation has been growing at about the same rate since mid-1990s, the prevalence 
of option plans has been increasing in the U.S. while it has been decreasing in the U.K. Thus, 
in this analysis, we only focus on the CEO cash compensation (salary and bonus), and the 
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total compensation and total remuneration only for the highest paid director and the whole 
board of directors. 
 
Table 5-1 in Appendix I provides the statistics of the pay variables including mean, median, 
and standard deviation, respectively, for the whole sample period. It can be observed that the 
mean of all the variables are greater than the corresponding median, implying that the pay 
variables are right skewed, which is consistent to the results of the previous studies (e.g. 
Gregg et al.(2005)). This happens mainly because some firms pay their directors 
extraordinarily high salaries. Also, such large values of standard deviations suggest the 
considerable differences of compensation across firms over the sample period, 2004 to 2009.  
 
 
Figure 5-1: Mean of CEO pay 
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Figure 5-2: Mean and percentage change of the directors’ pay 
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the pay for highest paid director, and the total board remuneration over the sample period, 
2004-2009. The second part of Figure 5-2 plots the mean of the percentage change in the 
corresponding pay for CEO, highest paid director and the total board, respectively. It is clear 
that although all of the pay-offs have a similar trend of general increase during the whole 
period, they all peak at 2007 (which is the year that financial crisis arrived) before falling 
afterwards. For instance, CEO total compensation rises overall by approximately 16%; 
however, in the years immediately before the financial crisis it increased by 44% (i.e. from 
2004 to 2007). The CEO cash compensation peaked in 2008, the lag of adjustment might 
have caused this because the CEO base pay is usually predetermined. In addition, the 
movements of CEO pay and the pay for highest paid director are different, which is 
consistent with the claim in the previous literature that the CEO and highest paid director 
may not always be the same person in a firm. 
 
 
5.4.3.  Performance and Other Control Variables 
5.4.3.1.  Firm Performance 
 
One of the most widely used measures of the corporate performance is the Return on the 
Total Assets (ROA), which is equal to the ratio of profit (loss) to the value of total assets. 
Some alternative accounting measures of performance are used in the U.K. research literature, 
such as: Return On Shareholders Funds (ROSF), Return On Capital Employed (ROCE), and 
Earnings Per Share (EPS). However, little evidence of relative performance evaluation has 
been found (Gregg et al. 2005). Total stock returns can be treated as one proxy for corporate 
performance, but it will be appropriate for all-equity firms (Mehran 1995). Meanwhile, 
Tobin’s q, which has also been used in the literature, is argued to be a better proxy for the 
growth opportunity of a firm. In our analysis in this study we will adopt ROA as one of the 
measures of the firm performance because accounting returns are highly important in 
determining executive compensation; for example, Antle and Smith (1986), Jensen and 
Murphy(1990), Mehran (1995). In addition to the ROA this study will also use another 
measure of return, which is calculated using the methodology of principal component 
analysis. Although different measurements of returns are argued to have their own 
shortcomings, they are still highly correlated with each other (Mehran 1995). It is, therefore, 
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important to use the principal components of returns to analyse the relationship between pay 
and performance because it captures the variations in alternative measures of returns into 
account simultaneously. 
 
Figure 5-3: Firm performance 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the different measures of returns which are commonly used as a proxy for 
firm performance. It can be seen from this illustration that the economy boomed till 2006 to 
2007, and the returns reached their highest level in 2006. Following the financial crisis the 
economy crashed and the returns of the FTSE 350 companies went down dramatically. By 
2009 the levels were below those of 2004. Meanwhile, it is also noticeable that all of the 
measures of returns are highly correlated, hence, ROA is used as one proxy for firm 
performance following the previous studies. In addition, the principal components of these 
returns are adopted as an additional measure of firm performance in our analysis. The first 
principal component captures the main trend and explains more than 76% of the variation in 
these three returns (i.e. ROA, ROCE and ROSF). The methodology of principal component 
has not yet been applied in the analysis of executive compensation and firm performance, and 
it can be seen as one of the refinements of this current study. By using the principal 
component, as well as ROA, this study is able to check the robustness of the pay-performance 
relationship. 
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5.4.3.2.  Control Variables 
 
The control variables in this analysis include firm size, financial leverage, stock price 
volatility, and the board size. In this current study firm size is measured by the sales of the 
company, which is consistent with the most of the prior studies. In the literature firm size is 
found to be one of the most important determinants in constructing the directors’ 
compensation. There are also several studies which use market capitalisation as an alternative 
proxy for firm size; however, the problem is that it will be correlated with the shareholders 
return (Gregg et al. 2005). Accordingly, the previous research has shown a tendency of a 
negative relationship between firm size and performance. Table 5-2 in Appendix I shows the 
different measures of firm size that have been used in previous studies. In this current study 
sales is chosen to be the proxy for firm size because it is highly skewed with considerably 
large range, which eliminate the firm size bias.  
 
Other control variables used in this chapter are financial leverage (which is equal to the ratio 
of company debts over total assets) and stock price volatility (which is a stock’s average 
annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year). The board size is 
taken into consideration because the numbers of directors on the board are different among 
firms and it may influence not only the remuneration of the whole board but also the 
compensation of the executives. Intuitively, the total board will increase as more directors are 
hired simply because there are more people to pay on the board. Also, more directors on the 
board implies the company is larger in size and more complex in structure; hence, it may 
need more capable directors and it will, consequently, have to pay them more. However, it is 
hard to predict the influence of board size on the compensation of the CEO and the highest 
paid director. On one hand, as mentioned above, the larger the board size is then the larger 
and more complicated the firm will be, and this will need a more highly paid CEO or highest 
paid director because they will have to take more responsibility and make more effort to run 
the company. According to Core et al. (1999), CEOs get higher cash and total remuneration 
when the board is relatively larger. On the other hand, the Cadbury (1992) report 
recommended that the power has to be distributed among executives, hence, larger board 
sizes indicates more directors to share the roles and the CEO or the highest paid director will 
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have less to do and will consequently receive lower compensation. The Greenbury (1995) and 
Hampel (1998) reports also emphasised the monitoring role of the board.  
 
 
5.4.3.3.  Industry Structure 
 
In order to control for the difference among industries, this study follow the example of 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) and adopt four groups of industries: mining and manufacturers, 
utilities, financial services and others. There are other criteria that have been used to sort 
industries; for instance, the FTSE actuarial industry groups and industry groups following 
SIC code (Gibbons and Murphy 1992). However, these categories include too many industry 
groups and this results in relatively fewer observations in each group, which will weaken the 
power of interpretation for different groups. 
 
Besides the industry dummies, this study takes into account other criteria and asks questions 
such as: What is the difference of the directors’ compensation determination between those 
firms listed on the FTSE 100 and those who are not? What are the consequences if these 
firms have different dividend payout policies?  
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5.5. Modelling Framework  
5.5.1. Compensation 
 
Usually, the relationship between directors’ compensation and corporate performance is 
estimated with a relatively simple reduced form equation rather than principal-agent model 
(Conyon 1995). The model used to analyse the pay-performance relationship follows 
Murphy’s (1999) baseline model. However, our model is dynamic, different from Murphy’s 
by including the compensation level in the previous period to control the consistency, and it 
also adopts fixed effects panel estimation controlling for both period- and 
cross-sectional-specific effects, more specifically: 
 
(5.5.1)     
        ittiitititit ControlsePerformanconCompensationCompensati   1lnln  
                                                                       
The CEO cash and total compensation pay for the highest paid director and the total board are 
examined, respectively. 
i  
captures the firm specific effect that varies across different firms 
and which is constant across time, such as a firm’s specific technical structure or 
organizational culture. 
t  
refers to a time trend which is invariant across different firms; for 
instance, the macroeconomic shocks which are common to all firms. 
it  is the error term.  
 
Two measurements of firm performance are implied: the first is Return On Assets (ROA), 
which is widely used in previous studies; the second is the Principal Component (PC) of 
different measures of returns. This is another of the contributions of this study because none 
of the previous research, so far as we are aware, has used PC of returns as a proxy of a firm’s 
return and by using it this study is able to avoid the arbitrary decision of focusing on just one 
single measure of corporate returns. Additionally, it is possible to check the robustness of the 
pay-performance relationship by using these two measurements of corporate returns. Control 
variables include firm size, board size, financial leverage, stock market risk, and some 
relative dummies.  
 
Furthermore, the existence of the relationship between pay and performance is tested for the 
equation in first difference specification, which can be estimated by Equation (5.5.2): 
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(5.5.2)
        ittitititit ControlsePerformanconCompensationCompensati   1lnln  
 
Where   is defined as a first difference operator that 1 ititit xxx . The first difference 
equation specification is used here for the first time in research in this area and it is consistent 
with the counterpart level equation, which implicitly controls for the firm specific effects but 
which estimates the influence of the growth of the company’s performance on the growth of 
the executives’ pay. 
 
It is argued that a fixed effects bias exists in level modelling procedure and that this bias 
arises from the problem of omitted variables. One important feature of first difference models 
is that the estimate of   is free from a company fixed effects bias (Murphy 1985). In a more 
specific example, the managerial talent could be one of the omitted variables because it is 
hard to measure and interpret. Thus, it is possible that the   estimate in the level equation 
reflects the effect of managerial talent on pay variable rather than the impact of corporate 
return. However, if managerial talent is reasonably assumed to be relatively constant over 
time, then the first difference model could eliminate the bias and make the   estimate 
reflect performance effect only (Conyon and Sadler 2001). 
 
In this chapter both levels and first differences regressions are performed on CEO cash as a 
dependent variable as well as on the CEO total compensation, the pay of highest paid director, 
and the remuneration of the whole board, respectively. In Equation (5.5.1) we include 
industry-specific effects as well as time-effects, which is consistent with the prior studies. 
However, for Model (5.5.2) only time-specific effects are included as firm-specific effects are 
eliminated by taking first differences. Moreover, both specifications allow for persistence in 
the compensation variable by adding in a lagged dependent variable, thus coefficient   
estimates the degrees of persistence in the compensation variables in levels and first 
differences equations, respectively, and their significance implies the validity of the implicit 
restriction of 0  in most of the previous literature. 
 
 
5.5.2. Firm Performance 
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Following Mehran (1995), the model for evaluating the impact of the directors’ remuneration 
on corporate performance can be specified as in Equation (5.5.3) below: 
 
(5.5.3)              ittiititit ControlsonCompensatiePerformanc   ln   
 
Two aspects of dependent variable ‘performance’ are considered in this chapter: the first is 
the return, which is commonly used as the proxy for corporate performance; the second is the 
firm’s growth opportunity, which can be measured by Tobin’s q. All of the compensation 
items are taken into account for the CEO, the highest paid director, and the total board, 
respectively. 
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5.6. Empirical Results  
 
The regression estimates for the relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance are reported in Table 5-3 to Table 5-22 in Appendix I at the end of this chapter. 
CEO cash and total compensation, remunerations for highest paid director, and the whole 
board are estimated separately in both levels and first differences specifications. The 
regression estimates, which reveal the influence of directors’ pay on firm performance, are 
contained in Table 5-23 in Appendix I. The impacts of compensation on both a firm’s 
performance and its growth opportunities are discussed. In order to check the robustness of 
the results (eliminating the bias from limited and unbalanced observations) the bootstrapping 
coefficients are calculated and the corresponding results are reported in Tables 5-24 and Table 
5-25 in Appendix I. 
 
 
5.6.1. Regression Results for Compensation 
 
Table 5-3 shows the regression results for CEO total compensation. Two proxies for firm 
performance have been introduced to examine its effect on CEO total compensation. The 
coefficient estimates for both proxies, ROA and PC of returns, are reported in adjacent 
columns in Table 5-3. One could observe that all the relative coefficients reflecting 
pay-performance relationship have predicted signs and are statistically significant at a 1% 
level. Moreover, the method of cross-section SUR is adopted to control for heteroskedasticity 
and cross-section correlation. The coefficient estimates on the performance terms are still 
positive and statistically significant. The positive and statistically significant relationship 
between CEO pay and company performance supports the principal-agent theory, indicating 
that firms with higher level of returns pay higher compensation to their CEOs. 
 
In addition, one could also find that CEO total pay is positively and significantly related to 
firm size, which is consistent with the expectation that large companies with more complex 
structures tend to set up higher compensation to attract more capable and talented CEOs. This 
result is also consistent with previous studies; for instance, Ozkan (2007) finds the same trend 
where larger firms pay greater CEO compensation. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for 
price volatility is negative and significant, suggesting that CEOs get higher pay once they 
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keep the stock prices of their companies more stable. The CEO compensation level moves in 
the opposite direction to financial leverage, which is measured as the company’s total debts to 
total assets ratio. The coefficient estimate for financial leverage is also negative and 
significant, which indicates that the higher the percentage of debts in total assets are then the 
lower the CEO will be paid in their total compensation package because a higher leverage 
exposes a firm to greater risk. However, the number of directors on the board does not have a 
significant effect on CEO total compensation according to the regression results of the 
corresponding insignificant coefficient estimates. However, analytically the effect of board 
size on CEO pay is conflicting. On the one hand, to have a larger board means that the firm 
either has a relatively more complex structure or is simply larger in size. Intuitively, the 
CEOs in these firms need to take more responsibility and make more effort, hence, they 
should get higher pay. Ozkan (2007) finds a positive and significant relationship between 
CEO total compensation and board size. However, on the other hand, a large board has more 
directors to share the power and responsibilities, especially after the publication of the 
Cadbury (1992) report which recommended power sharing among the executives. Thus, 
CEOs in firms with a larger board will possibly take fewer jobs and, therefore, get fewer 
emoluments. Hence, it is difficult to say if there is a clear relationship between CEO pay and 
board size. Our findings are consistent with Gregg et al. (2005), who also reports an 
insignificant effect of the size of board on executive compensation. 
 
The econometric results for CEO compensation in first differences are contained in Table 5-4. 
It can be observed from this that (through equation estimation of the first differences 
specification model for CEO total compensation) there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between changes in CEO total compensation and firm performance. 
This implies that the growth of a firm’s return (both ROA and PC of returns) significantly 
improves the CEO’s pay rise.  
 
Meanwhile, the change of stock price volatility has been found to have a significant but 
negative effect on the change of CEO total compensation. Likewise, the change of financial 
leverage has a negative and significant effect on the change of CEO total compensation, 
while taking ROA as a proxy for performance; however, the coefficient estimates are negative 
but statistically insignificant with PC of returns acting as the measurement of corporate 
performance. Additionally, the change of CEO total compensation in the previous period 
significantly decreases the change of CEO total pay in the current period. Weak links are also 
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found between CEO total pay change and the changes of both firm and board sizes, which is 
reasonable because one could reckon that the board size, for example, is relatively stable over 
time.  
 
Slope dummies are applied in the CEO total compensation analysis and Table 5-5 in 
Appendix I provides the results of this. Following Conyon and Murphy (2000), these FTSE 
350 companies can be split into four industry groups: mining and manufacturers, utilities, 
financial services and others. The coefficient estimates for the cross terms of ROA multiplied 
by industry dummies for different industries indicate the different impacts of corporate 
performance on CEO total pay between the selected industry and the other industries. Thus, 
the first four columns show the different relationships between CEO total compensation and 
ROA among firms in different industries. It can be observed that the coefficient estimates for 
the slope dummies for industries of mining and manufacturers and utilities are statistically 
significant but negative, while that for financial services industry is significant and positive. 
This demonstrates that, for instance, when compared to the other industries the ROA has a 
slightly smaller effect on the CEO compensation of the mining and manufacturers industrial 
sector. Companies in the financial industry have the strongest link between CEO total 
compensation and corporate performance.  
 
The fifth column in Table 5-5 provides the difference in pay-performance relationship 
between companies in the FTSE 100 index and the FTSE 350. This demonstrates that the 
effects of ROA on CEO total compensation is much weaker for FTSE 100 firms than that for 
companies in the FTSE 350, and the difference is statistically significant. In addition, the 
coefficient estimate for the slope dummy of the dividend payout ratio is reported in the last 
column. The dividend payout ratio provides an idea of how well the earnings support the 
dividend payments. More mature companies tend to have a higher payout ratio. Accordingly, 
the statistically significant but negative coefficient estimate for the dividend payout dummy 
demonstrates that those firms with a higher payout ratio have a weaker link between CEO 
total pay and performance. The regression results for the first difference specification are 
similar and reported in Table 5-6 in Appendix I. 
 
The regression results for CEO cash compensation (defined as the sum of base salary and 
annual bonus) are reported in Tables 5-7 to Table 5-10 in Appendix I. These results are 
similar to those for CEO total pay except for some small differences. One of these small 
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differences is that there is a statistically significant but negative impact of board size on CEO 
cash compensation with cross-section SUR controlling heteroskedasticity and cross-section 
correlation. This indicates that firms with more directors on the board tend to pay their CEO 
less. One possible interpretation of this result is that firms with a larger board have more 
directors to take care of their business and to monitor their CEOs.  
 
According to results provided in Table 5-9, the differences in pay-performance relationship 
for CEO cash compensation among industries are not as great as those for CEO total pay. In 
addition, there is no significant difference in the relationship between CEO cash 
compensation and a firm’s performance, either between companies within the FTSE 100 and 
those elsewhere or between firms with high and low dividend payout ratios. Meanwhile, the 
CEO cash compensation in the previous period has little influence on that in the current 
period in both level and change specifications, while the corresponding coefficient estimate is 
significant only in the first difference specification for CEO total compensation. 
 
In addition to the examination of the link of CEO pay and firm performance, the same 
pay-performance analyses are implemented for both highest paid directors and the whole 
board. It is discussed in the literature that the CEO and highest paid director is not always the 
same person in the company (e.g. the chairman of board can sometimes be the highest paid 
director). It is reasonable, therefore, to also examine the pay-performance relationship for the 
highest paid director and, to some extent, it can be treated as one alternative and used to 
check the robustness of CEO pay-performance relationship.  
 
The results in Tables 5-11 to 5-14 in Appendix I show a very similar pattern for the highest 
paid director with those for CEO, with only a few differences which appear for control 
variables and slope dummies. In comparison to the CEO regression results, financial leverage 
plays a more important role in determining the remuneration package for highest paid director. 
The estimated coefficients for financial leverage in both levels and first differences 
regressions are negative and significant. As to slope dummies, for the ROA associated with 
FTSE 100 dummy and dividend payout dummy are statistically insignificant, showing that 
there is little difference in pay-performance relationship for the highest paid director between 
firms in FTSE 100 index and FTSE 250. It also shows that a firm’s dividend payout policy 
does not have significant impact on relationship between pay for highest paid director and 
corporate performance. 
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As for the total board remuneration, according to the results presented in Tables 5-15 to 5-18 
in Appendix I board size becomes a crucial determinant of total board pay. The coefficient 
estimates for board size in either level or first difference specification is positive and 
significant, which suggests intuitively that firms with more directors have higher 
remunerations for the whole board because there are more directors who need to be paid. 
However, when compared to individual compensation package, the financial leverage does 
not have a significant influence on the total board remuneration and the dividend policy has a 
weak impact on the pay-performance relationship for the whole board. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5-1 describes the tendency of CEO compensation packages and, 
accordingly, all of the components of the CEO’s pay to peak at year 2007. The exception to 
this is the CEO’s base salary which has been set up in advance and which is supposed to be 
more stationary. This tendency can also be observed in Figure 5-2 for the remunerations of 
highest paid director and the whole board. This is consistent with the current economic 
environment: the current financial crisis erupted in mid-2007 and from then on most Western 
economies have dropped dramatically, and the social and political environment in many 
Western countries has started to fall apart following the crash. Hence, a further contribution 
of this chapter is to examine the effects that the financial crisis has had on the pay 
determination process among the largest companies in the U.K. Tables 5-19 to 5-22 in 
Appendix I report the regression results of the pay-performance relationship both before and 
after the financial crisis for CEO total and cash compensation, remuneration for the highest 
paid director, and for the whole board, respectively.  
 
All in all, it can be seen that stock price volatility has become the only significant factor in 
these compensation determinations in the past two years after the financial crisis erupted. 
Little evidence of a link between compensation and firm performance could be found 
afterwards. 
 
 
5.6.2. Regression Results for Firm Performance 
 
Agency theory suggests that the principal chooses the directors’ compensation based on the 
firm performance. In this section, some performance analyses are provided to reveal the 
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efficacy of these predictions. Panels A and B of Table 5-23 in Appendix I provide the results 
of regressing firm performance and growth opportunity on the CEO’s total and cash 
compensation as well as on the remuneration for highest paid director and whole board, 
respectively. ROA is used as a proxy for firm performance in Panel A, while Tobin’s q is 
treated as a measurement for growth opportunity in Panel B, and both are shown to be 
consistent with previous literature.  
 
Estimation in Panel A uses total assets as a proxy for firm size instead of sales because the 
return is calculated based on the value of sales. The coefficients for compensation variables 
are all positive and statistically significant in both panels, except for CEO cash compensation 
in Panel B. These results indicate that those companies whose compensations for CEO, 
highest paid director, and the whole board are relatively high tend to produce higher returns 
for shareholders and have more pleasant growth opportunities than those in which the relative 
compensations are low. For example, the coefficient for CEO total compensation in Panel A 
is 3.7128, which implies that the elasticity of ROA with respect to CEO total compensation is 
0.4404 with the mean value of ROA equal to 8.4304. In another example, when the mean of 
Tobin’s q is equal to 1.7867 the elasticity of firm’s growth opportunity with respect to CEO 
total compensation is 0.0379. 
 
In addition, most of the coefficients for the control variables in both panels are significant, 
suggesting that firm size, stock price volatility, and financial leverage all have an important 
influence on that firm’s returns and growth opportunities. For instance, the coefficient for 
price volatility in Panel A is -29.3405, thus the point elasticity at the mean value of ROA with 
respect to price volatility is -1.0177.  
 
 
5.6.3. Bootstrapping Results 
 
Bootstrapping is a statistical method of resampling from an approximating distribution. Here, 
the bootstrapping method is applied to a standard approximating distribution, the empirical 
distribution of observed data. It constructs a number of resamples of observed dataset random 
sampling from the original dataset. Bootstrapping is a simple and straightforward method. It 
allows one to calculate a single statistic from one sample and then resample to gather lots of 
alternative versions of that statistic. Ader et al. (2008) recommend that it is possible to use the 
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bootstrapping procedure for a situation where the sample size is insufficient for 
straightforward statistical inference. 
 
In doing the compensation analysis in this study the focus has been upon the relationship 
between directors’ pay and firm performance among U.K. large companies. However, it is not 
possible to get relative information for all U.K. companies, so only FTSE 350 listed 
companies are included in the sample. In addition, because of the lack of information the 
sample is an unbalanced panel dataset. From this small sample, only one estimated parameter 
is yielded: implying the relationship between pay and corporate performance. Thus, in order 
to understand how much this relationship varies the bootstrapping methodology is applied to 
randomly extract new samples 1,000 times to create a large number of datasets. The 
estimated parameter is then computed for each of these datasets. The bootstrapping results are 
reported in Tables 5-24 and 5-25 at the end of Appendix I, revealing the distributions of the 
corresponding parameter estimates. 
 
The Monte Carlo algorithm for case resampling is applied here to yield distributions of 
estimated  s. This can also be seen as a robustness check for the original coefficient 
estimates. Table 5-24 provides the intervals of estimated  s for Model 5.5.1, which 
examined the effect of firm performance on different compensation measures. Table 5-25 
reveals the robustness of the impact of compensation variables on a firm’s return and growth 
opportunities. From these results it can easily be observed that the interval estimate for each 
  is narrow, with the original estimate being very close to the mean. Hence, one can 
conclude that the original estimates for pay-performance relationship are effective and robust.  
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5.7. Conclusion 
 
According to Agency Theory, conflicts of interest exist between the principal (i.e. the 
shareholders) and the agent (i.e. the managers, especially the executive directors). The 
directors’ remuneration packages play an important role in corporations in aligning the 
interests of directors to those of shareholders. Compensation packages have been recognised 
to act as a crucial mechanism to attract, motivate, and monitor top managers. Thus, the 
relationship between the directors’ remuneration and corporate performance has attracted lots 
of public and academic attention. It is, therefore, important to understand how firms 
determine the directors’ remuneration packages. This current empirical chpater explores the 
link between directors’ remuneration and firm performance using a panel data set of 
companies taken from FTSE 350 index for the period 2004 to 2009, and it provides some 
evidence in addition to the previous literature.  
 
In contrast to the previous studies which have analysed either the CEO compensation 
packages or the remuneration for highest paid directors, in this chapter we have introduced 
dynamic compensation models in order to evaluate the remuneration packages for the CEO, 
the highest paid director, and the whole board. The empirical results indicate that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between corporate performance and the directors’ pay for 
CEO cash compensation, CEO total compensation, remuneration for highest paid director as 
well as the remuneration of the total board. The regression in first differences has also been 
examined to understand the pay-performance relationship in changes, which is for the first 
time in research in this area. The corresponding estimation results for first order difference 
specification are consistent with those of the level equation estimation. These findings 
suggest that the recommendations in the U.K. corporate governance reports (i.e. Cadbury 
(1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998) and Higgs (2003)) which advise linking the 
directors’ remuneration more closely to firm performance have been effective in practice for 
both executives and the whole board. It is also found that larger firms pay their directors 
relatively higher remuneration, which supports the idea that larger firms need higher quality 
directors, especially more talented executive directors, and are willing to offer higher 
compensation to attract them. The sample is split into pre- and post-crisis subsamples over 
2004 to 2007 and 2008 to 2009, respectively, in order to examine the impact of the recent 
financial crisis on the relationship between the directors’ pay and firm performance. It can be 
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seen as another major contribtuion in this chapter. Our results suggest that the link of 
pay-performance has been broken down since the financial crisis erupted. In addition, firms 
in different industries are observed to behave differently in pay-performance relationship, 
while the board size does not have a significant impact on the relationship between pay and 
performance for CEOs and highest paid directors in large UK firms. However, since there are 
only two-year data included for post-crisis analysis and the compensation might need time to 
adjust, it is not easy to make solid conclusion with limited informantion in such a short period 
since this financial crisis erupted. 
 
Moreover, the influence of directors’ pay on corporate performance is also evaluated. The 
results show the existence of a positive and significant impact of directors’ pay on firm 
returns and growth opportunities, which practically demonstrates the importance of the 
decision making in setting directors’ compensation packages. In addition, the bootstrap 
results suggest that the positive and significant relationship between the directors’ 
remuneration and firm performance is robust through both directions. 
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Appendix I 
 
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics of Pay Variables 
Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median 
CEO Salary 986 509236.4 250257.9 450000.0 
CEO Bonus 986 597987.8 811924.1 377000.0 
CEO Others 986 239592.4 709336.7 65546.50 
CEO Total Compensation 986 1346946. 1286865. 958500.0 
Total Compensation for Highest Paid 
Director (th) 
1216 1225.667 1151.485 919.0000 
Director’s Remuneration (th) 1243 3755.738 3540.999 2682.000 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Size 
Firm Size Variables 
Variable  No. of Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Median 
Market Capitalisation (mil) 1288 4939.922 13632.49 1111.000 
Sales (th) 1432 3755913. 12049384 856800.0 
Total Assets (th) 1332 18633484 110000000 1365550. 
Turnover (th) 1259 3874684. 13019020 953900.0 
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Table 5-3: Dependent variable is ln(CEO Total Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects 
OLS 
Fixed Effects  
W. D. 
Fixed Effects  
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.1500** 
(0.0667) 
0.1452** 
(0.0691) 
0.1500** 
(0.0633) 
0.1452** 
(0.0671) 
0.1500*** 
(0.0445)
 
0.1452*** 
(0.0512) 
ROA 0.0079*** 
(0.0021) 
 0.0079*** 
(0.0022) 
 0.0079*** 
(0.0011) 
 
Return  0.0704*** 
(0.0192) 
 0.0704*** 
(0.0174) 
 0.0704*** 
(0.0095) 
Board size -0.0052 
(0.0106) 
-0.0065 
(0.0111) 
-0.0052 
(0.0087) 
-0.0065 
(0.0091) 
-0.0052 
(0.0061) 
-0.0065 
(0.0060) 
lag total 
compensation 
0.0886* 
(0.0502) 
0.0890* 
(0.0518) 
0.0886 
(0.0995) 
0.0890 
(0.1036) 
0.0886 
(0.1921) 
0.0890 
(0.1915) 
Price 
Volatility 
-1.4739*** 
(0.5000) 
-1.4483*** 
(0.5208) 
-1.4739*** 
(0.4608) 
-1.4483*** 
(0.4787) 
-1.4739** 
(0.6225) 
-1.4483** 
(0.6394) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.4519*** 
(0.1743) 
-0.4104* 
(0.2260) 
-0.4519*** 
(0.1541) 
-0.4104* 
(0.2113) 
-0.4519*** 
(0.1714) 
-0.4104 
(0.2591)
 
constant 11.2854*** 
(1.0757) 
11.3866*** 
(1.1074) 
11.2854*** 
(1.4095) 
11.3866*** 
(1.4692) 
11.2854*** 
(2.4343) 
11.3866*** 
(2.4522) 
Cross-section 
Effects 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Time Effects [0.0011] [0.0007] [0.0011] [0.0007] [0.0011] [0.0007] 
Adjusted-R
2
 79.21% 79.05% 79.21% 79.05% 79.21% 79.05% 
S.E. 0.3074 0.3113 0.3074 0.3113 0.3074 0.3113 
N 211 210 211 210 211 210 
T 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-4: Dependent variable is Dln(CEO Total Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects 
OLS 
Fixed Effects 
W. D. 
Fixed Effects  
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.1392* 
(0.0766) 
0.1307 
(0.0807) 
0.1392* 
(0.1029) 
0.1307 
(0.1144) 
0.1392 
(0.0848)
 
0.1307 
(0.0927) 
DROA 0.0080*** 
(0.0022) 
 0.0080** 
(0.0032) 
 0.0080*** 
(0.0026) 
 
DReturn  0.0735*** 
(0.0201) 
 0.0735*** 
(0.0264) 
 0.0735*** 
(0.0221) 
D(Board size) -0.0063 
(0.0105) 
-0.0057 
(0.0111) 
-0.0063 
(0.0095) 
-0.0057 
(0.0100) 
-0.0063 
(0.0105) 
-0.0057 
(0.0112) 
D(lag total 
compensation) 
-0.2865*** 
(0.0499) 
-0.2871*** 
(0.0516) 
-0.2865*** 
(0.0827) 
-0.2871*** 
(0.0856) 
-0.2865** 
(0.1261) 
-0.2871** 
(0.1316) 
D(Price 
Volatility) 
-2.4590*** 
(0.6225) 
-2.3561*** 
(0.6472) 
-2.4590*** 
(0.7612) 
-2.3561*** 
(0.7990) 
-2.4590*** 
(0.6632) 
-2.3561*** 
(0.6921) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.3383* 
(0.1733) 
-0.2302 
(0.2317) 
-0.3383 
(0.2085) 
-0.2302 
(0.2801) 
-0.3383* 
(0.1941) 
-0.2302 
(0.2966)
 
constant 0.0927*** 
(0.0213) 
0.0941*** 
(0.0226) 
0.0927*** 
(0.0249) 
0.0941*** 
(0.0272) 
0.0927*** 
(0.0265) 
0.0941*** 
(0.0290) 
Adjusted-R
2
 16.84% 16.18% 16.84% 16.18% 16.84% 16.18% 
S.E. 0.3824 0.3869 0.3824 0.3869 0.3824 0.3869 
N 191 185 191 185 191 185 
T 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-5: Dependent variable is ln(CEO Total Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.1585*** 
(0.0437) 
0.1488*** 
(0.0486) 
0.1797*** 
(0.0476) 
0.1495*** 
(0.0442) 
0.1390*** 
(0.0436) 
0.1472*** 
(0.0499) 
ROA 0.0098*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0101*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0034*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0094*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0113*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0128*** 
(0.0028) 
Board size -0.0046 
(0.0061) 
-0.0051 
(0.0062) 
-0.0055 
(0.0058) 
-0.0056 
(0.0061) 
-0.0067 
(0.0061) 
-0.0069 
(0.0067) 
lag total 
compensation 
0.0819 
(0.1924) 
0.0867 
(0.1894) 
0.0388 
(0.1789) 
0.0865 
(0.1902) 
0.0826 
(0.1907) 
0.0909 
(0.1894) 
Price Volatility -1.5354** 
(0.6219) 
-1.3309** 
(0.6080) 
-1.6322*** 
(0.6177) 
-1.5041** 
(0.6269) 
-1.4631** 
(0.5813) 
-1.5146** 
(0.6125) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.4656*** 
(0.1756) 
-0.4581** 
(0.1801) 
-0.4214** 
(0.1666) 
-0.4384*** 
(0.1603) 
-0.4707*** 
(0.1757) 
-0.4467** 
(0.1969) 
ROA*Mining & 
Manufacturers 
-0.0068*** 
(0.0023) 
     
ROA*Utilities  -0.0124*** 
(0.0031) 
    
ROA*Financials   0.0291*** 
(0.0075) 
   
ROA*Others    -0.0038 
(0.0040) 
  
ROA*FTSE100     -0.0106*** 
(0.0032) 
 
ROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     -0.0060* 
(0.0035) 
Constant 11.2941*** 
(2.4264) 
11.2850*** 
(2.3774) 
11.6103*** 
(2.2497) 
11.3228*** 
(2.4137) 
11.5515*** 
(2.4048) 
11.3084*** 
(2.5289) 
Adjusted-R
2
 79.28% 79.39% 80.53% 79.20% 79.45% 78.55% 
Standard errors in paranthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-6: Dependent variable is Dln(CEO Total Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.1497** 
(0.0750) 
0.1369 
(0.0846) 
0.1698** 
(0.0752) 
0.1396* 
(0.0792) 
0.1176 
(0.0794)
 
0.1003 
(0.0885) 
DROA 0.0104*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0119*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0038* 
(0.0020) 
0.0077*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0142*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0044) 
D(Board size) -0.0065 
(0.0072) 
-0.0067 
(0.0073) 
-0.0079 
(0.0069) 
-0.0064 
(0.0073) 
-0.0094 
(0.0070) 
-0.0088 
(0.0078) 
D(lag total 
compensation) 
-0.2901 
(0.2188) 
-0.2850 
(0.2160) 
-0.2936 
(0.1917) 
-0.2867 
(0.2204) 
-0.2866 
(0.2143) 
-0.2811 
(0.2144) 
D(Price Volatility) -2.5533*** 
(0.8409) 
-2.2110*** 
(0.8461) 
-2.4198*** 
(0.7658) 
-2.4516*** 
(0.8544) 
-2.2045*** 
(0.7863) 
-2.2176** 
(0.8987) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.3617 
(0.2489) 
-0.3176 
(0.2606) 
-0.2884 
(0.2383) 
-0.3407 
(0.2378) 
-0.3416 
(0.2597) 
-0.2531 
(0.2635) 
DROA*Mining & 
Manufacturer 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0029) 
     
DROA*Utilities  -0.0126*** 
(0.0037) 
    
DROA*Financials   0.0425*** 
(0.0119) 
   
DROA*Others    0.0010 
(0.0064) 
  
DROA*FTSE100     -0.0141*** 
(0.0040) 
 
DROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     -0.0120** 
(0.0053) 
Constant 0.0906*** 
(0.0252) 
0.0979*** 
(0.0256) 
0.1002*** 
(0.0238) 
0.0927*** 
(0.0252) 
0.0977*** 
(0.0245) 
0.1109*** 
(0.0260) 
Adjusted-R
2 
17.31% 18.00% 24.11% 16.67% 18.76% 19.70% 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-7: Dependent variable is ln(CEO Cash Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects W. D. Fixed Effects Cross-section 
SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.0832 
(0.0629) 
0.0737 
(0.0651) 
0.0832 
(0.0540) 
0.0737 
(0.0565) 
0.0832** 
(0.0370)
 
0.0737* 
(0.0385) 
ROA 0.0039** 
(0.0020) 
 0.0039** 
(0.0020) 
 0.0039*** 
(0.0010) 
 
Return  0.0353** 
(0.0177) 
 0.0353** 
(0.0174) 
 0.0353*** 
(0.0119) 
Board size -0.0132 
(0.0098) 
-0.0142 
(0.0102) 
-0.0132 
(0.0084)
 
-0.0142 
(0.0087) 
-0.0132* 
(0.0076) 
-0.0142* 
(0.0082) 
lag cash 
compensation 
0.0497 
(0.0552) 
0.0671 
(0.0565) 
0.0497 
(0.0876) 
0.0671 
(0.0908) 
0.0497 
(0.1831) 
0.0671 
(0.1828) 
Price 
Volatility 
-1.7718*** 
(0.5063) 
-1.8881*** 
(0.5206) 
-1.7718*** 
(0.5289) 
-1.8881*** 
(0.5516) 
-1.7718*** 
(0.6758) 
-1.8881*** 
(0.6631) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.2811* 
(0.1442) 
-0.2363 
(0.1934) 
-0.2811** 
(0.1279) 
-0.2363 
(0.1813) 
-0.2811** 
(0.1270) 
-0.2363 
(0.1451)
 
constant 12.7189*** 
(1.0804) 
12.6546*** 
(1.1102) 
12.7189*** 
(1.3744) 
12.6546*** 
(1.4311) 
12.7189*** 
(2.5851) 
12.6546*** 
(2.5820) 
Cross-section 
Effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Time Effects [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Adjusted-R
2
 84.40% 84.47% 84.40% 84.47% 84.40% 84.47% 
S.E. 0.2338 0.2357 0.2338 0.2357 0.2338 0.2357 
N 192 189 192 189 192 189 
T 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-8: Dependent variable is ln(CEO Cash Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects 
OLS 
Fixed Effects 
W. D. 
Fixed Effects 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.0909 
(0.0712) 
0.0770 
(0.0751) 
0.0909 
(0.0701) 
0.0770 
(0.0770) 
0.0909* 
(0.0549) 
0.0770 
(0.0594) 
DROA 0.0042** 
(0.0019) 
 0.0042 
(0.0026) 
 0.0042*** 
(0.0015) 
 
DReturn  0.0470*** 
(0.0178) 
 0.0470** 
(0.0232) 
 0.0470*** 
(0.0132) 
D(Board size) -0.0119 
(0.0101) 
-0.0128 
(0.0107) 
-0.0119 
(0.0088) 
-0.0128 
(0.0093) 
-0.0119 
(0.0082) 
-0.0128 
(0.0090) 
D(lag cash 
compensation) 
-0.3031*** 
(0.0561) 
-0.2981*** 
(0.0581) 
-0.3031*** 
(0.0888) 
-0.2981*** 
(0.0936) 
-0.3031 
(0.2083) 
-0.2981 
(0.2129) 
D(Price 
Volatility) 
-2.9094*** 
(0.6281) 
-2.9228*** 
(0.6429) 
-2.9094*** 
(0.7612) 
-2.9228*** 
(0.7890) 
-2.9094*** 
(0.8632) 
-2.9228*** 
(0.8949) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.3523** 
(0.1426) 
-0.2120 
(0.1948) 
-0.3523*** 
(0.1348) 
-0.2120 
(0.2073) 
-0.3523*** 
(0.1203) 
-0.2120 
(0.1553) 
constant 0.1108*** 
(0.0204) 
0.1150*** 
(0.0215) 
0.1108*** 
(0.0187) 
0.1150*** 
(0.0204) 
0.1108*** 
(0.0282) 
0.1150*** 
(0.0317) 
Adjusted-R
2
 19.54% 18.11% 19.54% 18.11% 19.54% 18.11% 
S.E. 0.2946 0.2967 0.2946 0.2967 0.2946 0.2967 
N 155 148 155 148 155 148 
T 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-9: Dependent variable is ln(CEO Cash Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.0928** 
(0.0358) 
0.0914** 
(0.0359) 
0.0910** 
(0.0354) 
0.0880** 
(0.0356) 
0.0817** 
(0.0373) 
0.0663* 
(0.0391) 
ROA 0.0019* 
(0.0010) 
0.0063*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0030** 
(0.0014) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0075*** 
(0.0023) 
Board size -0.0128 
(0.0079) 
-0.0128* 
(0.0077) 
-0.0138* 
(0.0076) 
-0.0136* 
(0.0076) 
-0.0138* 
(0.0075) 
-0.0130 
(0.0081) 
lag cash 
compensation 
0.0606 
(0.1820) 
0.0536 
(0.1803) 
0.0371 
(0.1806) 
0.0441 
(0.1793) 
0.0504 
(0.1822) 
0.0600 
(0.1816) 
Price Volatility -1.6907** 
(0.6902) 
-1.6403** 
(0.6832) 
-1.7724** 
(0.6865) 
-1.8005*** 
(0.6816) 
-1.7486*** 
(0.6714) 
-1.6012** 
(0.6798) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.2524* 
(0.1293) 
-0.2841** 
(0.1262) 
-0.2743** 
(0.1268) 
-0.2649** 
(0.1249) 
-0.2926** 
(0.1293) 
-0.2848** 
(0.1400) 
ROA*Mining& 
Manufacturers 
0.0114*** 
(0.0030) 
     
ROA*Utilities  -0.0095*** 
(0.0035) 
    
ROA*Financials   0.0067 
(0.0075) 
   
ROA*Others    -0.0042 
(0.0036) 
  
ROA*FTSE100     -0.0048 
(0.0031) 
 
ROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     -0.0041 
(0.0036) 
Constant 12.3525*** 
(2.6131) 
12.5013*** 
(2.4842) 
12.7905*** 
(2.4978) 
12.7246*** 
(2.5602) 
12.7360*** 
(2.5769) 
12.7440*** 
(2.6536) 
Adjusted-R
2
 84.64% 84.57% 84.44% 84.%42 84.43% 84.78% 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-10: Dependent variable is Dln(CEO Cash Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.0973* 
(0.0559) 
0.0989* 
(0.0554) 
0.1061** 
(0.0519) 
0.0932* 
(0.0550) 
0.0813 
(0.0568)
 
0.0489 
(0.0605) 
DROA 0.0026* 
(0.0015) 
0.0083*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0026 
(0.0019) 
0.0050** 
(0.0023) 
0.0075*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0116*** 
(0.0028) 
D(Board size) -0.0109 
(0.0085) 
-0.0125 
(0.0084) 
-0.0138* 
(0.0081) 
-0.0117 
(0.0081) 
-0.0133 
(0.0083) 
-0.0124 
(0.0089) 
D(lag cash 
compensation) 
-0.2976 
(0.2092) 
-0.2902 
(0.2048) 
-0.3030 
(0.1969) 
-0.3046 
(0.2060) 
-0.2939 
(0.2049) 
-0.2852 
(0.2032) 
D(Price Volatility) -2.8065*** 
(0.9057) 
-2.7186*** 
(0.8480) 
-2.8387*** 
(0.8037) 
-2.9145*** 
(0.8629) 
-2.8246*** 
(0.8272) 
-2.5478*** 
(0.8134) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.3271*** 
(0.1197) 
-0.3401*** 
(0.1269) 
-0.3351*** 
(0.1228) 
-0.3447*** 
(0.1188) 
-0.3572*** 
(0.1270) 
-0.3335*** 
(0.1283) 
DROA*Mining & 
Manufacturers 
0.0081** 
(0.0041) 
     
DROA*Utilities  -0.0102*** 
(0.0036) 
    
DROA*Financials   0.0173 
(0.0110)
 
   
DROA*Others    -0.0026 
(0.0040) 
  
DROA*FTSE100     -0.0061 
(0.0043) 
 
DROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     -0.0103*** 
(0.0034) 
Constant 0.1115*** 
(0.0284) 
0.1143*** 
(0.0283) 
0.1122*** 
(0.0270) 
0.1104*** 
(0.0285) 
0.1133*** 
(0.0281) 
0.1214*** 
(0.0281) 
Adjusted-R
2 
20.06% 20.97% 21.21% 19.40% 19.94% 22.12% 
Standard errors in parenthesiss; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-11: Dependent variable is ln(Highest Paid Director Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects W. D. Fixed Effects Cross-section 
SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.1815*** 
(0.0612) 
0.1802*** 
(0.0631) 
0.1815*** 
(0.0654) 
0.1802*** 
(0.0680) 
0.1815*** 
(0.0553)
 
0.1802*** 
(0.0588) 
ROA 0.0072*** 
(0.0017) 
 0.0072*** 
(0.0014) 
 0.0072*** 
(0.0008) 
 
Return  0.0578*** 
(0.0150) 
 0.0578*** 
(0.0132) 
 0.0578*** 
(0.0059) 
Board size 0.0070 
(0.0094) 
0.0060 
(0.0098) 
0.0070 
(0.0083) 
0.0060 
(0.0087) 
0.0070 
(0.0092) 
0.0060 
(0.0099) 
Lag hpd 
compensation 
-0.0491 
(0.0413) 
-0.0373 
(0.0440) 
-0.0491 
(0.0595) 
-0.0373 
(0.0660) 
-0.0491 
(0.1911) 
-0.0373 
(0.2035) 
Price 
Volatility 
-1.5428*** 
(0.4401) 
-1.5237*** 
(0.4589) 
-1.5428*** 
(0.4034) 
-1.5237*** 
(0.4191) 
-1.5428*** 
(0.4032) 
-1.5237*** 
(0.4506) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.2308 
(0.1444) 
-0.3611* 
(0.1849) 
-0.2308** 
(0.1145) 
-0.3611** 
(0.1585) 
-0.2308* 
(0.1354) 
-0.3611** 
(0.1663)
 
constant 5.2102*** 
(0.8650) 
5.2841*** 
(0.8915) 
5.2102*** 
(0.7940) 
5.2841*** 
(0.8069) 
5.2102*** 
(1.2633) 
5.2841*** 
(1.2844) 
Cross-section 
Effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Time Effects [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Adjusted-R
2
 78.06% 77.69% 78.06% 77.69% 78.06% 77.69% 
S.E. 0.3012 0.3051 0.3012 0.3051 0.3012 0.3051 
N 198 198 198 198 198 198 
T 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-12: Dependent variable is Dln(Highest Paid Director Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects  
OLS 
Fixed Effects 
W. D. 
Fixed Effects 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.2048*** 
(0.0730) 
0.2099*** 
(0.0767) 
0.2048** 
(0.0984) 
0.2099** 
(0.1053) 
0.2048** 
(0.0856)
 
0.2099** 
(0.0937) 
DROA 0.0089*** 
(0.0018) 
 0.0089*** 
(0.0016) 
 0.0089*** 
(0.0012) 
 
DReturn  0.0744*** 
(0.0169) 
 0.0744*** 
(0.0164) 
 0.0744*** 
(0.0097) 
D(Board size) -0.0010 
(0.0090) 
-0.0018 
(0.0095) 
-0.0010 
(0.0089) 
-0.0018 
(0.0095) 
-0.0010 
(0.0112) 
-0.0018 
(0.0112) 
D(lag hpd 
compensation) 
-0.3646*** 
(0.0385) 
-0.3668*** 
(0.0412) 
-0.3646*** 
(0.0721) 
-0.3668*** 
(0.0800) 
0.3646** 
(0.1824) 
-0.3668* 
(0.1950) 
D(Price 
Volatility) 
-1.6407*** 
(0.5582) 
-1.5743*** 
(0.5818) 
-1.6407** 
(0.6691) 
-1.5743** 
(0.6983) 
-1.6407** 
(0.6447) 
-1.5743** 
(0.7029) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.3429*** 
(0.1470) 
-0.5253*** 
(0.1934) 
-0.3429*** 
(0.1170) 
-0.5253*** 
(0.1834) 
-0.3429** 
(0.1404) 
-0.5253** 
(0.1887)
 
constant 0.0882*** 
(0.0176) 
0.0925*** 
(0.0187) 
0.0882*** 
(0.0180) 
0.0925*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0882*** 
(0.0238) 
0.0925*** 
(0.0245) 
Adjusted-R
2
 22.46% 22.05% 22.46% 22.05% 22.46% 22.05% 
S.E. 0.3628 0.3672 0.3628 0.3672 0.3628 0.3672 
N 184 179 184 179 184 179 
T 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-13: Dependent variable is ln(Highest Paid Director Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.1831*** 
(0.0552) 
0.1836*** 
(0.0576) 
0.1961*** 
(0.0507) 
0.1818*** 
(0.0531) 
0.1792*** 
(0.0549) 
0.1926*** 
(0.0595) 
ROA 0.0076*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0039*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0103*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0078*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0011) 
Board size 0.0070 
(0.0092) 
0.0059 
(0.0090) 
0.0067 
(0.0092) 
0.0074 
(0.0093) 
0.0071 
(0.0093) 
0.0085 
(0.0097) 
lag hpd 
compensation 
-0.0491 
(0.1911) 
-0.0474 
(0.1894) 
-0.0512 
(0.1882) 
-0.0521 
(0.1890) 
-0.0496 
(0.1908) 
-0.0497 
(0.1908) 
Price Volatility -1.5575*** 
(0.3991) 
-1.5072*** 
(0.3930) 
-1.6042*** 
(0.4090) 
-1.5251*** 
(0.4109) 
-1.5302*** 
(0.4007) 
-1.5888*** 
(0.4129) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.2304* 
(0.1359) 
-0.2377* 
(0.1387) 
-0.2048 
(0.1309) 
-0.2107 
(0.1320) 
-0.2355* 
(0.1344) 
-0.2858** 
(0.1444) 
ROA*Mining & 
Manufacturers 
-0.0013 
(0.0017) 
     
ROA*Utilities  -0.0129 
(0.0112) 
    
ROA*Financials   0.0105*** 
(0.0030) 
   
ROA*Others    -0.0074*** 
(0.0020) 
  
ROA*FTSE100     -0.0024 
(0.0021) 
 
ROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     0.0041 
(0.0025)
 
Constant 5.1950*** 
(1.2553) 
5.1823*** 
(1.2397) 
5.0461*** 
(1.2077) 
5.1952*** 
(1.2570) 
5.2442*** 
(1.2469) 
5.0830*** 
(1.2193) 
Adjusted-R
2
 78.03% 78.06% 78.42% 78.25% 78.04% 77.39% 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5-14: Dependent variable is Dln(Highest Paid Director Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.2093** 
(0.0842) 
0.2164** 
(0.0883) 
0.2129** 
(0.0825) 
0.2008** 
(0.0857) 
0.2040** 
(0.0848)
 
0.2145** 
(0.0905) 
DROA 0.0099*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0093*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0102*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0091*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0095*** 
(0.0020) 
D(Board size) -0.0009 
(0.0111) 
-0.0023 
(0.0108) 
-0.0012 
(0.0111) 
-0.0010 
(0.0112) 
-0.0011 
(0.0112) 
-0.0006 
(0.0119) 
D(lag hpd 
compensation) 
-0.3649** 
(0.1822) 
-0.3611** 
(0.1801) 
-0.3628** 
(0.1811) 
-0.3642** 
(0.1822) 
-0.3645** 
(0.1824) 
-0.3623** 
(0.1808) 
D(Price Volatility) -1.6484** 
(0.6476) 
-1.5935** 
(0.6375) 
-1.6270** 
(0.6605) 
-1.6350** 
(0.6467) 
-1.6320** 
(0.6438) 
-1.6104** 
(0.6932) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.3464** 
(0.1450) 
-0.3486** 
(0.1433) 
-0.3287** 
(0.1332) 
-0.3317** 
(0.1354) 
-0.3453** 
(0.1412) 
-0.3654** 
(0.1607) 
DROA*Mining & 
Manufacturers 
-0.0031 
(0.0021) 
     
DROA*Utilities  -0.0185 
(0.0150) 
    
DROA*Financials   0.0084** 
(0.0038) 
   
DROA*Others    -0.0036 
(0.0027) 
  
DROA*FTSE100     -0.0009 
(0.0032) 
 
DROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     0.0021 
(0.0044) 
Constant 0.0877*** 
(0.0237) 
0.0869*** 
(0.0232) 
0.0860*** 
(0.0234) 
0.0882*** 
(0.0238) 
0.0882*** 
(0.0238) 
0.0916*** 
(0.0238) 
Adjusted-R
2 
22.42% 22.66% 23.06% 22.46% 22.33% 22.75% 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-15: Dependent variable is ln(Total Board Remuneration) 
 Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects W. D. Fixed Effects Cross-section 
SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.1652*** 
(0.0598) 
0.1584** 
(0.0616) 
0.1652*** 
(0.0459) 
0.1584*** 
(0.0469) 
0.1652*** 
(0.0410)
 
0.1584*** 
(0.0459) 
ROA 0.0040** 
(0.0016) 
 0.0040*** 
(0.0013) 
 0.0040*** 
(0.0011) 
 
Return  0.0356** 
(0.0146) 
 0.0356*** 
(0.0116) 
 0.0356*** 
(0.0085) 
Board size 0.0423*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0410*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0410*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0410*** 
(0.0101) 
Lag board 
remuneration 
0.0827** 
(0.0397) 
0.0941** 
(0.0415) 
0.0827 
(0.0591) 
0.0941 
(0.0628) 
0.0827 
(0.1974) 
0.0941 
(0.2028) 
Price 
Volatility 
-1.5269*** 
(0.4240) 
-1.5323*** 
(0.4413) 
-1.5269*** 
(0.4521) 
-1.5323*** 
(0.4691) 
-1.5269*** 
(0.3279) 
-1.5323*** 
(0.3765) 
Financial 
Leverage 
0.0693 
(0.1414) 
0.0376 
(0.1808) 
0.0693 
(0.1158) 
0.0376 
(0.1565) 
0.0693 
(0.1167) 
0.0376 
(0.1537)
 
constant 4.9577*** 
(0.8389) 
5.0327*** 
(0.8637) 
4.9577*** 
(0.6615) 
5.0327*** 
(0.6777) 
4.9577*** 
(1.2084) 
5.0327*** 
(1.2267) 
Cross-section 
Effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Time Effects [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Adjusted-R
2
 81.68% 81.49% 81.68% 81.49% 81.68% 81.49% 
S.E. 0.2963 0.3000 0.2963 0.3000 0.2963 0.3000 
N 203 203 203 203 203 203 
T 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-16: Dependent variable is Dln(Total Board Compensation) 
 Fixed Effects  
OLS 
Fixed Effects 
W. D. 
Fixed Effects 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.1619** 
(0.0709) 
0.1662** 
(0.0740) 
0.1619** 
(0.0628) 
0.1662** 
(0.0669) 
0.1619** 
(0.0628)
 
0.1662*** 
(0.0636) 
DROA 0.0055*** 
(0.0018) 
 0.0055*** 
(0.0019) 
 0.0055*** 
(0.0018) 
 
DReturn  0.0450*** 
(0.0164) 
 0.0450*** 
(0.0164) 
 0.0450*** 
(0.0145) 
D(Board size) 0.0222** 
(0.0087) 
0.0192** 
(0.0092) 
0.0222*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0192** 
(0.0083) 
0.0222** 
(0.0110) 
0.0192 
(0.0118) 
D(lag board 
compensation) 
-0.2361*** 
(0.0383) 
-0.2472*** 
(0.0398) 
-0.2361*** 
(0.0906) 
-0.2472*** 
(0.0954) 
-0.2361 
(0.1946) 
-0.2472 
(0.1985) 
D(Price 
Volatility) 
-1.6050*** 
(0.5317) 
-1.5674*** 
(0.5500) 
-1.6050** 
(0.6980) 
-1.5674** 
(0.7170) 
-1.6050*** 
(0.5740) 
-1.5674*** 
(0.6031) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.0001 
(0.1442) 
-0.1038 
(0.1884) 
-0.0001 
(0.1252) 
-0.1038 
(0.1954) 
-0.0001 
(0.1484) 
-0.1038 
(0.1961)
 
constant 0.0528*** 
(0.0170) 
0.0578*** 
(0.0179) 
0.0528*** 
(0.0167) 
0.0578*** 
(0.0178) 
0.0528*** 
(0.0179) 
0.0578*** 
(0.0197) 
Adjusted-R
2
 15.57% 16.78% 15.57% 16.78% 15.57% 16.78% 
S.E. 0.3571 0.3596 0.3571 0.3596 0.3571 0.3596 
N 188 183 188 183 188 183 
T 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-17: Dependent variable is ln(Total Board Remuneration) 
 Fixed Effects Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
ln(sales) 0.1616*** 
(0.0406) 
0.1680*** 
(0.0431) 
0.1713*** 
(0.0420) 
0.1646*** 
(0.0403) 
0.1608*** 
(0.0409) 
0.1585*** 
(0.0496) 
ROA 0.0033** 
(0.0014) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0025** 
(0.0012) 
0.0063*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0050*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0014) 
Board size 0.0422*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0410*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0425*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0424*** 
(0.0094) 
0.0441*** 
(0.0095) 
lag board 
remuneration 
0.0841 
(0.1977) 
0.0822 
(0.1973) 
0.0806 
(0.1967) 
0.0831 
(0.1963) 
0.0829 
(0.1972) 
0.0870 
(0.1976) 
Price Volatility -1.4936*** 
(0.3139) 
-1.4896*** 
(0.3263) 
-1.5618*** 
(0.3178) 
-1.5191*** 
(0.3263) 
-1.5065*** 
(0.3227) 
-1.5770*** 
(0.3347) 
Financial 
Leverage 
0.0684 
(0.1132) 
0.0611 
(0.1177) 
0.0800 
(0.1173) 
0.0841 
(0.1129) 
0.0609 
(0.1191) 
0.0382 
(0.1243) 
ROA*Mining & 
Manufacturers 
0.0029 
(0.0023) 
     
ROA*Utilities  -0.0149*** 
(0.0053) 
    
ROA*Financials   0.0045 
(0.0035) 
   
ROA*Others    -0.0056*** 
(0.0020) 
  
ROA*FTSE100     -0.0043*** 
(0.0013) 
 
ROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     0.0006 
(0.0030)
 
Constant 4.9817*** 
(1.2044) 
4.9395*** 
(1.1828) 
4.9023*** 
(1.1887) 
4.9426*** 
(1.2060) 
5.0177*** 
(1.2034) 
5.0332*** 
(1.1728) 
Adjusted-R
2
 81.67% 81.70% 81.71% 81.76% 81.70% 80.84% 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
250 
 
Table 5-18: Dependent variable is Dln(Total Board Remuneration) 
 Cross-section SUR (PCSE) 
Dln(sales) 0.1636** 
(0.0640) 
0.1726*** 
(0.0645) 
0.1666** 
(0.0656) 
0.1584** 
(0.0631) 
0.1579** 
(0.0635)
 
0.1528** 
(0.0685) 
DROA 0.0058** 
(0.0023) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0037* 
(0.0021) 
0.0064*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0065*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0056** 
(0.0022) 
D(Board size) 0.0222** 
(0.0110) 
0.0210** 
(0.0106) 
0.0221** 
(0.0109) 
0.0222** 
(0.0110) 
0.0217* 
(0.0111) 
0.0241** 
(0.0113) 
D(lag board 
remuneration) 
-0.2369 
(0.1950) 
-0.2363 
(0.1941) 
-0.2352 
(0.1932) 
-0.2335 
(0.1960) 
-0.2360 
(0.1938) 
-0.2332 
(0.1945) 
D(Price Volatility) -1.6080*** 
(0.5702) 
-1.5688*** 
(0.5692) 
-1.6005*** 
(0.5794) 
-1.6007*** 
(0.5726) 
-1.5573*** 
(0.5615) 
-1.6549*** 
(0.6057) 
D(Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.0012 
(0.1511) 
-0.0051 
(0.1504) 
0.0078 
(0.1461) 
0.0075 
(0.1457) 
-0.0142 
(0.1538) 
-0.0187 
(0.1615) 
DROA*Mining & 
Manufacturers 
-0.0011 
(0.0033) 
     
DROA*Utilities  -0.0173** 
(0.0068) 
    
DROA*Financials   0.0052 
(0.0049) 
   
DROA*Others    -0.0027 
(0.0032) 
  
DROA*FTSE100     -0.0050** 
(0.0020) 
 
DROA*Dividend 
Payout 
     0.0005 
(0.0040) 
Constant 0.0527*** 
(0.0178) 
0.0519*** 
(0.0175) 
0.0516*** 
(0.0178) 
0.0527*** 
(0.0179) 
0.0525*** 
(0.0177) 
0.0565*** 
(0.0182) 
Adjusted-R
2 
15.45% 15.75% 15.75% 15.52% 15.66% 15.78% 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-19: Dependent variable is ln(CEO Total Compensation) 
 Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2008-2009 
ln(sales) 0.1869*** 
(0.0468) 
0.1692*** 
(0.0503) 
0.1869*** 
(0.0414) 
0.1692*** 
(0.0487) 
0.1582* 
(0.0815) 
0.1142 
(0.0861) 
0.1582** 
(0.0643) 
0.1142* 
(0.0628) 
-0.0698 
(0.2099) 
-0.0904 
(0.2138) 
-0.0698 
(0.0924) 
-0.0904 
(0.0884) 
ROA 0.0071*** 
(0.0018) 
 0.0071*** 
(0.0019) 
 0.0063 
(0.0041) 
 0.0063 
(0.0067) 
 0.0022 
(0.0049) 
 0.0022 
(0.0027) 
 
Return  0.0565*** 
(0.0155) 
 0.0565*** 
(0.0146) 
 0.0644* 
(0.0353) 
 0.0644 
(0.0469) 
 0.0318 
(0.0388) 
 0.0318 
(0.0219) 
Board size -0.0010 
(0.0087) 
-0.0021 
(0.0091) 
-0.0010 
(0.0075) 
-0.0021 
(0.0080) 
-0.0150 
(0.0168) 
-0.0101 
(0.0177) 
-0.0150 
(0.0140) 
-0.0101 
(0.0153) 
-0.0037 
(0.0270) 
-0.0092 
(0.0289) 
-0.0037 
(0.0121) 
-0.0092 
(0.0122) 
Price 
Volatility 
-1.3888*** 
(0.3925) 
-1.4007*** 
(0.4043) 
-1.3888*** 
(0.3949) 
-1.4007*** 
(0.4058) 
-1.8056* 
(1.0780) 
-1.7796* 
(1.0775) 
-1.8056 
(1.4335) 
-1.7796 
(1.3943) 
-3.0258** 
(1.3987) 
-3.0049** 
(1.4911) 
-3.0258** 
(1.4406) 
-3.0049** 
(1.4813) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.2371* 
(0.1303) 
-0.2666 
(0.1715) 
-0.2371* 
(0.1248) 
-0.2666 
(0.1778) 
-0.2230 
(0.1909) 
-0.0480 
(0.2854) 
-0.2230 
(0.1951) 
-0.0480 
(0.2849) 
-0.0864 
(0.5697) 
-0.1218 
(0.6132) 
-0.0864 
(0.4127) 
-0.1218 
(0.4260) 
constant 11.7549*** 
(0.6653) 
12.0873*** 
(0.6978) 
11.7549*** 
(0.5913) 
12.0873*** 
(0.6555) 
12.3514*** 
(1.2260) 
12.8229*** 
(1.2659) 
12.3514*** 
(1.1315) 
12.8229*** 
(1.1054) 
15.8702*** 
(2.9969) 
16.2540*** 
(3.0894) 
15.8702*** 
(1.2304) 
16.2540*** 
(1.2218) 
Adjusted-R2 80.23% 80.18% 80.23% 80.18% 83.60% 83.82% 83.60% 83.82% 83.82% 83.54% 83.82% 83.54% 
 
S.E. 0.3000 0.3030 0.3000 0.3030 0.2641 0.2641 0.2641 0.2641 0.2704 0.2769 0.2704 0.2769 
N 211 210 211 210 182 179 182 179 202 196 202 196 
T 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-20: Dependent variable is ln(CEO Cash Compensation) 
 Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2008-2009 
ln(sales) 0.1013** 
(0.0405) 
0.0897** 
(0.0438) 
0.1013*** 
(0.0359) 
0.0897** 
(0.0396) 
0.0812 
(0.0735) 
0.0368 
(0.0781) 
0.812* 
(0.0497) 
0.0368 
(0.0480) 
-0.1011 
(0.2682) 
-0.1225 
(0.2794) 
-0.1011 
(0.1293) 
-0.1225 
(0.1305) 
ROA 0.0044*** 
(0.0017) 
 0.0044** 
(0.0018) 
 0.0023 
(0.0040) 
 0.0023 
(0.0062) 
 0.0052 
(0.0056) 
 0.0052 
(0.0032) 
 
Return  
 
0.0341** 
(0.0142) 
 0.0341** 
(0.0142) 
 0.0471 
(0.0356) 
 0.0471 
(0.0449) 
 0.0547 
(0.0424) 
 0.0547** 
(0.0242) 
Board size -0.0095 
(0.0073) 
-0.0102 
(0.0077) 
-0.0095 
(0.0066) 
-0.0102 
(0.0070) 
-0.0329** 
(0.0153) 
-0.0344** 
(0.0162) 
-0.0329** 
(0.0130) 
-0.0344** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0131 
(0.0308) 
-0.0212 
(0.0338) 
-0.0131 
(0.0130) 
-0.0212* 
(0.0125) 
Price 
Volatility 
-1.3997*** 
(0.3448) 
-1.5189*** 
(0.3547) 
-1.3997*** 
(0.3482) 
-1.5189*** 
(0.3589) 
-2.4628** 
(0.9901) 
-2.6450*** 
(0.9855) 
-2.4628** 
(1.2050) 
-2.6450** 
(1.1694) 
-1.5200 
(1.9852) 
-1.7776 
(2.1352) 
-1.5200 
(1.2251) 
-1.7776 
(1.2929) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.0885 
(0.1055) 
-0.0954 
(0.1453) 
-0.0885 
(0.1110) 
-0.0954 
(0.1504) 
-0.1458 
(0.1692) 
0.0167 
(0.2630) 
-0.1458 
(0.1564) 
0.1667 
(0.2463) 
0.0461 
(0.6249) 
-0.0297 
(0.7026) 
0.0461 
(0.4619) 
-0.0297 
(0.4412) 
constant 12.8168*** 
(0.5749) 
13.0543*** 
(0.6034) 
12.8168*** 
(0.5058) 
13.0543*** 
(0.5453) 
13.6334*** 
(1.0923) 
14.2191*** 
(1.5231) 
13.6334*** 
(0.8499) 
14.2191*** 
(0.8121) 
15.7448*** 
(3.8147) 
16.3008*** 
(3.9971) 
15.7448*** 
(1.8254) 
16.3008*** 
(1.8739) 
Adjusted-R2 85.21% 85.17% 85.21% 85.17% 85.94% 86.37% 85.94% 86.37% 80.00% 79.38% 80.00% 79.38% 
S.E. 0.2284 0.2307 0.2284 0.2307 0.2194 0.2174 0.2194 0.2174 0.2589 0.2666 0.2589 0.2666 
N 200 199 200 199 171 169 171 169 171 165 171 165 
T 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-21: Dependent variable is ln(Highest Paid Director) 
 Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2008-2009 
ln(sales) 0.1678*** 
(0.0482) 
0.1615*** 
(0.0517) 
0.1678*** 
(0.0434) 
0.1615*** 
(0.0481) 
0.1209 
(0.0871) 
0.0865 
(0.0914) 
0.1209** 
(0.0575) 
0.0865 
(0.0605) 
-0.1959 
(0.2587) 
-0.2255 
(0.2633) 
-0.1959 
(0.1701) 
-0.2255 
(0.1675) 
ROA 0.0083*** 
(0.0016) 
 0.0083*** 
(0.0014) 
 0.0050 
(0.0040) 
 0.0050 
(0.0042) 
 0.0081 
(0.0051) 
 0.0081** 
(0.0032) 
 
Return  0.0668*** 
(0.0146) 
 0.0668*** 
(0.0131) 
 0.0669* 
(0.0342) 
 0.0669** 
(0.0299) 
 0.0843** 
(0.0399) 
 0.0843*** 
(0.0230) 
Board size 0.0124 
(0.0088) 
0.0124 
(0.0092) 
0.0124 
(0.0078) 
0.0124 
(0.0082) 
0.0356** 
(0.0169) 
0.0371** 
(0.0175) 
0.0356** 
(0.0140) 
0.0371** 
(0.0150) 
-0.0227 
(0.0280) 
-0.0303 
(0.0295) 
-0.0227 
(0.0200) 
-0.0303 
(0.0202) 
Price 
Volatility 
-0.9741** 
(0.3941) 
-0.9714** 
(0.4088) 
-0.9741*** 
(0.3622) 
-0.9714*** 
(0.3743) 
0.0921 
(1.0536) 
0.0715 
(1.0532) 
0.0921 
(1.0566) 
0.0715 
(1.0315) 
-1.3807 
(1.4675) 
-1.2568 
(1.5513) 
-1.3807 
(1.5509) 
-1.2568 
(1.5890) 
Financial 
Leverage 
-0.1152 
(0.1289) 
-0.2216 
(0.1678) 
-0.1152 
(0.1075) 
-0.2216 
(0.1484) 
-0.2788 
(0.2010) 
-0.2955 
(0.2941) 
-0.2788** 
(0.1292) 
-0.2955 
(0.1935) 
0.0609 
(0.5348) 
-0.0750 
(0.5575) 
0.0609 
(0.4208) 
-0.0750 
(0.3738) 
constant 4.7436*** 
(0.6888) 
4.9588*** 
(0.7218) 
4.7436*** 
(0.6323) 
4.9588*** 
(0.6781) 
4.8595*** 
(1.2914) 
5.3650*** 
(1.3304) 
4.8595*** 
(0.9309) 
5.3650*** 
(0.9453) 
10.3183*** 
(3.6990) 
10.9324*** 
(3.7994) 
10.3183*** 
(2.3098) 
10.9324*** 
(2.3082) 
Adjusted-R2 77.67% 77.30% 77.67% 77.30% 79.41% 79.61% 79.41% 79.61% 79.99% 79.69% 79.99% 79.69% 
S.E. 0.3092 0.3132 0.3092 0.3132 0.2913 0.2911 0.2913 0.2911 0.2811 0.2861 0.2811 0.2861 
N 209 209 209 209 190 188 190 188 194 188 194 188 
T 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-22: Dependent variable is ln(Total Board Remuneration) 
 Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2004-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D.  
2004-2006 
Fixed 
Effects  
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects  
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2008-2009 
Fixed 
Effects 
W.D. 
2008-2009 
ln(sales) 0.2041*** 
(0.0491) 
0.1947*** 
(0.0527) 
0.2041*** 
(0.0392) 
0.1947*** 
(0.0419) 
0.0771 
(0.0806) 
0.0182 
(0.0844) 
0.0771 
(0.0583) 
0.0182 
(0.0500) 
-0.0113 
(0.2224) 
-0.0616 
(0.2282) 
-0.0113 
(0.1117) 
-0.0616 
(0.1034) 
ROA 0.0057*** 
(0.0017) 
 0.0057*** 
(0.0014) 
 0.0166*** 
(0.0037) 
 0.0166*** 
(0.0039) 
 0.0017 
(0.0043) 
 0.0017 
(0.0024) 
 
Return  0.0510*** 
(0.0150) 
 0.0510*** 
(0.0121) 
 0.1437*** 
(0.0317) 
 0.1437*** 
(0.0294) 
 0.0416 
(0.0342) 
 0.0416** 
(0.0193) 
Board size 0.0481*** 
(0.0089) 
0.0468*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0481*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0468*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0392** 
(0.0152) 
0.0399** 
(0.0158) 
0.0392*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0399*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0011 
(0.0239) 
-0.0085 
(0.0254) 
-0.0011 
(0.0159) 
-0.0085 
(0.0161) 
Price 
Volatility 
-0.7343* 
(0.4009) 
-0.7095* 
(0.4160) 
-0.7343* 
(0.4177) 
-0.7095 
(0.4363) 
-0.0221 
(0.9393) 
0.4105 
(0.9369) 
-0.0221 
(0.7471) 
0.4105 
(0.7377) 
-2.2413* 
(1.2653) 
-2.0767 
(1.3467) 
-2.2413 
(1.4396) 
-2.0767 
(1.4707) 
Financial 
Leverage 
0.1277 
(0.1326) 
0.0862 
(0.1728) 
0.1277 
(0.1159) 
0.0862 
(0.1504) 
-0.1724 
(0.1856) 
-0.0410 
(0.2707) 
-0.1724 
(0.1414) 
-0.0410 
(0.1876) 
0.7127 
(0.4632) 
0.7607 
(0.4891) 
0.7127** 
(0.3559) 
0.7607** 
(0.3419) 
constant 4.7231*** 
(0.6983) 
4.9382*** 
(0.7330) 
4.7231*** 
(0.5625) 
4.9382*** 
(0.5854) 
6.4215*** 
(1.1966) 
7.1503*** 
(1.2294) 
6.4215*** 
(0.9111) 
7.1503*** 
(0.8194) 
8.4131*** 
(3.1853) 
9.1616*** 
(3.2971) 
8.4131*** 
(1.4297) 
9.1616*** 
(1.3380) 
Adjusted-R2 79.11% 78.82% 79.11% 78.82% 84.85% 85.12% 84.85% 85.12% 86.87% 86.47% 86.87% 86.47% 
S.E. 0.3190 0.3235 0.3190 0.3235 0.2711 0.2702 0.2711 0.2702 0.2452 0.2513 0.2452 0.2513 
N 209 209 209 209 190 188 190 188 199 193 199 193 
T 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5-23: Regression of performance on compensation 
 Panel A: Dependent Variable: ROA Panel B: Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q 
ln(CEO cash 
compensation) 
3.2952*** 
(0.9071) 
   0.0808 
(0.0780) 
   
ln(total CEO 
compensation) 
 3.7128*** 
(0.5652) 
 
 
  
 
0.0678** 
(0.0335) 
 
 
 
ln(highest paid director)   
 
4.7088*** 
(0.6936) 
   0.0815** 
(0.0356) 
 
ln(total board 
remuneration) 
   
 
3.1687*** 
(0.7073) 
  
 
 0.0774* 
(0.0419) 
Board size -0.1836 
(0.1707) 
-0.2634 
(0.1953) 
-0.3861* 
(0.2165) 
-0.5183** 
(0.2277) 
0.0064 
(0.0097) 
0.0044 
(0.0069) 
0.0099* 
(0.0057) 
0.0031 
(0.0061) 
ln(sales) 
 
 
 
 
 
  -0.3378*** 
(0.0742) 
-0.2555*** 
(0.0657) 
-0.2759*** 
(0.0779) 
-0.2783*** 
(0.0761) 
ln(total assets) -3.2430*** 
(0.9403) 
-2.2047** 
(1.0607) 
-1.5173 
(1.3650) 
-1.0419 
(1.4677) 
    
Price Volatility -29.3405*** 
(8.8152) 
-48.4134*** 
(8.7473) 
-54.8823*** 
(12.0128) 
-56.6389*** 
(12.5530) 
-1.2209** 
(0.5785) 
-1.1408** 
(0.5615) 
-1.1720** 
(0.5305) 
-1.2227** 
(0.5315) 
Financial Leverage -5.2706* 
(2.9805) 
-7.6386** 
(3.5783) 
-11.8540** 
(5.0484) 
-13.1331** 
(5.0934) 
0.8369*** 
(0.2657) 
0.8840*** 
(0.2575) 
0.7369*** 
(0.2194) 
0.7157*** 
(0.2198) 
constant 24.5601 
(18.6599) 
10.7564 
(15.6409) 
25.1852 
(19.2117) 
28.3650 
(20.6102) 
5.0627*** 
(1.5397) 
4.0508*** 
(1.0241) 
4.7147*** 
(1.0895) 
4.7980*** 
(1.0794) 
Adjusted-R2 56.60% 57.53% 56.41% 55.95% 75.04% 76.44% 78.215 78.41% 
S.E.  5.8738 6.4796 7.1065 7.1849 0.4215 0.4255 0.3986 0.3965 
N 202 213 210 210 200 211 209 209 
T 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5-24: Bootstrapping results with replications of 1000 times 
Dependent 
Variable 
Estimated relationship 
with ROA 
Lower Bound 
95% 
Upper Bound 
95% 
In/Out Bias-corrected Lower 
Bound 95% 
Bias-corrected Upper 
Bound 95% 
In/Out 
lntc 0.0079 0.00120 0.01259 In 0.00206 0.01384 In 
lncash 0.0039 -0.00264 0.00878 In -0.00147 0.01047 In 
lnphd 0.0072 0.00188 0.00971 In 0.00216 0.00987 In 
lndremu 0.0040 0.00092 0.00785 In 0.00150 0.00848 In 
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Table 5-25: Bootstrapping results with replications of 1000 times 
Panel A: Dependent variable: ROA 
Compensation Estimated 
Coefficient 
Lower Bound 
95% 
Upper Bound 
95% 
In/Out Bias-corrected Lower Bound 
95% 
Bias-corrected Upper Bound 
95% 
In/Out 
lntc 3.7128 1.49220 4.94221 In 1.57283 5.07194 In 
lncash 3.2952 0.34309 5.42552 In 0.36933 5.39376 In 
lnphd 4.7088 1.62637 6.31914 In 1.97921 6.75858 In 
lndremu 3.1687 1.03830 4.65868 In 1.07177 4.73862 In 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
Compensation Estimated 
Coefficient 
Lower Bound 
95% 
Upper Bound 
95% 
In/Out Bias-corrected Lower Bound 
95% 
Bias-corrected Upper Bound 
95% 
In/Out 
lntc 0.0678 -0.05839 0.15499 In -0.05226 0.16293 In 
lncash 0.0808 -0.21158 0.17980 In -0.23442 0.16269 In 
lnphd 0.0815 -0.03687 0.14932 In -0.03689 0.15385 In 
lndremu 0.0774 0.00544 0.16145 In 0.00896 0.16432 In 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
 
This study concentrates on exchange rates, the term structure of interest rates, as well 
as security risk and corporate finance on executive compensation. In the exchange 
market the forward rate biasedness and forward premium puzzle are considered as 
two of the most important anomalies. It has been suggested that these puzzles could 
be solved by using better econometric and statistical procedures. Maynard (2003) 
further argues that the negative coefficient in the forward premium regression cannot 
be fully explained using the time series characteristics of variables. Thus, this study 
applies improved econometric methodologies and incorporates panel data 
constructions into the empirical investigation.  
 
The forward-spot relation is examined through regressions in both levels and returns 
using information from thirty-one developed and emerging economies. The empirical 
results from regressions in levels demonstrate a robust cointegrating relation, which 
indicates a solid long-run relationship between the forward and corresponding future 
spot exchange rates. This robustness is confirmed through different cointegration tests, 
and by using data in both weekly and daily frequencies. Moreover, the forward rate 
unbiasedness hypothesis of zero intercept and slope of unity in the regression of the 
logarithm of the spot rate on the forward rate could not be rejected for most developed 
and emerging markets with daily data over the last two decades. Meanwhile, the 
previous empirical research regarding the forward premium anomaly is based on 
evidence which is mainly obtained from developed economies. This study adds 
evidence to the empirical literature to show that the forward premium puzzle might 
not be a pervasive phenomenon by using information from twenty emerging 
economies. Furthermore, a more strong and significant link is obtained between 
currency depreciation and the forward premium using ARCH/GARCH models to 
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capture the volatility clustering, although they are not able to solve this puzzle. The 
regressions of the changes of the spot rate on the forward premium are also well 
estimated under panel construction in order to provide a complete picture. The slope 
coefficient estimates from rolling regressions using shorter samples are widely 
dispersed, especially for the developed economies, and some of them are positive and 
significantly greater than one. 
 
This study also investigates the relationship between the exchange rate and the term 
structure of interest rates by regressing the log of real exchange rate on the 
three-month interest rate differential and normalised one-month interest rate 
differential, especially for emerging economies. Both CCR and DOLS methodologies 
are applied in the analysis under both time series and panel construction. The 
empirical results of this analysis suggest that the term structure of interest rates plays 
an important role in determining exchange rate. Negative slope coefficient estimates 
are found for the long-term interest rate differentials for most emerging economies 
and they are found to be statistically significant. This result is consistent with the 
previous literature. However, the theoretical model of the exchange rate and the term 
structure of interest rates suggest that there is a complicated relationship between the 
short-term interest rate and the exchange rate. Empirically, a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimate is obtained for South Africa and the Philippines. 
According to the theoretical model, this indicates that the indirect complementarity 
between the domestic short-term bonds and foreign bonds dominates the direct 
substitutability. In addition, negative and significant slope coefficients are obtained 
under panel construction for emerging countries for both short-term and long-term 
interest rate differentials. Since solid relationships are identified between the real 
exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates, one possible way for the 
monetary authorities to manage their foreign exchange markets could be through the 
adjustments of interest rate policies. In addition, the structural breaks are taken into 
account since the exchange rate regime of most emerging economies has been 
changing during the sample period. These results support the parameter stability when 
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regressing the real exchange rate on the three-month real interest rate differential and 
normalised one-month interest rate differential. This implies that this cointegrating 
relationship between the exchange rate and the term structure of interest rates is stable 
despite the changes in the exchange regimes for the emerging market. 
 
The term structure of interest rates also has a strong forecasting power in the stock 
and bond markets. There is an empirical stylised fact that the time variation in the 
expected excess returns of the long-term bonds is persistent and positively related to 
the time variation in the yield spread. Viceira (2007) pushes this point further and 
argues that the time variation in bond risk is also positively related to the changes in 
the yield spread for the U.S. economy. This study provides additional empirical 
evidence that the time variation in bond risk (measured as realised covariance of bond 
returns with stock returns, bond CAPM beta, and bond return volatility) is statistically 
significant and positively related with the movement in the yield spread for most 
economies in G7 over the period January 1991 to April 2011.  
 
In addition to the yield spread, the short-term nominal interest rate also plays an 
important role in forecasting the bond risk, which is measured as the second moments 
of the bond returns. Furthermore, this chapter provides strong evidence that the 
short-term interest rate has a significant effect on the time variation in bond and stock 
risks under a panel construction which treats the G7 as a whole economy. Meanwhile, 
the yield spread is also a statistically significant determinant in forecasting the time 
variation in the second moments of bond returns. The empirical results imply that the 
interest rate policy may be important in reducing market volatility. Additionally, this 
chapter also examines the effects of the recent financial crisis, which erupted in 
mid-2007, on the relationship between the time variation in security risk and the time 
variation in the term structure of interest rates in order to consider the stability 
throughout the sample period. The empirical results indicate that this relationship has 
significantly changed due to the economic crisis.  
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Lastly, this chapter studies the relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
corporate performance, which is another interesting topic that has attracted 
considerable public and academic attention. According to agency theory this problem 
arises from the conflicts of interest existing between shareholders and executives. In 
order to understand how firms determine the remuneration packages to attract, 
motivate, and monitor top managers, especially executive directors, this study 
empirically explores the link between the directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance by using a panel data set of companies taken from FTSE 350 Index over 
the period 2004 to 2009. The result of this analysis adds to our understanding of this 
problem and it provides evidence in addition to that provided by the previous 
literature. 
 
In contrast to the previous studies which have analysed either CEO compensation 
packages or remuneration for highest paid directors, this study introduces dynamic 
compensation models and evaluates the remuneration packages for the CEO, the 
highest paid director, and the total board. The empirical results suggest that there is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between corporate performance and 
the directors’ pay for: the CEO’s cash compensation, the CEO’s total compensation, 
and for the remuneration for the highest paid director and the total board. The 
estimation results for the first order difference specification are consistent with those 
of the level equation estimation. In addition, these results show that larger firms pay 
their directors relatively higher remuneration, which confirms the intuition that larger 
firms need higher quality directors, especially more talented executive directors, and 
are willing to offer higher compensation to attract them. Moreover, two subsamples 
(i.e. 2004 to 2006 and 2008 to 2009) are estimated separately in order to evaluate the 
impact of the recent financial crisis on the relationship between the directors’ pay and 
firm performance. This is an interesting point to analyse because large firms have 
faced sharp decrease in their returns without similar changes taking places in their 
executives’ remuneration packages. The empirical results suggest that the link 
between pay and performance has been broken due to the crisis. Additionally, firms in 
262 
 
different industries are observed to behave differently in the pay-performance 
relationship, the strongest link between pay and performance could be found in those 
firms from financial industry.  
 
On the other hand, a positive and significant influence of directors’ pay on firm 
performance is also confirmed and this result is consistent with the previous literature. 
This result demonstrates the importance of decision making in setting the directors’ 
compensation packages. Lastly, the results from bootstrapping procedures indicate 
that this positive and significant relationship between the directors’ remuneration and 
corporate performance is robust through both directions.  
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